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It is a familiar tenet that desires and beliefs have opposite directions of fit. Our 
beliefs, according to this view, should be changed to fit the world – if necessary – 
because they are for saying how things are. Our desires give us reasons to change 
the world, because they are for saying what to do, or how things should be. I argue 
that like beliefs, desires have only the mind-to-world direction of fit. 
In arguing for this conclusion, I present new accounts of both desire and direction 
of fit. Desires are inputs to the goal-directed system – a system for behavioural 
control studied in psychology and neuroscience – with the function of tracking the 
reward values of outcomes. In the goal-directed system these states are combined 
with further states representing contingencies between actions and outcomes, in 
order to select the actions which offer greatest reward. According to this account, 
desires come in occurrent and standing forms, are likely to have a wide range of 
outcomes as their objects, and interact with habits, emotions and intentions in 
familiar ways. 
My account of direction of fit uses a teleosemantic framework. Teleosemantics is 
a family of theories of representation that aim to identify the characteristic functions 
of representations and the systems in which they operate, and focus on 
representation as a biological phenomenon. It is particularly suited to thinking about 
direction of fit, because representations have their directions of fit in virtue of what 
they are for – that is, their functions. I claim that representations have the mind-to-
world direction of fit when the systems that produce them have the function of doing 
so under specific conditions, and the world-to-mind direction of fit when the 
systems that consume them have the function of behaving in specific ways, 
whenever the representations occur. Desires do not have the world-to-mind direction 
of fit, because what the goal-directed system should do when any given desire is 
occurrent also depends on what other desires are occurrent at the time, and on the 
agent’s beliefs. 
It does not follow that we have no reason to try to make the world fit our desires; 
instead, this conclusion shows that the place of desires in rational motivation is less 
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Our desires are among the most powerful influences on what we do and what we 
care about. Desires control our lives from moment to moment – at least in those 
moments when we have the opportunity to make choices – but they also shape our 
projects, careers, homes and relationships. We cannot hope to understand human 
motivation without understanding desire. 
Meanwhile, one of the central questions of philosophy is how some objects and 
events can represent, or be about, other things. In particular, the nature of 
representation is a foundational problem in philosophy of mind, since we 
continually appeal to the representational properties of mental states when giving 
everyday explanations of our behaviour and experiences, and when giving 
philosophical accounts of conscious experience, perception, motivation, and much 
else besides. 
This thesis aims to say what kind of representation is involved in desire. More 
specifically, the question I address is: what is the direction of fit of desire? My 
answer is that desires have only the mind-to-world direction of fit. In this 
introduction, I give initial characterisations of desire and direction of fit, explain 
why I think this is a good question, and outline my strategy for answering it. 
 
Both ‘desire’ and ‘direction of fit’ are technical terms in philosophy, although 
there are no widely-agreed definitions for them. Desires are mental states that 
interact with beliefs in motivating us to act. Paradigmatically, we are motivated to 
act when we believe that doing so is likely to lead to or promote the satisfaction of 
one or more of our desires. To fill out that idea a bit more, ‘satisfying a desire’ is 
taken to mean that the agent gets what they desire, not that they feel satisfaction on 
getting it. The objects of desire are states of affairs, often called ‘outcomes’, and 
desiring some outcome means wanting it to be the case. So when we are motivated 
by our desires, we paradigmatically believe that by acting we can make it more 
likely that one or more of the states of affairs that we desire will be the case. 
Philosophers typically think of each of us as having many desires, for a wide 
range of different things – more or less all of those things we would ordinarily be 
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said to want. For instance, I presently desire to drink some water, and to climb the 
Biancograt on Piz Bernina in the Swiss Alps, and for the civil war in Syria to end 
soon. Outside philosophy, it is common to attribute to people desires for things 
which are not states of affairs – we might say that I desire water, or that I desire the 
summit. But an assumption of this thesis will be that strictly speaking there are no 
such desires (for an argument for this view, see Sinhababu 2015). To say that I 
desire water is either false, or means that I desire to drink or to have some water. 
As well as explaining motivation and action, desires can also explain why we feel 
pleased or disappointed, and why some thoughts and objects capture our attention. 
For example, I am disposed to be pleased when I hear of success for my old rowing 
club, and to wonder sometimes about how they are doing, because I desire that they 
succeed. These points suggest that we have standing desires, which persist over long 
periods, because I am disposed to be pleased when I hear that my old club has won 
even if they are far from my thoughts at the time; but it also seems that for relatively 
short periods our desires can become occurrent. This would explain why I am 
sometimes very strongly motivated to eat chocolate ice-cream, and yet most of the 
time I make no effort to get it. The idea would be that my desire for chocolate ice-
cream is a long-standing feature of my personality, but that it only motivates me 
when something about my circumstances causes it to temporarily take a different 
form, by becoming occurrent. 
Moving on to the subject of direction of fit, it is intuitive that two important 
categories of representation are those that aim to say how things are, and those that 
tell some consumer of the representation what to do. Many representations can be 
characterised by saying which of these two kinds they belong to, and giving the 
proposition or state of affairs which they say is the case or is to be brought about. 
Some examples will help to illustrate the point. The assertions ‘Grass is green’ and 
‘Snow is white’ both aim to say how things are, but obviously differ in how they say 
things are. In contrast, the assertion ‘The door is shut’ and the command ‘Shut the 
door!’ are of different kinds, but both stand in special representational relationships 
to the state of affairs of the door’s being shut; the assertion says that this is the case, 
while the command instructs an intended hearer to make it the case. These two 
sentences have the same content, but different directions of fit. 
Direction of fit exists beyond language, however. For example, two identical 
scale drawings may have different directions of fit if one is intended to show what 
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an existing house looks like, while the other is a plan to be followed in building a 
new house. Sometimes one representation has both directions of fit; a single drawing 
could be at the same time an illustration of an existing house, and a specification for 
a new one. 
Why is this property of representations called ‘direction of fit’? First, note that 
when two things are supposed to fit one another, sometimes the ‘responsibility’ for 
achieving the fit lies solely or primarily with one of the two. We often look for shoes 
that fit our feet, and when doing this we take a failure to fit to be a fault in the shoe. 
But in the Cinderella story, the Prince looks for a foot to fit the lost shoe. In both 
cases, success would be feet and shoes fitting one another, but they differ in whether 
the shoe or the foot should be changed to achieve this. Returning to representation, 
both of the two scale drawings – the survey and the plan – are supposed to ‘fit’ the 
world. They both succeed if the house concerned is (or ends up) the way they show. 
But the direction of fit is different, because if the survey and the real house do not fit 
one another then the survey should be changed, but if the plan and the house do not 
fit then the house should be changed. In the terminology which is most common in 
philosophy, the survey has the mind-to-world direction of fit, because the 
representation (in this case not a mental one) is supposed to fit the world, while the 
plan has the world-to-mind direction of fit. 
In this context, a common thought is that beliefs have the mind-to-world direction 
of fit, while desires have the world-to-mind direction of fit. On that view, my desire 
to eat ice-cream would be a representation with the world-to-mind direction of fit 
with respect to the state of affairs that I am eating ice-cream. My desire would tell 
me, or some part of me, to make it the case that I am eating ice-cream. The 
conclusion that I am going to argue for is that this is wrong. On my view, desires do 
not have the world-to-mind direction of fit, but do have the mind-to-world direction 
of fit. To this extent, desires are like beliefs or assertions. My desire to eat ice-cream 
has the mind-to-world direction of fit with respect to a state of affairs of roughly the 
form My eating ice-cream is good for me to degree x. 
 
One reason to doubt that desires have only the world-to-mind direction of fit, and 
hence one motivation for my project, is that it matters to our well-being not only that 
our desires are satisfied, but also that we desire the right things. Other things being 
equal, a person’s life will go much better if they have a strong desire to eat fresh 
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fruit and little desire to smoke crack cocaine than vice versa. From a biological point 
of view, it would be strange if the job of desires was anything other than to keep 
track of, and to direct our motivation towards, outcomes that it would be 
biologically beneficial for us to bring about. In particular, it would be bizarre if we 
had an unconstrained capacity to generate desires spontaneously, which then played 
a major role in determining how we act. These points suggest that norms of some 
kind apply to the circumstances in which particular desires should be produced, as 
well as to what we should do given our desires. In turn, this suggests that desires 
may have the mind-to-world direction of fit. 
In addition to this, having any given desire at a time does not determine what we 
subjectively ought to do, because this also depends on our beliefs about the actions 
available to us and their likely consequences, and on the other desires we have at the 
time. So it is not obvious that desires do tell us what to do; this point suggests they 
may lack the world-to-mind direction of fit. These arguments are nothing like 
sufficient to support my conclusion, but they do suggest that working out the 
direction of fit of desire is a difficult enough issue to be worthy of detailed 
investigation. 
Detailed investigation of the direction of fit of desire is also worthwhile because 
direction of fit itself is a somewhat neglected subject. Given that many 
representations, apparently including beliefs and desires, assertions and commands, 
may be characterised by their direction of fit and their content, direction of fit might 
be a natural target for philosophers of mind working towards naturalistic general 
theories of representation. But in fact the leading philosophers working on this 
project in the 1980s and 1990s were mostly preoccupied with the problem of 
content, and to some extent with distinguishing representations from non-
representations. Ruth Millikan’s teleosemantics (1984, 2004) is an exception to this, 
in that she gives explicit conditions for what she calls indicative and imperative 
content, and in my view she succeeded in developing a very attractive framework 
for theorising about direction of fit. However, it has been alleged that Millikan’s 
account implies that all representations have both directions of fit (Artiga 2013). The 
topic of direction of fit is more familiar from meta-ethics, since the directions of fit 
of desire and belief are appealed to in a famous argument by Michael Smith (1987). 
But the discussion in this area has largely been confined to desire and belief, despite 
the evidence that many other kinds of representations also have directions of fit. 
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Although my ultimate aim is to determine the direction of fit of desire, I will defend 
a more general account of direction of fit than those offered in the meta-ethical 
context. 
Smith’s argument also shows one way in which the direction of fit of desire 
matters. Smith relies on the premise that desire and belief have different directions 
of fit in arguing for the Humean Theory of Motivation, which is the claim that being 
motivated by reasons requires the presence of a desire that one believes the action in 
question will help to satisfy. The Humean Theory of Motivation implies that beliefs 
alone are not capable of motivating actions taken for reasons, even if they include 
beliefs about what would be right, or what one has most reason to do. This is a 
remarkable conclusion in its own right, but it further implies that if moral judgments 
(or other normative judgments) are intrinsically motivating, then those judgments 
cannot be beliefs. In turn, this conclusion is thought to undermine moral realism. So 
if Smith’s argument is the best available for the Humean Theory of Motivation (as 
Shafer-Landau 2003 claims), then the potential consequences of my view extend to 
the most fundamental meta-ethical and meta-normative issues. 
Finally, my topic is timely because a substantial body of empirical evidence 
concerning the mechanisms of action-selection is now available, and there is 
sufficient scientific consensus to allow initial conclusions to be drawn about desires 
and the processes surrounding them. Empirical discoveries about how the human 
mind actually works can often throw new light on topics of philosophical interest, 
such as consciousness, perception, action, motivation, rationality, and mental 
representation. Further to this, the prospects of many philosophical theories about 
such phenomena seem to be contingent on facts that can only be adequately 
confirmed or denied by science, because we assume that these phenomena exist in 
humans. For instance, a theory proposing that consciousness requires a certain 
functional process will be plausible only if the brain (or perhaps the body as a 
whole) performs that process. Similar things could be said about theories of both 
practical and theoretical rational inference, although we are prepared to accept that 
humans fall some way short of ideal rationality. So a promising methodology for 
philosophy of mind in cases in which the relevant science is available and some 
philosophical theorising has already been attempted is to investigate how well the 
science and the philosophy fit with one another, and adjust the philosophy (and 
conceivably argue for new science) accordingly. 
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Many philosophers studying consciousness and perception have been following 
something like this method for some time, and it has certainly been advocated in 
other fields, such as by the naturalized epistemology movement. But in the study of 
action and motivation it is relatively new. Tim Schroeder’s work to develop a 
neuroscientifically-informed account of desire, and to draw out its philosophical 
consequences (T. Schroeder 2004, Arpaly & Schroeder 2014), seems to me to be 
extremely important for this reason, and has been an inspiration for this thesis. The 
neuroscience of desire is also becoming known among philosophers studying 
addiction (see e.g. the papers in Levy 2014). There is a valuable opportunity at 
present for more philosophers to learn about this science and to debate its 
implications. 
 
In order to reach my conclusion, which is that desires have only the mind-to-
world direction of fit, I will argue for the following five premises: 
 
I. Desires are outcome values. 
II. The goal-directed control system works by promoting the performance of the 
action that has the greatest expected reward value, based on outcome values and 
representations of action-outcome relationships. 
III. Outcome values are inputs to the goal-directed control system, which are 
produced and modified by a system which is to some extent responsive to 
evidence for the reward values of outcomes, and it is normal for more than one 
outcome value to act as an input to the goal-directed control system at any one 
time. 
IV. Biological representations with consumers that have discretion have only the 
mind-to-world direction of fit. 
V. It follows from I-III that desires are biological representations with consumers 
that have discretion. 
 
I will argue for premises I-III in part I of this thesis, which focuses on what desires 
are and how they contribute to motivation and action. Then in part II, which focuses 
on direction of fit, I will argue for premises IV and V. Parts I and II make up the 
bulk of the thesis, but since its relationship to the Humean Theory of Motivation is 
one of the main reasons why the direction of fit of desire is of interest, I also discuss 
 11 
the implications of my argument and conclusion for this theory. This is the topic of 
Part III. 
Part I is made up of chapters 1-5, and my case for premise I spans all five of these 
chapters. This is because I aim to show what desires are by identifying a natural kind 
of psychological state that has many of the most important properties that are 
commonly associated with desire. States belonging to this natural kind are 
sometimes called ‘outcome values’. So almost all of my discussion of what desires 
are and what they do contributes to the case for premise I. In these five chapters, I 
take on the following tasks: 
- In chapter 1, I explain what I mean by ‘desire’, and state and briefly defend 
some assumptions. I also give a more detailed outline of part I. 
- In chapter 2, I introduce the goal-directed and habitual control systems, and 
give the empirical case for their existence and distinctness from one another. 
So premise II is established primarily by the work of this chapter. I also 
present some other relevant neuroscience. 
- In chapter 3, I discuss in detail what outcome values (i.e. desires) are, how 
they contribute to the goal-directed system, and how they are formed and 
modified. Premise III is established primarily in this chapter. 
- In chapter 4, I consider how the goal-directed and habitual systems interact 
with each other and with other systems that may contribute to action-
selection, and wrap up my positive case for premises I-III. 
- Finally, in chapter 5 I present arguments against Schroeder’s (2004) theory of 
desire. This theory is an important rival to my view, since Schroeder draws on 
a similar body of empirical evidence, but reaches a different conclusion to 
me. 
In part II I argue for premises IV and V. However, a considerable amount of 
preliminary work is necessary beforehand. My theory of direction of fit (of which 
premise IV is a partial statement) uses a conceptual framework drawn from 
teleosemantics, which it is necessary for me to explain before I can present and 
defend my own view. Also, teleosemantics has been the subject of several well-
known objections, some of which would be seriously damaging to my theory if they 
succeeded, so I take the opportunity to address these objections. Part II is therefore 
structured as follows: 
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- In chapter 6, I introduce the topic of direction of fit and describe some 
advantages of the teleosemantic approach to this topic. I also give a more 
detailed outline of part II. 
- In chapter 7, I outline a version of teleosemantics, introducing several 
important technical terms, and defend it against a range of objections which 
are relevant to my project. 
- In chapter 8, I argue for a new theory of direction of fit, called the Discretion 
View. Since premise IV is a partial statement of this theory, the argument for 
premise IV comes in this chapter. 
- Finally, in chapter 9 I apply my theory of direction of fit to desires, drawing 
on the work of part I. This yields premise V, and therefore my conclusion. I 
also discuss the nature of reward, and summarise my argument of chapters 1-
9. 
Part III contains only a single chapter, chapter 10, which is concerned with the 
Humean Theory of Motivation. One way to argue against my conclusion might be to 
claim that it is inconsistent with some attractive aspect of Humeanism, so part of the 
purpose of this chapter is to respond to this possible line of objection. However, 
although I respond to several possible objections in the course of my argument, my 
main aim in this thesis is to present the positive case for my view. 
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Part I: Desire 
 
Chapter 1: Desire as a Natural Kind 
 
1.1 Introduction to Part I 
 
My aim in this and the following four chapters is to develop an account of desire 
as a natural kind, and to describe some of the psychological processes in which 
desires are involved. These include, most importantly, some of the major processes 
that contribute to determining how we act. This account will vindicate premises I-III 
of my overall argument: 
 
I. Desires are outcome values. 
II. The goal-directed control system works by promoting the performance of the 
action that has the greatest expected reward value, based on outcome values and 
representations of action-outcome relationships. 
III. Outcome values are inputs to the goal-directed control system, which are 
produced and modified by a system which is to some extent responsive to 
evidence for the reward values of outcomes, and it is normal for more than one 
outcome value to act as an input to the goal-directed control system at any one 
time. 
 
Premises II and III will be supported relatively directly by the empirical evidence I 
will present, and premise I will follow from my account, given the plausible 
assumption that if there is some natural kind that does enough of what desires are 
commonly thought to do, then what it is to be a desire is to be a member of this 
natural kind. 
My strategy will be to present a more wide-ranging and more detailed account of 
the goal-directed system and related systems than is embodied in premises II and III. 
I take the best reason to believe these two premises to be that they make important 
contributions to an attractive overall picture of action-selection, which is at the 
centre of a flourishing research programme. It will not be possible for me to give an 
exhaustive survey of this research, but I hope to show how the main elements fit 
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together to create a compelling theory. The breadth and depth of my discussion will 
also contribute to the case for premise I, by showing the range of ways in which 
outcome values fit the functional profile that philosophers typically associate with 
desire. 
 
In chapter 2, I will present some background psychology and neuroscience which 
is necessary for understanding the neuroscience of desire. There are two main topics 
to be addressed. First, there is evidence from behavioural psychology suggesting 
that humans and many other mammals use two systems for action control, called the 
habitual and goal-directed systems. I will describe the experiments that distinguish 
these two systems, and some neuroscientific results suggesting that they are 
anatomically and functionally distinct. This part of the chapter will directly support 
premise II. Second, the basal ganglia are a group of brain structures contained in the 
cerebral hemispheres, which are centrally involved in action-selection and the 
learning processes that affect it. They are also the primary site of action of 
dopamine, a neurotransmitter which is often thought to have an intimate connection 
with desire. So I will outline the basic anatomy of the basal ganglia and explain how 
it can subserve action selection, and give an initial account of dopamine’s role. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the goal-directed system, and gives more detail about some 
of the topics introduced in chapter 2. These include the function of dopamine, and 
the relationship between desires and basic drives – drives for food and water, for 
instance. I also introduce the crucial distinction between standing and occurrent 
desires, and describe the different roles of these two kinds of states. The overall goal 
of chapter 3 is to explain how the goal-directed system works, in enough detail to 
make it plausible that there is such a system working in that way. So this chapter 
will also contribute to premise II, and will form the main part of my case for premise 
III. 
In chapter 4, I take a broader view of action-selection, asking how the habitual 
and goal-directed systems might co-operate or compete with one another, and what 
other systems there are that contribute to determining how we act. I also review 
premises I-III, and describe how each is supported by the work of chapters 1-4. 
Finally, in chapter 5 I address an important concern about my account of desire. 
Tim Schroeder (2004, Arpaly & Schroeder 2014) has used a similar body of 
scientific theory and evidence to me in developing his theory of desire, and like me 
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he aimed to find a natural kind to identify as desire. Yet Schroeder’s theory is not 
the same as mine – he not only gives a characterisation of desire that I dispute, but 
the theories are not even co-extensive. So I explain why my account is preferable. 
 
In this chapter, my concern is with philosophical preliminaries to the project of 
this part of the thesis. I first describe what I mean by ‘desire’, then state and defend 
some assumptions, and explain why the lengthy discussion of empirical questions 
that forms much of the rest of part I is worthwhile in the pursuit of philosophical 
aims. 
 
1.2 Clarifying ‘Desire’ 
 
The word ‘desire’ is understood in a number of different ways both by 
philosophers, and in ordinary English. It is also relatively rare outside philosophy 
for the word ‘desire’ to be used in the attribution of intentional attitudes; we more 
commonly use verbs such as ‘want’, ‘like’, ‘hope’, ‘wish’ or ‘prefer’, instead.1 But 
‘want’, by far the most common of these, is itself either polysemous or highly 
indeterminate in meaning. So in this section I explain the sense in which I use the 
term ‘desire’, and thus specify my topic more precisely than I have done so far. 
In the sense in which I use the word ‘desire’, it refers to a particular kind of 
psychological state that motivates us to act in combination with beliefs about our 
actions, and also refers to the members of that kind. Desires in this sense are also 
thought to affect how we feel about events and states of affairs that happen to us or 
which we learn about; we are thought to experience pleasure when things turn out as 
we desire, in this sense of the term. In this sense, most of us are thought to have a 
very wide range of desires, and philosophers often think of these desires as having a 
distinctive role with respect to practical rationality. On one hand, it is typically 
thought to be rational to act on one’s desires, providing one does so in the right way, 
and certain conditions are met – and our having desires in this sense and being able 
to act on them is part of what makes us rational creatures. On the other hand, it is 
                                                
1 In the 450m-word Corpus of Contemporary American English, ‘desire’ appears much less 
frequently as a verb than any of these five – around three times less frequently than ‘prefer’, which is 
in turn much less common than the other four. ‘Desire’ is more common as a noun, however – only a 
little less so than ‘belief’.  
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also thought that the extent to which desires can be rationally criticised or justified is 
quite limited. 
This class of psychological states can be usefully compared with a range of other, 
related phenomena. 
First, philosophers sometimes distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental 
desires. According to the usual way of drawing the distinction, the things we 
intrinsically desire are those that we want for their own sake, whereas those that we 
instrumentally desire we want only as a means to some further end. We can make 
this a little more precise by taking instrumental desires to be desires that we might 
immediately lose were we to change our beliefs about how their objects relate to 
other things we desire, value or care about. Paradigmatically, one has an 
instrumental desire for A if one has that desire only because one has a further desire 
for B, and believes that A is conducive to B; and is also disposed to lose the desire 
for A immediately on learning that A is not conducive to B. Instrumental desires are 
therefore formed and lost by a wholly rational process, whereas the process by 
which intrinsic desires are formed and lost is to some extent arational. Here I am 
only concerned with intrinsic desires, and my view is that instrumental desires are 
states of a very different kind. 
Talk of instrumental desires may be closely related to the fact that we often use 
the word ‘want’ in describing what we are aiming for or hoping for on particular 
occasions. We say things like ‘I want to finish my draft today’, ‘I want to avoid 
being on the tube at rush hour’, or ‘I want Nadal to win this match, because I think 
his performance has been courageous’. In cases of this kind we seem to be 
describing either our intentions, or preferences which we have consciously adopted. 
So we are describing the outputs of choices or decisions, rather than the inputs – 
which might also be described as desires, or by talking about what we want. My 
concern here is with a class of psychological states that act as inputs to choices, and 
I will reserve the term ‘desire’ for this class. 
A further philosophical distinction is between what are sometimes called desires 
proper and pro-attitudes (Schueler 1995). This is not a distinction between two 
disjoint classes; instead, desires proper are thought to be a subset of the pro-
attitudes. Pro-attitudes also include instrumental desires, emotional urges, and 
possibly also intentions and normative and evaluative beliefs. What all of these 
kinds of states have in common is that they can motivate us to act in combination 
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with beliefs about what the likely consequences of our actions would be, or about 
other ways in which our actions would promote the objects of our pro-attitudes. The 
distinction is often used in arguing that just because a certain mental state can be 
motivating, it does not follow that it is a desire. So, for example, a philosopher 
might argue that fear is a form of desire, because fear causes actions in combination 
with instrumental beliefs. The distinction between desires proper and pro-attitudes 
could be used to rebut this simple argument. But whether this rebuttal succeeded or 
failed would depend on which sense of ‘desire’ was relevant in the context; some 
philosophers, such as Michael Smith (1987), call all pro-attitudes ‘desires’. 
My topic here is desires proper, and I take it to be an empirical question whether 
there are pro-attitudes which are not desires. But it is important to note that there 
may be no substantive difference on this point between me and a philosopher who 
uses ‘desire’ in Smith’s way. Such a philosopher could pose the same empirical 
question by asking whether there is more than one kind of desire. I touch on this 
question in chapter 4. 
Finally, desires are sometimes thought of as a kind of conscious experience. On 
this way of thinking about desire, what it is to (occurrently) desire something is to 
feel a desire for that thing. Philosophers who thought of desire in this way might 
claim that part of what characterises desires as a category of mental state is some 
distinctive phenomenal quality that they all share, and they might also suggest that 
the phenomenology of desire contributes to explaining how and why desires 
motivate us to act. But one need not be a philosopher to think of desire as a kind of 
conscious experience. We commonly use expressions such as ‘I felt a strong desire 
to…’, and in some contexts this phrase would be an equivalent substitute for ‘I 
wanted to…’. To see that we use talk of what we want both in this way, and to 
describe our intentions, note that both of the following descriptions could reasonably 
be given of a case of mild temptation: ‘I didn’t want to go back to bed, but I felt a 
strong desire to do so’; ‘I had decided not to go back to bed, but at that moment I 
really wanted to’. 
The phenomenology of desire is not part of my topic here, but that does not mean 
that desires as conscious experiences are a different kind of mental state from the 
desires I will be discussing. Conscious experiences either are, or are very closely 
linked to, instances of activity in the brain. So it is possible that we consciously 
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experience some or all of our occurrent desires (in my sense of ‘desire’), and that 
these are the very conscious states that are sometimes called ‘desires’. 
 
1.3 Assumptions and Objections 
 
I will assume that if there is some natural kind of human psychological state that 
does enough of what desires are normally thought to do, then what it is to be a desire 
is to be a member of this kind. I will further assume that the following two claims 
follow from this basic assumption: first, that if the same kind of psychological state 
also exists in other animals, then those other animals also have desires; and second, 
that if there is such a natural kind, then desires are brain states, in a sense which I 
will shortly explain. Given these assumptions, it makes sense for me to use 
empirical evidence to investigate what desires are like, especially since my main 
interest at this point is in the causal role and biological functions of desire. It is hard 
to deny that science is the most appropriate method for studying such matters. These 
assumptions entail a view of the metaphysics of desire which is similar in its 
essentials to David Lewis’s metaphysics of mind (Lewis 1980, 1994). In this 
section, I will first describe some similarities and differences between Lewis’s 
position and the approach I am adopting here, then consider two potential objections 
to these assumptions. 
 
According to Lewis, our concepts of mental states such as belief, desire and pain 
are concepts of states that occupy certain causal roles. These causal roles are 
determined by the places that the various kinds of mental states take in folk 
psychology, which Lewis takes to be a theory of the causes of behaviour. However, 
he denies that token physical states are desires (for example) if and only if they 
occupy the specific causal role that folk psychology associates with desire. Instead, 
his view is that for a token physical state to be a desire it must be a member of some 
kind, the members of which typically occupy the correct causal role. Lewis uses the 
case of pain to illustrate this point. Suppose some particular pattern of nervous 
system activity occupies the causal role associated with pain, in almost all humans; 
then even if there was some man who was disposed to behave differently from the 
rest of us in response to this kind of neural activity, Lewis’s view is that it would 
still be pain (Lewis 1980). Lewis also does not insist that a neural kind must occupy 
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the exact causal role imagined by folk psychology in order to constitute a mental 
kind, as long as the match is close enough, and no other neural kind comes closer. In 
these two fundamental respects, my basic assumption entails a view of desire which 
follows Lewis’s theory closely. 
Lewis also writes that mental state kinds may be constituted by different physical 
kinds in different populations. So human desire, for example, may not be the same 
thing as desire in robots or alien species. Assuming that we cannot share 
psychological natural kinds with robots or aliens, my assumption as it stands entails 
that robots and aliens do not have desires. To avoid this consequence, I could adopt 
Lewis’s approach, re-writing my assumption to specify that what it is to be a human, 
mammalian or animal desire is to be a member of the right natural kind. For my 
purposes here, however, the possibility of robot and alien desires is irrelevant, so I 
will leave open the choice between these two alternatives. 
My assumptions also leave open two further questions on which Lewis takes firm 
views. First, for Lewis mental states are characterised by their causal roles, whereas 
an alternative view is that it is teleological functions that matter. A state’s 
teleological function is, very roughly, how it is supposed to interact causally with 
other entities, and such functions can arise naturally in virtue of the contributions 
traits make to organisms’ survival and reproduction (see ch. 7 for more detail on this 
topic). Lycan (1987, ch. 4) argues that there are several advantages to thinking of 
mental states as characterised by teleological functions rather than causal roles, and 
Millikan (1996, 2002) argues that biological and psychological natural kinds are 
defined by their functions, rather than by causal roles or anatomy and physiology. 
So my talk of ‘what desires are normally thought to do’ could be construed either in 
terms of causal roles, or of teleological functions. I have no need to settle this issue, 
because the empirical evidence I will present identifies a natural kind that fits our 
usual way of thinking about desire very well both in what it typically does, and in its 
apparent function. 
Second, Lewis is committed to the controversial claim that mental state terms are 
nonrigid designators. Rigid designators are terms that refer to the same object in 
every possible world in which that object exists, and never to anything else; nonrigid 
designators refer to different things in different possible worlds. Lewis’s view is that 
it is possible that different neural kinds could have occupied the causal roles 
characteristic of the various mental kinds, so mental kinds such as desire could have 
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been other than as they actually are. For example, suppose that desires are instances 
of activity in cortical region X, defined by its position in the head; activity in some 
other region might have played this causal role, so as Lewis would put it, desire 
might not have been desire. Kripke (1980) argues that this consequence makes 
Lewis’s position untenable. 
Lewis’s view is that this is no objection to his theory, because there is no good 
reason to suppose that mental state terms are rigid designators. But my assumption 
does not require that I endorse Lewis’s position here. An alternative view is that 
what characterises desires as a natural kind is either their causal role, or their 
teleological function. If this is correct, the identity conditions across possible worlds 
of this natural kind might be such that it is not possible for human desire to be 
constituted by any other. In this case, ‘desire’ would be a rigid designator. And 
crucially, this view is plausible, because it is doubtful that anatomical or 
physiological specifications can capture relatively ‘high-level’ natural kinds in 
psychology, such as desire. 
The sense in which desires are brain states is therefore as follows. Provided that 
there is a psychological natural kind that does enough of what desires are normally 
thought to do, token desires are identical to token brain states. The kind desire is 
identical to a brain-state kind, but what unites this latter kind may be a shared causal 
or functional role, rather than some anatomical or physiological feature. Even if so, 
it is likely that almost all human desires share some characteristic anatomical or 
physiological properties, and it would certainly not follow that investigation of such 
properties was irrelevant to understanding desire. Desires which belong to the same 
kind in virtue of having the same object (such as desires for ice-cream) may well 
also all belong to the same causally- or functionally-individuated brain state kind, 
but it is much less likely that this kind would be of significant interest to 
neuroscience than the kind encompassing all desires. 
Finally, one aspect of Lewis’s theory which differs significantly from my 
preferred approach is the place he gives to folk psychology. According to Lewis, 
conceptual analysis reveals what sort of thing desires must be, if there are any 
desires – that is, the occupants of a certain causal role – and empirical research will 
tell us whether there are desires, and fill in some more details about what they are 
like. The conceptual analysis stage here is specifically an investigation of the 
commitments of folk psychology. I have two reservations about this approach, 
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which are that ‘desire’ is to some extent a technical term in philosophy, and that it is 
doubtful whether there is a single coherent folk-psychological concept of desire. 
These points mean that careful and detailed study of folk psychology with the aim of 
identifying a single concept of desire may be not only unproductive, but also beside 
the point. Instead, we should try to identify coherent strands within existing thought 
about desire (both folk-psychological and philosophical) and think about how these 
strands relate to each other, and can contribute to wider philosophical projects, such 
as understanding action, reasons or representation. So my reason for making my 
basic assumption is that it captures an important part of how both philosophers and 
‘the folk’ think about desire, and focusing on this part has the potential to be 
philosophically productive. 
 
I now turn to two closely-linked lines of objection to my assumptions, both of 
which are also related to the difference just described between Lewis’s approach and 
mine. 
First, Scott Sehon (2005, ch. 6) has argued against what he calls the Standard 
View: the claim that it is an implicit commitment of folk psychology that if there are 
mental states, then they are identical to brain states. His argument focuses on the 
possibility that we may be unable to identify brain states that fit the causal profiles 
associated with mental states such as beliefs and desires. In this situation, Sehon 
points out, those who stick to the Standard View must accept that there are no 
beliefs or desires. But Sehon also claims that we should be extremely reluctant to 
accept this conclusion – so much so that if there turn out to be no brain states that 
can be identified as beliefs and desires, then we should abandon the Standard View 
rather than accepting eliminativism. 
According to Sehon, this means that whether the Standard View is plausible is 
contingent on certain as-yet-unknown neuroscientific facts. Given that the Standard 
View is also supposed to be a claim about the commitments of folk psychology, he 
claims that this shows that the Standard View is highly unattractive, because the 
commitments of folk psychology cannot be contingent on such unknown facts. The 
Standard View is much like Lewis’s view, because Lewis does think that it is a 
commitment of folk psychology that mental states play characteristic causal roles. 
So Lewis must accept that if no brain states (or perhaps embodied brain states) play 
the relevant causal roles, then there are no beliefs or desires. 
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The reason this argument poses a challenge to my assumptions is that Sehon’s 
claim that we should be reluctant to accept eliminativism about beliefs and desires is 
very plausible. In particular, Sehon emphasises that belief-desire psychology is 
explanatorily valuable even if it is not reducible to neuroscience, because it is the 
primary means by which we give rationalising, rather than causal, explanations. 
Something like this view is shared by a large and diverse group of philosophers. So 
the challenge is to show how to reconcile my assumption that if there are suitable 
brain states, then those states are desires, with the attractive claim that if there are no 
such brain states, we nonetheless have desires. 
My approach can reconcile these points – unlike Lewis’s – because my 
assumptions are only partly motivated by respect for the apparent commitments of 
folk psychology. In making them I am also aiming to contribute to the development 
of the most useful possible taxonomy of mental states for a range of explanatory 
purposes. That is, I expect my assumptions to be philosophically productive; and 
what it is philosophically productive to assume about the nature of desire may well 
be contingent on future neuroscience. The natural-kind approach to desire that I 
have adopted has the potential to be very productive, as I hope to show in the course 
of this thesis (although as I describe briefly in section 10.1, it may also yield far 
more of interest than I am able to address here), provided that there is a natural kind 
of psychological state that does enough of what desires are ordinarily thought to do. 
If not, then philosophers should seek another way to think of desire, and focus their 
attention more exclusively on its rational and perhaps phenomenological aspects. 
This brings us to the second possible line of objection to my assumptions, which 
is that since I will not engage in conceptual analysis of the term ‘desire’, I risk 
changing the subject. This objection might be motivated by the thought that an 
account that purports to say what desires are must start by giving a detailed analysis 
of the concept of desire. Unless grounded in such an analysis, the account might 
have independent value, but it would not be an account of desire. 
This objection fails primarily because, as I have already emphasised, it is 
doubtful whether there is a single coherent concept of desire in folk psychology, and 
because the term ‘desire’ is used in a range of different ways by philosophers. These 
points mean that there is no wholly determinate subject to be changed. However, we 
should also not overestimate the differences between different conceptions of desire. 
There is a very widely-shared idea that desires are mental states which interact with 
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instrumental beliefs to motivate action, which also affect our moods and emotions, 
and which have a wide range of objects. So even though there is variation among 
those who think of desires in this way, theories of desire which start from this shared 
conception are likely to have broad significance. 
 
In this chapter, I have further explained what I mean by ‘desire’, and defended 
my assumption that if there is some natural kind of psychological state that does 
enough of what desires are normally thought to do, then what it is to be a desire is to 
be a member of this natural kind. In the next three chapters, I will therefore seek to 
show that there is such a natural kind, and to give a detailed account of some of the 
more philosophically-significant properties of members of this kind.  
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Chapter 2: Two Systems: Background Psychology and 
Neuroscience 
 
2.1 Two Systems for the Pursuit of Reward 
 
Much of the empirical research relevant to understanding desire is based on the 
apparent result that rats and humans use two systems for action-selection, running in 
parallel. These are the habitual and goal-directed systems. Given the way that the 
goal-directed system is thought to work, showing that these two systems exist would 
be a major step towards showing that there is a natural kind of mammalian 
psychological state that can reasonably be identified as desire, and also to 
confirming premise II of my overall argument. In the next section, 2.2, I describe 
behavioural studies which provide evidence for the existence of these two systems, 
then in section 2.3 I give a brief account of the structure and function of the basal 
ganglia, which is essential background for understanding the neuroscience of action 
selection. In section 2.4 I give an initial account of the function of dopamine, and in 
2.5 I describe neuroscientific results which provide further evidence for the 
existence and distinctness of the two systems. In this section, I introduce the two 
systems; almost all of the points mentioned in this section will be explored in more 
detail later on. 
 
According to current theories, the habitual and goal-directed systems both change 
in response to the individual’s experiences. In different ways, they both keep track 
of how good the apparent results are of the individual’s actions, and modify their 
future behaviour accordingly. They therefore contrast with reflex systems, which 
tend to produce the same action in the same circumstances, regardless of how things 
have gone in those circumstances in the past. The two systems are also both general-
purpose, in the sense that rather than being systems for helping us to get specific 
beneficial outcomes, such as food or healthy offspring, or to avoid specific threats, 
they are capable of helping us to get any of these outcomes, and to balance the 
demands made by our various needs. So they are thought of as systems for 
maximising reward, which we can think of as the ‘common currency’ by which 
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actions and outcomes are measured. The two systems are distinguished primarily by 
the kinds of information about actions and reward that they store and use. 
In the habitual control system – which I will also call simply the habit system – 
behaviour is controlled by learnt associations between stimuli and responses. Stimuli 
are features of the animal’s circumstances which they are able to perceive, and 
responses are actions. So either the patterns of behaviour generated by this system, 
or the states that are responsible for causing these patterns of behaviour, are 
sometimes known as S-R associations, acquired by S-R learning. I will usually call 
S-R associations ‘habits’. S-R learning takes place when stimuli are followed by 
responses, which in turn are followed by reinforcement signals. These are signals 
produced in the brain which vary in strength and valence according to the level of 
reward which is perceived as being provided by the environment. According to 
modern theories, reinforcement signals represent reward prediction errors; that is, 
the difference between the level of reward perceived, and that which was expected. 
Positive reinforcement signals strengthen associations between stimuli and rewards, 
and negative ones weaken them; so habits get stronger when things subsequently go 
better than expected, and weaker when things go worse than expected. In so far as 
the habit system controls our behaviour, we perform the actions that we represent as 
being most valuable in our current circumstances.2 
S-R learning is the ‘classic’ form of operant conditioning (also called 
instrumental conditioning) which was studied by psychologists working in the 
behaviourist tradition (Thorndike 1905, Hull 1943). However, unlike the 
behaviourists, modern researchers typically think of habits as representing the 
expected values of responses to stimuli. 
In contrast, the goal-directed system works by keeping track of two different 
relationships. These are the probabilistic relationships between actions and outcomes 
(which will be contingent on the circumstances), and the levels of reward that are 
associated with outcomes. In this chapter I will call the states representing these two 
relationships action-outcome contingencies and outcome values, respectively. An 
important feature of the goal-directed system is that these relationships can be learnt 
about independently, with the information being stored and recombined for later use. 
                                                
2 It’s normal in modern cognitive neuroscience to think of the habitual and goal-directed systems as 
working stochastically, meaning that they determine the probabilities of actions, rather than fixing 
absolutely which will be performed. This is an important feature of the systems, but it is not essential 
to the idea of a habit system or a goal-directed system. 
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For example, an animal might learn that eating honey is rewarding on one occasion, 
and that breaking open beehives tends to lead to getting honey on another occasion, 
then use these two pieces of information in deciding how to act on a third occasion. 
The goal-directed system is more sophisticated than the habit system (I will describe 
some of its advantages later) and also correspondingly more demanding, in that it 
requires the capacities to acquire, store and update both action-outcome 
contingencies and outcome values, and to combine them in action-selection. Under 
given circumstances, the goal-directed system is thought to calculate the expected 
values of each salient action from the agent’s representations of outcome values and 
action-outcome relationships, and then to cause the action with the highest expected 
value. 
Although there is much more to be said about the two systems, at this point it will 
be useful to remind ourselves of my first two premises: 
 
I. Desires are outcome values. 
II. The goal-directed control system works by promoting the performance of the 
action that has the greatest expected reward value, based on outcome values and 
representations of action-outcome relationships. 
 
The descriptions of the two systems just given have two consequences for these 
premises. First, if I can show that the goal-directed system is real – that there really 
is a psychological system in humans and other mammals that works in the way I just 
described – that will establish premise II. Second, given the assumptions I set out in 
section 1.3, to establish premise I I need to show that outcome values form a 
psychological natural kind that can reasonably be thought of as desire. An initial 
point in favour of this claim is that in folk psychology we recognise, and tend to 
distinguish, habitual behaviour and behaviour caused by beliefs and desires. So if 
the two systems are real and distinct, then since there is a structural similarity 
between the goal-directed system and the way we think desires influence action, 
there is some reason to think of the inputs to the goal-directed system as desires and 
instrumental beliefs. For these reasons, my priority in this chapter is to show that the 




2.2 Behavioural Evidence for the Two Systems 
 
In the 1980s, clear behavioural evidence emerged that rats’ actions can be 
controlled by states analogous to desires and beliefs, as well as by habits, 
contradicting previous behaviourist theories. It is now widely accepted that rats and 
other animals, including humans, are capable of both stimulus-response and 
response-outcome (R-O) learning, contributing to distinct systems for habitual and 
goal-directed control, a result anticipated by Tolman (1949). The behavioural 
techniques that were developed in the 1980s are now being widely used to probe the 
neural mechanisms that support these systems. 
The primary source of evidence for goal-directed control in rats is studies of 
outcome devaluation, the first of which was performed by Adams and Dickinson 
(1981). Outcome devaluation experiments typically have the following form. On the 
first day, rats are given the opportunity to press a lever, and are given a food reward 
such as sucrose when they do so. The rats are exposed to this environment for long 
enough to learn an association between lever-pressing and reward. Then on the 
second day, the rats are divided into two groups. One group experiences outcome 
devaluation, meaning that they are allowed to consume the particular food being 
used in the study, then injected with lithium chloride, which induces gastric illness. 
The second, control group also receives both the food and the injection, but these are 
given at different times, with the intention that the rats will treat them as unrelated 
events. Some studies use different methods for devaluing the outcome, such as 
inducing specific satiety – allowing subjects to eat all they want of the food reward. 
There are also various possible procedures for generating control data. All of the rats 
are kept away from the lever on the second day. Finally, on a third day, the rats are 
again given the opportunity to press the lever, but this test is conducted in extinction, 
meaning that the rats do not receive a reward for lever-presses. Adams and 
Dickinson and subsequent investigators have found that the rats for whom the 
outcome was devalued press the lever significantly less than the controls in the test 
phase on the third day. 
In these studies, the two groups of rats perform differently in the test phase, and 
this difference must be explained by some difference in the rats’ experiences during 
the experiment. The only such difference comes on the second day, when one group 
experiences the pairing of the food reward with illness, and the other does not. It is 
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hard to resist the conclusion that the rats behave differently in the test phase because 
they value the food differently, and if this is accepted, it must also be accepted that 
the rats anticipate receiving this food when they press the lever. In other words, the 
rats’ behaviour is controlled by states apparently representing the values of 
outcomes, and further states that seem to represent relationships between actions and 
outcomes. Rats apparently possess a basic form of belief-desire psychology, and I 
will later refer to these two kinds of states as desires and instrumental beliefs, 
respectively.3 
However, rats do not always show sensitivity to outcome devaluation. After some 
training regimes, they will continue to perform actions even when the outcomes 
presented in training have been devalued. In particular, overtraining leads to loss of 
sensitivity to devaluation (Adams 1981). Since insensitivity to devaluation is what 
would be predicted by traditional accounts on which S-R associations are learnt by 
operant conditioning, it is widely accepted that this shows that rats use two systems, 
one goal-directed and one habitual, to control actions. It is thought that the systems 
work in parallel, but that the habit system learns more slowly than the goal-directed 
system, which would explain why extensive training leads to insensitivity to 
devaluation, since it causes a transition to habitual control. Further evidence for the 
view that habits as identified by outcome devaluation studies are indeed S-R 
associations is provided by the observation that these behaviours are sensitive to 
changes in the environment in which the action is performed (Killcross & Coutureau 
2003). 
In similar studies, humans have been found to perform in similar ways. Instead of 
devaluing foods by inducing illness, in human studies devaluation is produced by 
inducing specific satiety. In one study (Tricomi et al. 2009), participants were 
trained to press two buttons to receive small quantities of two different foods. After 
a limited amount of training, one food was devalued, and the participants reduced 
their performance on the button associated with that food, in extinction, to a greater 
extent than the other button. However, after overtraining, devaluation did not have 
this effect. These results are similar to those found with rats in very similar 
paradigms (involving two actions, and using specific satiety as the devaluation 
                                                
3 Why ‘basic’? One reason is because outcome devaluation does not show that rats can learn about 
action-outcome relationships in any way other than by performing actions themselves, or about the 
values of outcomes other than by experiencing them themselves. Another is that it does not show that 
they can perform chains of instrumental reasoning. 
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mechanism; Balleine & Dickinson 1998). A recent experiment gives a vivid 
illustration of the two systems at work in humans, and shows why S-R associations 
are thought of as habits (Neal et al. 2011). Participants were in a cinema, watching a 
film, and were given popcorn that was either fresh and delicious or stale and 
unpleasant. Those who had frequently eaten popcorn in cinemas before ate the same 
amount of popcorn, even if it was stale, whereas those were not regular popcorn-
eaters ate far more of the fresh popcorn. That is, those who were not ‘in the habit’ of 
eating popcorn were sensitive to whether eating the popcorn produced a pleasant 
outcome, but those that were ‘in the habit’ ate on regardless. Psychologists would 
describe their behaviour as controlled by the stimulus, rather than by the outcome. 
Outcome devaluation has now become a central experimental paradigm in this 
area of psychology and neuroscience. When researchers want to study the effects of 
different manipulations of the learning environment specifically on either goal-
directed or habitual behaviour, they train those behaviours using schedules known to 
produce either sensitivity or insensitivity to devaluation. When they want to know 
how a particular brain area is involved in goal-directed or habitual control, or 
whether a given area is necessary for one of these two processes, they use outcome 
devaluation as a means to test what systems animals are using. The fruitfulness of 
these experiments, some of which are discussed below, is further evidence both that 
outcome devaluation is a robust effect and that it tells us something substantial about 
cognitive architecture. However, it is worth bearing in mind that outcome 
devaluation is not without idiosyncracies as a means of testing for goal-directed or 
habitual control. For instance, although it is an advantage of outcome devaluation 
that the same effect is found whether induced illness or specific satiety are used, it is 
noteworthy that these both affect the value of an action in the same direction. Also, 
outcome devaluation seems to test directly for the involvement of a representation of 
an outcome in action selection, and only indirectly, via the idea that stimulus-control 
or outcome-control exhaust the possibilities, for the involvement of an S-R 
association. Issues like these may be important when considering the implications of 
specific observations, but can only be assessed in the context of specific claims 
about such observations. 
Another behavioural technique which is used to distinguish goal-directed from 
habitual responding is contingency degradation. Goal-directed control relies on pairs 
of states; agents produce goal-directed actions only when they place high values on 
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outcomes, and expect their actions to lead to those outcomes. Contingency 
degradation is the counterpart to outcome devaluation, but with agents’ expectations 
of outcomes, rather than the values they place on those outcomes, being 
manipulated. It is important for contingency degradation experiments that the theory 
of S-R learning requires only contiguity, not contingency, in the relationship 
between responses and the delivery of reinforcers. What this means is that S-R 
associations are strengthened whenever reinforcers are offered, even if they are also 
frequently delivered at times when the relevant action has not been performed. For 
the reinforcers to be contingent on the response, they would have to be delivered 
only when the response occurred. 
Two different paradigms are collectively referred to as contingency degradation. 
First, outcomes can be delivered without the relevant action’s being performed, 
degrading the contingency of outcomes on actions. In theory, this manipulation 
should reduce goal-directed action, but not habitual action, because actions continue 
to be reinforced. Hammond (1980) and more recent researchers (see Balleine & 
O’Doherty 2010) have found that this procedure does reduce goal-directed 
responding, confirming that action-outcome representations require contingency 
rather than merely contiguity, and this manipulation is now used when testing for 
goal-directed control (e.g. Yin et al. 2005). Second, Dickinson and colleagues 
(1998) found that undertrained rats, but not overtrained ones, could adapt their 
behaviour in response to omission schedules. These are manipulations in which an 
outcome that has previously always followed a particular action is now delivered 
only when that action is withheld. This again shows the sensitivity of rats to action-
outcome contingencies, using evidence from rewarding outcomes that occur without 
action as well as those that follow action, and it can also be used to test for goal-
directed or habitual control. 
I will discuss further evidence for the existence of these two distinct systems in 
section 2.5; before we turn to that evidence, it will be useful to review the functional 
anatomy of the basal ganglia. 
 
2.3 The Basal Ganglia 
 
The basal ganglia are a group of nuclei contained within the cerebral hemispheres 
which are of particular importance for understanding motivation and action. 
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Understanding their basic functional anatomy is useful both for understanding the 
goal-directed and habitual systems specifically, and for beginning to see the how the 
brain achieves adaptive action-selection more generally. The basal ganglia are 
connected to many parts of the cortex by loops that pass from the cortex, through the 
basal ganglia and thalamus, and back to the same areas of cortex. As I will describe 
in this section, they are thought to provide a mechanism for selecting actions by 
disinhibiting cortical activity (Redgrave et al. 1999). This should not be 
misinterpreted; it has been argued that the selection and control of action is the 
ultimate purpose of the brain as a whole, and there are several other areas that make 
relatively direct contributions. The suggestion is rather that the basal ganglia choose 
among possible actions, which have been identified and evaluated by partially 
distinct systems, and a detailed account has been developed of how they do this. 
This account provides useful background for understanding how the two systems 
could be implemented. In addition to this, however, the basal ganglia have been 
implicated in action learning and selection in a number of further roles, related to the 
wide range of cortical areas with which they are closely connected (Balleine & 
O’Doherty 2010). These more varied and complex roles are more directly relevant 
to understanding goal-directed and habitual control, and I discuss them in elsewhere 
in this chapter, and in subsequent chapters. 
 
The basal ganglia are connected to the cortex by parallel, partially segregated 
loops (Alexander et al. 1986). Each small area of cortex sends projections to the 
basal ganglia, which in turn project to the thalamus, which projects back to the 
cortex. Projections from the cortex to the basal ganglia and from the thalamus to the 
cortex are primarily excitatory, using the neurotransmitter glutamate, but those from 
the basal ganglia to the thalamus are inhibitory, using the neurotransmitter GABA. 
So in general, the effect of loops through the basal ganglia is to suppress activity in 
the cortex. However, when signals from the cortex to the basal ganglia are relatively 
strong, this causes the inhibitory signal to be weakened, so the area of cortex that 
produced the strong signal will be disinhibited. The effect of the basal ganglia is 
therefore to inhibit weak signals, and disinhibit strong signals. We can already see 
how a mechanism like this could select actions; the action associated with the 
strongest signal would be selectively disinhibited, while the others are suppressed. 
Very roughly, then, the idea is that candidate actions are associated with instances of 
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activity in the cortex, and when things are going well the strength of this activity 
will be proportional to the value of the action; these signals compete with one 
another, some getting stronger and others weaker, and actions that get ‘strong’ 
enough are performed. The contribution of the basal ganglia is in facilitating (and as 
we will see later, influencing) the competition. Philosophers may find this 
reminiscent of the idea that the mind somehow ‘weighs’ desires, causing the agent to 
act on the strongest. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Basal ganglia connectivity showing direct and indirect pathways (A), and the full extent of 
connectivity (B). Redgrave (2007). 
 
A number of mechanisms contribute to the function of disinhibiting strong 
signals, and inhibiting weak ones. The first of these is the direct and indirect 
pathways, shown on figure 1A. The direct pathway is the GABAergic connection 
from the striatum, the input nucleus of the basal ganglia, direct to the GPi/SNr 
(globus pallidus internal segment and substantia nigra pars reticulata), the output 
nuclei, while the indirect pathway is the other route shown in 1A, that goes through 
the GPe (globus pallidus external segment) and STN (subthalamic nucleus). The 
direct pathway inhibits the output nuclei, meaning that the overall effect of this 
pathway is disinhibitory, because the inhibition of the thalamus from the output 
nuclei is itself inhibited. This disinhibition will be greater for stronger inputs. The 
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way in which the direct pathway works relies on the fact that loops through the basal 
ganglia are largely segregated, meaning that the effect of the basal ganglia on a 
particular area of cortex is primarily determined by the signal that very area sends to 
the striatum. So the effect of the direct pathway alone amplifies strong signals, and 
suppresses weak ones. In addition, though, the connections making up the direct 
pathway are focused on specific areas of the GPi/SNr, while those making up the 
indirect pathway are diffuse. The indirect pathway excites the output nuclei, and 
consequently has an inhibitory effect on activity in the cortex. This means that when 
a strong signal is received by the striatum, the direct pathway will strongly inhibit a 
focused area of the GPi/SNr, while the indirect pathway will excite a diffuse area. 
So the indirect pathway has the overall effect of inhibiting activity in loops close to 
those that are most strongly active. 
This brings us to another important point. The motor cortex is arranged 
topographically, meaning that areas associated with nearby parts of the body are 
close to one another. Consequently, it is particularly important that one signal is 
selected to the exclusion of others in nearby corticostriatal loops, because each part 
of the body can only perform one action at a time. So as well as inhibiting weak 
signals and disinhibiting strong ones, the basal ganglia have mechanisms that 
generate competition between proximal loops. The indirect pathway is one such 
mechanism. There are also inhibitory interneurons in the striatum, and inhibitory 
collaterals on striatal cells, that have a similar effect. When cells in the striatum are 
strongly activated, these connections inhibit activity in other striatal cells. Finally, 
the medium spiny neurons, which are the cells in the striatum with which the direct 
and indirect pathways originate, can be in ‘up’ or ‘down’ states. They only fire in up 
states, which they only enter when they are strongly activated. 
These mechanisms allow the basal ganglia to select actions, but they are not in 
themselves action-specific; in principle, they could make other choices too. It has 
been suggested that the basal ganglia could select subjects for thought,4 and it is 
very likely that they select actions at multiple successive levels of description. When 
we are playing squash, for instance, our brains need to select where to direct the ball, 
a choice at a ‘higher’ level, and how to move the legs, arms and fingers to produce 
                                                
4 Redgrave et al. 2010 mentions ‘poverty of thought’ as a symptom of lesions to certain areas of the 
basal ganglia, comparable to the bradykinesia (impaired movement) seen in Parkinson’s Disease, 
which is a consequence of damage to other basal ganglia regions. 
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such a shot, which are choices at a ‘lower’ level. Both of these processes could 
involve resolving competitions between various alternatives. These suggestions are 
also anatomically plausible, since the basal ganglia are connected in loops to many 
areas of the cortex, not just the primary motor cortex, and all of these loops pass 
through the direct and indirect pathways. For more information and references on 
the basal ganglia, see Redgrave (2007). 
 
2.4 Dopamine and the Habit System 
 
The basal ganglia are also the major site for dopamine activity. Dopamine is a 
neurotransmitter released by the ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra pars 
compacta (VTA/SNc), collectively known as the midbrain dopamine neurons, which 
is often thought to be closely associated with desire. For instance, Schroeder’s 
(2004) theory of desire, as it applies to humans, amounts to roughly the claim that to 
desire an outcome is to be disposed to produce a dopamine signal when that 
outcome occurs. Dopamine seems to have multiple functions, and there is 
considerable uncertainty about at least some of these, which I discuss in section 3.5. 
This uncertainty is currently a major obstacle to a fuller understanding of both goal-
directed and habitual control. So dopamine is an important subject, but for now I 
will only give a preliminary account of two of its functions. 
 
One proposed function of dopamine is to facilitate and motivate action. The 
direct pathway originates with medium spiny neurons (MSNs) that have D1 
dopamine receptors, meaning that they are excited by dopamine, while the indirect 
pathway originates with MSNs that have D2 receptors, meaning that they are 
inhibited by dopamine. This means that when dopamine levels are relatively high, 
the direct pathway is predominant, and action representations in the cortex are 
readily excited by the basal ganglia. When dopamine levels are low, the indirect 
pathway is predominant, and action representations are more suppressed. So overall 
dopamine levels determine overall readiness to act, and correspondingly, 
Parkinson’s Disease is caused by underproduction of dopamine (Redgrave et al. 
2010). This function of dopamine is thought to be related to tonic rather than phasic 
dopamine release (Niv et al. 2007). Dopamine neurons in the VTA/SNc fire 
continually at a tonic rate, with sudden bursts of firing or pauses in firing in 
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response to specific events. So according to this proposal the tonic rate, which 
changes relatively gradually, determines readiness to act, while the phasic events – 
the sudden bursts and pauses – have other functions. 
This account of the function of tonic dopamine is relatively uncontroversial, but 
the functions of the phasic dopamine signal are a matter of ongoing debate (Berridge 
2007, Redgrave et al. 2008, Horvitz 2009, Bromberg-Martin et al. 2010). One 
hypothesis that is particularly well-known and relevant for present purposes is that 
phasic dopamine constitutes a reinforcement signal for habit learning. According to 
one computational model of habit learning, the temporal difference model (Sutton & 
Barto 1998), habit learning can be facilitated by a reward prediction error (RPE) 
signal.5 The RPE signal indicates the difference between the level of reward 
currently being received by the organism and the level that was predicted. In the 
context of a habit system, actions that are performed shortly before positive RPE 
signals are reinforced, while those followed by negative RPE signals are inhibited. 
When things go exactly as it expects, the agent does not change its behaviour. It 
makes sense that a system like this would work, at least if we assume that predicted 
levels of reward are determined by current habit strengths, because this means that 
positive RPE signals would constitute evidence that the response is rewarding 
enough to make a stronger habit appropriate. Reward prediction error signals 
effectively allow agents to keep track of the running average reward that performing 
each habit brings them, to which the strengths of those habits should plausibly be 
calibrated. So computational considerations give us a reason to expect to find RPE 
signals somewhere in the habit system. 
In this context, neurophysiological results of three kinds support the hypothesis 
that phasic dopamine indicates RPEs. First, a classic study by Olds and Milner 
(1954) found that rats would electrically self-stimulate the VTA/SNc to the 
exclusion of other activities, so dopamine has long been thought to signal reward or 
act as a reinforcer. Second, dopamine is known not to simply signal reward, because 
Schultz (1998) found that phasic dopamine responses diminish as rewards become 
predictable, and transfer to conditioned stimuli that predict primary rewards. That is, 
dopamine bursts are produced when rewards are surprising, but not when they are 
predicted. Dopamine also appears to signal negative reward prediction errors – if an 
                                                
5 Shea (2014) discusses the RPE signal from a philosophical perspective. 
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expected reward is not delivered, dopamine firing pauses briefly. Third, phasic 
dopamine causes long-term potentiation of cortico-striatal synapses (Reynolds & 
Wickens 2002, Arbuthnott & Wickens 2007), which is a mechanism by which 
dopamine could reinforce recent actions. 
A fairly simple account of the neural basis of the habit system thus appears to be 
emerging. Sensory stimuli are represented in the cortex, and other cortical areas 
represent and are capable of causing actions, while cortical areas of both kinds are 
connected to the basal ganglia by loops of the sort I have described. Dopamine 
signals RPEs, and is capable of affecting the strength of cortico-striatal synapses. So 
habits are connections in the striatum between representations of stimuli and 
responses, which are modified according to the extent to which they produce 
rewards. This account seems to be supported by evidence from lesion studies in rats 
(Yin et al. 2004, 2006) and imaging studies in humans (Tricomi et al. 2009), 
identifying the dorsolateral striatum (DLS), a part of the striatum connected to the 
sensorimotor cortex, as crucial for learning and performing habitual behaviours. 
However, there are a number of complications to this picture. One is that it 
involves excitatory connections in the striatum between projections from distinct 
cortical areas, which are not part of the anatomical description given above. Still, 
recent studies suggest that cortico-striatal loops can interact (Haber & Knutson 
2010). Excitatory interneurons connect medium spiny neurons, and cortical areas 
have diffuse as well as focused projections to the striatum. Another complication is 
that temporal difference learning is often thought to involve separate elements, 
called the ‘actor’ and the ‘critic’, that are responsible for driving action-selection via 
S-R associations, and representing and updating the values of the actions performed, 
respectively (Sutton & Barto 1998, Landreth 2009, Shea 2014). It has been 
suggested that the dorsal striatum and associated cortical areas form the actor, while 
the ventral striatum, along with parts of the cortex, plays the role of the critic 
(O’Doherty et al. 2004). Third, the simple account does not explain how the RPE 
signal is generated, and while the actor-critic view does account for reward 
predictions (producing these being the main function of the critic), it does not 
explain how received reward is measured. In addition to all of these, of course, there 
is the point that the function of phasic dopamine signals is a matter of controversy. 
But the idea that these signals are RPEs for updating the habit signal is now a 
 37 
common starting-point for that debate, and it certainly gives us further insight into 
how the habit system could work. 
 
2.5 Could there be just one system? 
 
So far I have presented the basic behavioural evidence for the existence of the 
two systems, described some of the functional anatomy of the basal ganglia, and 
suggested a partial account of the implementation of the habit system. I have not 
discussed how the goal-directed system might work, because that is the topic of 
chapter 3. Before moving on to it, I will discuss whether there is a viable alternative 
to the two-systems account of action selection. I will consider two possible 
alternatives. It should be noted that the goal-directed and habitual systems cannot 
possibly be wholly separate, since they both have the function of controlling the 
behaviour of a single body – at some point there must be an action-determining 
mechanism that is influenced by both systems. 
One reason to consider this question is that it may be easier to explain how a 
more sophisticated version of the habit system could have evolved, than how a new, 
goal-directed system could have been added.6 However, this idea is to some extent 
undermined by the fact that the main elements of the goal-directed system seem to 
be independently useful. First, states representing the values of outcomes are useful 
not only for deciding which outcomes to pursue, but also for assessing the level of 
value provided by ongoing states of affairs. Even creatures that lack goal-directed 
systems need the capacity to perform this kind of assessment, if they are to learn 
new habits. This does not show that any creature with a habit system must also have 
something akin to desires, because an important feature of goal-directed control is 
that outcome values themselves change according to the individual’s experiences, 
and the assessment of value for the purposes of habit-learning could rely just on 
innate states. But nonetheless, desire-like states are valuable even before they can 
play a direct role in action selection. Second, the ability to learn about action-
outcome contingencies is just a special case of the ability to learn about 
contingencies between events in general, which is very plausibly of independent 
value for several purposes. So given that it is made up of independently-useful 
                                                
6 David Papineau has repeatedly pressed me in conversation to explain exactly why studies in this 
area show there to be two systems, and has emphasised this point. 
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components, perhaps we should not be surprised by the evolution of a largely 
separate goal-directed system. 
 
The first possible alternative to the existence of two separate systems is that 
occurrent outcome values act as internal stimuli to which the habit system 
determines responses. There is reason to believe that basic drives such as hunger and 
thirst influence the habit system in this way (see section 3.3). Assuming it is 
possible for outcome values to do so too, an alternative account of outcome 
devaluation seems to be available. When outcome devaluation has taken place, the 
agent will no longer generate positive occurrent outcome values for the reward used, 
so their habitual behaviour will no longer be triggered. This account faces several 
difficulties, however. It does not explain why some actions are sensitive to outcome 
devaluation, and others are not; it is worth noting that the nature of the training 
regime, as well as its extent, affects this sensitivity (Dickinson & Nicholas 1983). 
Neither does it explain differences in the results of contingency degradation studies. 
It is also unclear whether a outcome value could become part of the stimulus in a 
typical outcome devaluation experiment, since these involve agents experiencing 
new outcomes for the first time. This account asks us to believe that a outcome value 
for sucrose solution can be salient to a rat as he takes an action that leads to his first 
exposure to this type of food. 
However, a second alternative to the two-systems account is harder to refute. On 
what I will call the sensitive habits view, states representing action-outcome 
contingencies only cause actions by their effects on S-R associations. If a particular 
rewarding outcome is found to be contingent on a particular action, an excitatory 
connection is formed between a representation of the outcome and the S-R 
association that controls that action. This would mean that habits are boosted when 
they are expected to lead to valuable outcomes. Just as on the two-systems account, 
action-outcome contingencies and S-R associations are learnt in parallel, but at 
different rates depending on the exact nature of the training regime. When the S-R 
association is relatively weak, performance will be reduced by outcome devaluation 
or contingency degradation as these experiences will lead to reduced excitation by 
the action-outcome association, but after extensive training the S-R association will 
be strong enough to consistently produce action independently. The sensitive-habits 
view does require a very different form of action learning from that involved in pure 
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S-R learning, because it involves both sensitivity to contingency rather than 
contiguity and the association with actions of subsequent events. But this view is 
still simpler than the two-systems view, because it does not posit two separate routes 
to action, but only two systems of action learning. 
The best evidence we have in favour of the two-systems view, as against the 
sensitive habits view, comes from a series of lesion studies on rats performed by Yin 
and colleagues. This group found that lesions of the posterior dorsomedial striatum 
(DMS) produced either before or after training that would otherwise produce goal-
directed behaviour left rats insensitive to both outcome devaluation and contingency 
degradation (Yin et al. 2005). In two other studies (Yin et al. 2004, 2006), they also 
found that lesions to the posterior dorsolateral striatum (DLS) made rats more 
sensitive to these tests, when trained in ways that usually produce habitual 
behaviour. These studies are taken to support the view that S-R associations are 
formed in the DLS, that action-outcome contingencies are represented in the DMS, 
that these states are learnt in parallel, and that they are independently capable of 
causing action. However, only one of these studies produced a result contradicting 
what would be predicted by the sensitive habits view. 
First, we can consider the experiments showing that DMS lesions cause 
insensitivity to outcome devaluation and contingency degradation (Yin et al. 2005). 
These experiments show that there is some part of the overall system for action 
selection such that without it, rats behave as though they are only capable of purely 
habitual control – as if their behaviour is determined by S-R associations alone. This 
does not distinguish between the hypotheses, as both predict this result: on both 
hypotheses, if action-outcome representations are destroyed, only S-R associations 
will remain. So to distinguish the hypotheses, we need to consider the studies that 
produced goal-directed behaviour. However, in one set of experiments (Yin et al. 
2004), the DLS lesions took place prior to any training. This leaves open the 
possibility that the DLS is necessary for the development of S-R associations that 
are strong enough to produce devaluation-insensitive responses, but that sensitive 
habits themselves can exist despite such lesions. Admittedly, this account does 
involve rejecting the common view that the same mechanism is responsible both for 
the formation and the gradual strengthening of S-R associations, so this result does 
put pressure on the sensitive habits hypothesis. But the crucial study for establishing 
the two-systems view comes from the work by Yin and colleagues from 2006. 
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In this experiment, intact rats were trained to press a lever for sucrose solution 
using an interval schedule, a training regime known to produce habitual behaviour. 
After this training, half of the rats had muscimol, a GABA-A agonist which prevents 
normal function, injected into the DLS. Half of each group of rats were then given 
training on an omission schedule before being tested for lever-pressing in extinction, 
while the other half were given similar training without the omission schedule 
before extinction testing. Rats that had not received muscimol injections performed 
similarly in extinction, regardless of whether they had experienced the omission 
schedule, showing insensitivity to contingency degradation. However, those that did 
not have a normally-functioning DLS were sensitive to contingency degradation; 
those of this group that had experienced the omission schedule responded less in 
extinction. 
The behaviour of the non-lesioned group in this study showed that the rats 
developed strong, stimulus-controlled habits in their initial training. So the sensitive-
habits view should predict that no lesion would be possible which would make the 
action sensitive to contingency degradation without destroying it entirely, because 
on the sensitive-habits view the S-R association would be critical to the action’s 
performance. On the other hand, the two-systems view predicts that in addition to 
the S-R association, an action-outcome representation should also exist and be 
independently capable of controlling the action, so a lesion destroying the S-R 
association should render the action sensitive to contingency degradation. In this 
experiment the lesioned group which did not experience the omission schedule 
continued to perform in extinction, but the lesioned group which experienced the 
omission schedule reduced performance. So the experiment confirms the prediction 
of the two-systems view, and contradicts that of the sensitive-habits view. 
 
In this chapter, I have introduced the goal-directed and habitual systems, and 
described evidence that they exist in animals including rats and humans, and are 
largely separate from one another. In the light of this evidence, I will now begin to 
use the terms ‘desire’ and ‘instrumental belief’ to refer to the two types of inputs to 
the goal-directed system. I do not take the case for identifying representations of 
outcome values of this type as desires to be complete, but it will be convenient to be 
able to use this term. My use of the term ‘instrumental belief’, meanwhile, should be 
regarded as wholly stipulative – I do not intend to make any substantive claims 
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about the nature of belief. I have also given initial accounts of the structure and 
function of the basal ganglia, and of two putative functions of dopamine. The 
evidence described in this chapter helps to establish at least my first two premises, 
but in order to further develop the case for premise I, and to establish premise III, we 
need to turn to the neuroscience of desire. 
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Chapter 3: The Neuroscience of Desire 
 
3.1 Anatomy of the Goal-Directed System 
 
In this chapter, I will address three main topics: first the anatomy of the goal-
directed system; then the distinction between occurrent and standing desires, and the 
roles they play in action selection; and finally the processes by which desires are 
formed and updated. These three topics will each contribute to a thorough account of 
the neuroscience of desire, and I will close the chapter with a diagram showing the 
main components and processes involved in the habitual and goal-directed system. 
My discussion of the latter two topics will provide direct support for premise III: 
 
III. Outcome values are inputs to the goal-directed control system, which are 
produced and modified by a system which is to some extent responsive to 
evidence for the reward values of outcomes, and it is normal for more than one 
outcome value to act as an input to the goal-directed control system at any one 
time. 
 
The first topic of this chapter, the anatomy of the goal-directed system, is important 
because successful anatomical studies of proposed psychological systems help to 
show that they are real. 
 
As we have seen, the cortex and striatum are connected by partially-segregated 
loops which also pass through the thalamus. Not surprisingly, then, the functions 
associated with different parts of the cortex are also associated with the most closely 
connected parts of the striatum, and vice versa. Many neuroscientists take the view 
that we can productively think of corticostriatal loops as integrated units for 
performing particular functions – for example, habitual control seems to be the joint 
responsibility of the DLS and the sensorimotor cortex. Similarly, the two key 
elements of the goal-directed system are also thought of as located in corticostriatal 
loops: representations of action-outcome contingencies in the DMS and medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and desires in the ventral striatum and associated 
prefrontal areas. Because the prefrontal cortex is one of the parts of the brain that 
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differs most between rats and humans, the areas associated with desire in these two 
groups are anatomically different: in rats it is the insular cortex, and in primates the 
orbitofrontal cortex (Wise 2008, Schoenbaum et al. 2009, Padoa-Schioppa 2011). 
Evidence placing action-outcome contingencies in the DMS and mPFC in rats 
comes primarily from lesion studies. As described above, lesions to the DMS cause 
insensitivity to both outcome devaluation and contingency degradation, whether 
they are inflicted before or after training (Yin et al. 2005). This is what would be 
predicted if the DMS was necessary for the formation and use of action-outcome 
contingencies, because without these only habitual control is possible. Lesions to the 
prelimbic cortex, which is part of the mPFC, cause insensitivity to both outcome 
devaluation and contingency degradation, when inflicted before training (Corbit & 
Balleine 2003); post-training lesions do not reduce sensitivity to outcome 
devaluation (Ostlund & Balleine 2005). This suggests that prelimbic cortex, or 
perhaps mPFC more generally, is necessary for the acquisition of action-outcome 
representations, but not for their later use. It would be worthwhile to test the effect 
of post-training mPFC lesions on sensitivity to contingency degradation, since it is 
natural to think that this area would be necessary for later modification of action-
outcome states, as well as their initial acquisition. Lesions to the medial dorsal 
nucleus of the thalamus, through which DMS-mPFC loops pass, also produce 
insensitivity to both tests. Meanwhile in humans, fMRI studies have found activity 
in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the anterior caudate (a part of the 
striatum to which it projects) to be consistent with these regions encoding action-
outcome contingencies. One study (Tanaka et al. 2008) found that activity in these 
areas was higher when subjects were performing tasks with high reward 
contingencies than tasks with lower contingencies. The medial PFC also showed 
activity related to reward contingencies. 
Of greater interest to us, however, is the neuroanatomy of desire. Balleine and 
O’Doherty (2010) argue that the ventral striatum, which includes the nucleus 
accumbens, and the basolateral amydala are centrally involved in desire in rats. The 
basolateral amygdala is thought to be a crucial site for the integration of sensory and 
emotional information, and has been implicated in representing outcome values 
(Balleine et al. 2003); it is also of interest because it is connected to the DMS and 
mPFC, offering a glimpse of how desires and action-outcome contingencies might 
be combined by the goal-directed system. Incidentally, the interaction between 
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desires and action-outcome contingencies may also be mediated by spiralling feed-
forward connections which project through the striatum from ventral to dorsal areas 
(Haber & Knutson 2010). The core of the nucleus accumbens has been found to be 
necessary for sensitivity to outcome devaluation in lesion studies (Corbit et al. 
2001), but not to be necessary for contingency degradation, a result which is 
consistent with a role in desire formation, and the nucleus accumbens has also been 
associated with desire in debates over the role of dopamine (e.g. Berridge 2007). 
In humans, the ventral striatum and amygdala are almost certainly still important 
for desire, but the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), which is connected by a loop with the 
ventral striatum (Haber & Knutson 2010), is also of particular interest. Evidence 
linking the OFC with desires, and in particular offer values, which seem to be 
occurrent desires (see section 3.2), has been discussed in several recent reviews (e.g. 
Rangel & Hare 2010, Kennerley & Walton 2011, Padoa-Schioppa 2011). There is 
evidence for this view from a variety of sources. Studies of brain-damaged patients 
indicate that the OFC and vmPFC are necessary for normal decision-making 
(Damasio 1994). Single-cell recording studies in primates have found that many 
cells in the OFC encode both the identity and the value of stimuli, and have led 
researchers to conclude that the OFC is the first site at which representation of 
stimuli is modulated according to their values (Rolls & Grabenhorst 2008). Notably, 
fMRI studies on humans have found that the magnitude of OFC activity is correlated 
with the amount that participants are willing to pay for available goods (Plassman et 
al. 2007). Several other imaging studies have also found OFC activity in response to 
a wide range of rewarding stimuli, including attractive, smiling faces (O’Doherty et 
al. 2003), aesthetically pleasing paintings and musical sequences (Kirk et al. 2009), 
and monetary gains and erotic stimuli (Sescousse et al. 2010). This wide range of 
different rewarding stimuli is particularly noteworthy, since philosophers typically 
take our intrinsic desires to have a wide range of objects, from foodstuffs to career 
objectives and outcomes valued for their aesthetic properties. 
 
3.2 Occurrent and Standing Desires 
 
Philosophers also often distinguish between occurrent and standing desires. 
Drawing this distinction helps us with several potential challenges to the simple 
account of the goal-directed system given so far. These include: explaining certain 
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features of individuals’ behaviour patterns; fitting the goal-directed system into 
more general accounts of how the brain works; explaining how the goal-directed 
system takes into account physiological needs; and explaining how the goal-directed 
system sets up tractable decision problems on individual occasions. Occurrent 
desires are often thought of as conscious desires, but I prefer to avoid relying on 
claims about the phenomenology of desire, because phenomenological claims in 
general are hard to verify. Also, it is unclear whether our conscious experiences of 
desire should be expected to reflect causally-significant categories. So I will draw 
the distinction in functional and neurological terms. 
As I introduced it at the start of chapter 2, the goal-directed system involves 
states that keep track of the apparent values of outcomes, based on the agent’s 
experiences. These states, which I have called ‘desires’, do not arise spontaneously, 
motivate actions, and then dissolve once they are satisfied. This means that the goal-
directed system as it has been described so far is well-suited to accounting for some 
ways in which desires seem to influence our actions, but not others. For instance, 
consider my behaviour with respect to ice-cream. In my life so far, I have sampled 
many flavours of ice-cream on a large number of occasions, and this has led me to 
have relatively settled preferences; at a well-stocked gelateria, I am now likely to 
order passion fruit, and unlikely to choose rum and raisin. My father also has 
relatively settled preferences, which are different from mine. The goal-directed 
system as it has been described so far can do a reasonable job of explaining this: my 
father and I have each learnt about how rewarding different flavours of ice-cream 
are over time, and because the desires we have formed in this way change only 
slowly, our behaviour is somewhat predictable even though ice-cream eating 
opportunities occur only rarely. The only mystery is why we end up with different 
preferences, and I discuss this point later in the chapter. On the other hand, we also 
need to explain why I occasionally spend my time eating ice-cream, but usually do 
not do so, or work to bring it about that I am doing so. Several factors are capable of 
contributing to such an explanation, but it is particularly noteworthy that I often do 
not seek ice-cream even when I know it is immediately available, and I am not 
engaged in any other time-constrained task. So there is reason to believe, even 
without considering the phenomenology of desire, that my desire to eat ice-cream is 
sometimes active and capable of motivating me to act, and at other times dormant. 
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Why this should be the case is a further question, but reflecting on that question 
gives us more reasons to think that desires can be either standing or occurrent. We 
need standing desires, which change only when we receive new information about 
the values of (types of) outcomes, in order to allow us to modify our behaviour 
appropriately to experiences which may have taken place over wide spans of time. 
Having occurrent desires as well permits short-term variation in desire-strength 
independently of this, and one reason such variation is valuable is that some 
outcomes are particularly good or bad under specific circumstances. For example, it 
is possible to learn that ice-cream is particularly good when the environment is hot, 
but not good when one has already overeaten. More generally, it is useful for desires 
to change in strength in response to changes in our physiological needs and other 
basic drives (Padoa-Schioppa 2011). But it is crucial that this happens without 
changing the strengths of our standing desires: for example, when an animal is very 
salt-deprived, it may be vital for its survival that its desires for salty food are very 
strong at that time; but if these desires for salty food are made permanently 
overwhelming to cope with this situation, the animal will soon suffer from excessive 
salt consumption. Another advantage of short-term variability might be to adapt 
behaviour to variation in the quality of token outcomes such as individual samples 
of food (Holton & Berridge 2014). Here the idea is that when one comes across a 
particularly good sample of its type, one should be very highly motivated to 
consume it, but one’s standing desire should not be so strongly strengthened. Holton 
and Berridge suggest that dopamine is involved in producing this kind of occurrent 
boosting of desire, and that this could contribute to explaining drug binges. 
The distinction between occurrent and standing desires also helps to explain how 
the goal-directed system fits into a popular general account of how the brain works. 
According to this general picture, the brain resolves uncertainty through 
competitions. For instance, if the information from the senses that the brain receives 
at a given time does not unambiguously tell it how things are, then instances of 
activity representing different possibilities will compete with one another, and what 
is perceived will be the situation represented by the winning pattern of activation 
(Clark 2013). These competitions are to some extent facilitated by the basal ganglia, 
as explained in section 2.3. Given that the structure of the cortex is almost the same 
across the whole brain, we should expect action-selection to involve 
computationally similar processes, and Cisek (2007) suggests that it amounts to a 
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competition between action representations prompted by the perceived environment. 
In the context of desire, what this suggests is that at any one time a number of 
instances of activity in the OFC and ventral striatum will be occurring, each 
representing the value of some available outcome. This idea would make sense of 
the results of fMRI studies of the OFC mentioned above. These instances of activity 
will tend to strengthen action representations in proportion to their own strength and 
the probabilities associated with occurrent instrumental beliefs. In addition to this, 
the brain learns and stores information by changing and maintaining structural 
features, which determine future patterns of activity. So we should also assume that 
structural features of the OFC and ventral striatum, such as synapse weights, 
constitute standing desires. 
A final respect in which the distinction between occurrent and standing desires is 
significant is that it helps to explain how the goal-directed system sets up tractable 
decisions for itself. It is relatively easy to see how the habit system responds to 
present circumstances; it generates action representations for those responses that 
are most strongly associated with present stimuli, which then compete with one 
another. In the goal-directed system, however, there is no obvious privileged means 
by which perceptual information can initiate the process of choice. Also, if too many 
possible actions and outcomes are considered in the course of one decision, the 
calculations required will quickly become unmanageable. The solution to the latter 
problem seems to be that only occurrent desires are taken into account, and a partial 
solution to the former one is that when the environment directs an individual’s 
attention to a particular object or outcome, this causes related desires to become 
occurrent, and that the strength of the occurrent desire is affected by the degree of 
attention (Hare et al. 2011). The phenomenon of Pavlovian-instrumental transfer, in 
which reward-related cues prompt increased performance of goal-directed 
behaviours, may be a manifestation of this process. Interestingly, it is likely that this 
process involves a positive feedback loop, because the strength of associated 
occurrent desires will also tend to increase attention to features of the environment. 
Such positive feedback loops may help to resolve competition between neural 
coalitions. In addition, goal-directed choice may be initiated by the recognition of 
the environment’s affordances – actions that are associated with particular stimuli 
not by habits, but because the stimuli show that the actions are possible. If these 
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actions are believed to be likely to lead to certain outcomes given the circumstances, 
then desires for those outcomes may become occurrent. 
Standing and occurrent desires therefore play different roles in action-selection, 
and may be expected to have different representational content. Standing desires 
store information about value, and intuitively represent the average levels of reward 
that outcomes have provided in the past, which is a reasonable estimate of the level 
that will be provided on arbitrary future occasions. Several factors influence the 
strengths of occurrent desires, including most importantly the strengths of standing 
desires, and they intuitively represent the levels of reward that outcomes are 
expected to provide on the occasions on which the desires occur. 
 
3.3 Basic Drives 
 
We have now made considerable progress in showing that the goal-directed 
system is real, and in understanding how desires causally influence action. However, 
there is an important part of the picture still missing. We have not yet seen how 
desires are formed and updated, which is of particular importance since they seem to 
have the function of tracking the reward values of outcomes. A central element of 
this process is the role of basic drives, and the nature of drives and their influence on 
action-selection is also an important topic in its own right. So we can now turn to 
basic drives, before moving on to the role of dopamine in desire-formation in the 
next section. 
The following claim is intended as a stipulative definition of the term ‘basic 
drive’: an animal has a basic drive for some outcome if and only if it is innately 
disposed to treat that outcome as rewarding, in virtue of the successful functioning 
of some bodily or psychological process, and not in virtue of having a basic drive 
for some other outcome.7 The reason for the second clause is that humans are 
innately disposed to find most, if not all, addictive drugs rewarding, but this is 
because those drugs ‘hijack’ reward systems, which are then not functioning 
successfully, rather than because we have basic drives for them. The reason for the 
third clause in the definition is that humans are innately disposed to treat doughnuts 
as rewarding, but this does not show that they have a basic drive for doughnuts, 
                                                
7 By ‘innately’, here and throughout, I simply mean ‘not as a consequence of learning’. 
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since it is explained by their basic drives for food and for sugar in particular (see 
Foddy & Savulescu 2010 for evidence relating to the basic drive for sugar). Given 
this definition, it is likely that humans have basic drives for food, water, sex (when 
mature) and positive social interactions such as smiles, among others. We also have 
basic aversions, for instance to pain, but I will leave these aside – to simplify 
matters, I attend only to the positive side of motivation and action-selection 
throughout this thesis. 
Basic drives interact with the habitual and goal-directed systems in two main 
ways. First, basic drives are the primary means by which we detect reward. Humans 
and other animals cannot simply see, feel or taste that things are good for them, but 
they need information about the levels of reward that new situations provide in order 
to acquire adaptive habits and desires. Part of the way this problem is solved is 
through basic drives, the objects of which are features of the environment (and their 
own bodies) that animals can perceive relatively directly, and which have tended in 
the evolutionary past to promote survival and reproduction. In many cases, the 
reason why the objects of basic drives promote survival and reproduction is that they 
are necessary for one or both of these. So if animals have basic drives, we can 
account more fully for how their habits are formed and updated. I described in 
section 2.4 how habit-updating could be performed by reward prediction error 
signals, and to generate these the animal needs predictions of reward, and the ability 
to measure occurrent reward. Habits themselves can be used to predict reward, and 
we have now seen that basic drives can be used to measure it. Reward could be 
measured by measuring aggregate drive-satisfaction. This idea is relevant to the 
goal-directed system as well, because we need a way to measure reward in order to 
form and update desires; I discuss this issue in more detail in the following two 
sections. 
The second way in which basic drives influence the habitual and goal-directed 
systems is by influencing action-selection on particular occasions. In both systems, 
and for almost all basic drives, this influence is dependent on learning; animals need 
to learn which habitual behaviours and desired outcomes are good for which basic 
drives. Before moving on to the evidence for this, however, we should note that this 
kind of influence requires something like a distinction between occurrent and 
standing drives. The degree to which we are motivated by the need for food must 
change dramatically over relatively short periods of time, because there are some 
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times at which getting food quickly is absolutely necessary for survival. However, 
for the purposes of desire- and habit-learning, it may on the whole be counter-
productive for there to be significant fluctuations in how rewarding we find the 
satisfaction of basic drives at various times. When we consume a specific foodstuff 
when hungry, the appropriate point to learn is not that this foodstuff is particularly 
good, but that it is the kind of good that is particularly worth pursuing in that state of 
need. So it is plausibly beneficial for us to have stable standing drives that contribute 
to reward learning. But it is also certain that the brain must respond to short-term 
changes in physiological needs (and perhaps other comparable states, like being in 
season for animals that have few opportunities to mate) in a way capable of 
influencing action at that time. So I propose that we have both standing drives, 
which are simply dispositions to find outcomes rewarding, and occurrent drives, 
which are instances of activity representing internal states of particular motivational 
significance. 
Occurrent drives influence action in similar ways in the two systems. Regarding 
the habit system, Dickinson et al. (1995) showed that rats that had been extensively 
trained when hungry to perform an action for food would reduce responding when 
they were sated. This result could be explained in any of three ways: it could be that 
the rats’ overall level of arousal was reduced; or that the reduced responding was 
caused by a mechanism that identified outcomes as good for particular drives; or 
that the hunger the rats experienced when they were trained formed an internal 
component of the stimulus to which they learned to respond (Niv et al. 2006). 
Experiments by Niv and colleagues (2006) showed that rats that are trained when 
sated to lever-press for sugar solution do not increase responding when thirsty, and 
that rats that are trained when hungry to lever-press for sugar solution reduce 
responding when thirsty. Sugar solution is good for both hunger and thirst, so these 
results seem to contradict both of the first two hypotheses. The first hypothesis, that 
basic drives influence habits only by influencing overall arousal, would presumably 
predict that thirsty rats would respond more than sated rats in the first experiment. If 
thirst does increase arousal, then this effect must have been cancelled out in that 
experiment, and one explanation of how this could happen is that the rats’ 
representation of situation when they were thirsty was different from that when they 
were trained. The second hypothesis would predict again that thirst would increase 
responding for sugar solution, and also that thirst and hunger would both motivate 
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the rats to perform habits leading to sugar solution, so it is undermined by both 
experiments. The best available hypothesis at present, then, is that states such as 
hunger and thirst can act as internal stimuli in stimulus-response learning – that the 
representations of their environments that animals come to associate with actions in 
habit learning include details about some internal states. 
Somewhat similarly, in the goal-directed system, several studies have shown that  
behaviour is only modulated by occurrent drives after animals have undergone 
‘incentive learning’; that is, after they have experienced the outcomes involved 
when in the relevant drive-state. Perhaps the most famous study showing this effect, 
by Dickinson and Dawson (1988), also provides support independent of outcome 
devaluation experiments for the claim that rats represent the outcomes of their 
actions. In this experiment, hungry but not thirsty rats were trained to perform two 
different actions for different food rewards. They pressed a lever to receive food 
pellets, and pulled a chain to receive sucrose solution. The rats were then given the 
opportunity to perform these actions when thirsty. Rats that had previously 
consumed sucrose solution when thirsty preferentially pulled the chain in extinction, 
but those that had not had this experience performed the two actions equally. The 
fact that the thirsty, experienced rats pulled the chain more than they pressed the 
lever shows that they represented the outcome of this action. But for present 
purposes the point is that only the experienced rats showed this effect. More 
strikingly, similar results are found in simpler tests. Rats that have been trained to 
press a lever for food will not increase their performance when hungry, compared to 
controls, unless they have previously consumed that food when hungry (Balleine 
1992; for further examples and references see Niv et al. 2006). 
These results about the two systems apparently show that rats might sometimes 
fail to perform actions that have led to food becoming available to them in the past, 
even when they are hungry and no other food is available. They also suggest that 
rats, and presumably other mammals, might continue to desire food even when they 
are not hungry. This would make sense given the apparently indirect connection 
between hunger and desires for food, and certainly speaks to the modern human 
experience. These characteristics would not be seriously maladaptive in 
environments in which hunger was common – so that it was unlikely that any given 
food opportunity would be discovered only when sated – and in which 
overconsumption was not typically dangerous. In fact, in environments in which the 
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latter is the case, it is likely to be adaptive for desires for food not to be dependent 
on hunger, since this will motivate the discovery of food resources which may be 
useful in leaner times. Strikingly, salt appetite seems to work in a quite different 
way from basic drives more generally: rats that have experienced actions leading to 
the delivery of salt into their mouths will perform these actions when deprived of 
salt, even though salt delivery has previously always been an aversive experience for 
them (Tindell et al. 2009). This suggests the existence of a special-purpose 
mechanism for tracking the presence of salt and responding to salt appetites, which 
would make some sense given that in contrast to other foods, salt appetite is a rare 
condition and overconsumption of salt is dangerous even in the short term. 
 
3.4 Dopamine and Desire-Formation, Part 1 
 
Part of what it means for a system for action-control to be goal-directed, as that 
term is used in current neuroscience, is for the inputs to the system representing the 
values of outcomes to change in response to evidence. So it is not necessary to 
examine how desires are formed and modified in order to test my claim that this 
process is to some extent responsive to evidence for the reward values of outcomes 
(part of premise III). Instead, this claim will be shown to be true if we can establish 
that humans have a goal-directed control system with inputs that can reasonably be 
thought of as desires. Nonetheless, this section and the following one will be 
dedicated to the question of how desires are formed and modified. I need to address 
this question in order to fill a gap that currently exists in my account of the goal-
directed system, and because it is relevant to showing that what I am calling 
‘desires’ deserve that label. More importantly, though, the issue is fascinating in its 
own right. Our desires do not emerge spontaneously, but are products of the ways in 
which years of experiences, in combination with congenital individual differences, 
guide us along intricate pathways in accordance with – presumably – some relatively 
simple basic principles. In this section, I will discuss a principle which may be 
central to desire-formation and desire-updating. Then in section 3.5 I will outline 
some significant challenges to giving a more detailed account of this principle, and 
to saying what role dopamine plays in its implementation. 
 
The claim that I will explore and defend in this section is the following: 
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Core Claim about Desire Modification: Desire modification is the result of 
associations between representations of outcomes and reward signals, which are 
generated using basic drives and desires themselves. 
 
Very roughly, then, my desire for a given outcome will get stronger when I represent 
that outcome as occurring at the same time as, or shortly before, a positive reward 
signal occurs in my brain, and weaker when my representing that outcome is 
accompanied by a negative reward signal. There are several respects in which we 
can make this account less rough, and several reasons to think that something of the 
kind must be right. I will start with the idea that desires are updated by reward 
signals. 
By reward signals, I mean signals in the brain the strengths of which correspond, 
according to the functions of the signals, with the level of reward detected in the 
environment at the time, which are attuned in this way to reward in general, rather 
than to rewards of particular kinds such as the satisfaction of particular basic drives. 
The sense of ‘correspond’ I have in mind here is fairly weak, so that if phasic 
dopamine signals are reward prediction error signals, as suggested in section 2.4, 
then they would count as reward signals. So the kinds of signals that would count as 
reward signals include RPE signals of various sorts (there is not just one kind of 
RPE signal; see section 3.5), as well as signals that simply represent the level of 
reward detected at the time. It is very likely that, regardless of whether dopamine is 
a reward signal, there are such signals in the brain, which contribute to habit 
learning. Habit learning requires assessing how much reward the current situation 
provides. So a first reason for believing that desires are updated by reward signals is 
that we can be confident that such signals are present in the brain. Given that such 
signals are present, it would be very surprising if they were not used. Another reason 
to think that reward signals are crucial to updating desires is that incentive learning 
is necessary for rats to adapt goal-directed behaviour to their physiological needs, as 
discussed in the previous section. This suggests that desire-formation is a process of 
associating outcomes with reward in general, rather than particular sources of 
reward, such as the satisfaction of occurrent drives. 
A second point to note about this claim is that what matters for desire-
modification is not what is actually happening, but what the agent represents as 
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happening. Misrepresentation of either the outcome for which the desire is modified, 
or of other features of the situation, can affect the ways in which desires are 
changed. For example, someone who, walking in a garden at dusk, notices the 
pleasant scent of what looks to them like a rose will come to have a slightly stronger 
desire to be around roses – perhaps to have them in their own garden – even if the 
flower they noticed was in fact a peony. In this case, misrepresentation causes the 
wrong desire to be updated. But to take another example, someone who tries playing 
pool for the first time, has a weak opponent, and is congratulated on his performance 
may falsely believe that he has performed particularly well, and may consequently 
generate a reward signal which will boost his desire to play pool. In this case, the 
problem is that a misrepresentation has contributed to the generation of the reward 
signal, with the result that the right desire is updated in the wrong way. However, it 
is also important that we can represent the same situation in different ways without 
any misrepresentation, if our attention is drawn to different features or if we apply 
different representational resources. For example, if an adult and a child both sample 
a delicious handmade blackberry ice-cream, the adult’s desire for handmade 
blackberry ice-cream may be boosted, whereas for the child the main change may be 
to their desire for purple ice-cream. 
This point, that it is representation rather than reality that matters, also raises the 
possibility of offline desire-updating. In principle, it may be possible for humans to 
generate reward signals by imagining rewarding situations, associate them with 
imagined outcomes, and thus form and update desires for outcomes without 
experiencing those outcomes. It is certainly a familiar thought that we often try to 
work out what we want by imagining what it would be like to be in different 
possible situations, and this could explain the potentially puzzling datum that we 
often have desires for outcomes that we have never ourselves experienced (such as 
to become a surgeon, climb Chimborazo, or win an Olympic gold). There is also 
some empirical evidence suggesting that this may be possible. In a recent study, 
subjects were found to be able to cause increased activity in their own midbrain 
dopamine neurons by imagining pleasurable scenarios (Sulzer et al. 2013). Also, one 
study has found that artificially stimulating dopamine using the drug L-DOPA while 
participants imagined possible future events led to them predicting greater pleasure 
from those events (Sharot et al. 2009), and another that the OFC is activated by both 
real and imagined rewards (Bray et al. 2010). 
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It is also important that reward signals are generated using both basic drives and 
desires themselves. RPE signals can only be generated if some means is available 
for measuring the level of reward currently being received, and in the previous 
section I described how basic drives contribute to this process. In addition to this, 
desires themselves may also be used. If desires represent the reward values of 
outcomes, it makes sense for them to be used when the organism needs to know the 
value of outcomes that are occurring at the time. I have already suggested (section 
2.5) that precursors of desires could usefully play this role in habit-learning 
regardless of whether a goal-directed system was present. So on this view, desires 
would have two roles in action-selection, one direct and one indirect, and would 
relate to reward signals in two different ways, being both updated by them, and 
involved in generating them. The phenomenon of secondary reinforcement (noticed 
by early behaviourists including Skinner 1938 and Hull 1943) provides evidence 
that desire does contribute in this way; in secondary reinforcement, actions are 
reinforced when they lead to outcomes that animals have been trained to find 
rewarding, such as lights and tones. Tim Schroeder (2004) also finds evidence that 
desires play this role, and argues that it is disposing us to find outcomes rewarding, 
rather than disposing us to pursue them, that most centrally characterises desire (for 
more on Schroeder’s view, see chapter 5). 
The proposal at hand is therefore that desires tend to be strengthened when the 
outcomes that are their objects occur together with outcomes for which we have 
either basic drives or existing desires. This proposal may raise a concern about the 
possibility that desires could cause themselves to be strengthened, and I will turn to 
this topic in the next section. But it is also noteworthy in that it may be adaptive for 
animals such as rats to be capable of secondary reinforcement, because it would 
provide one way in which they could learn to take actions that would lead to basic-
drive satisfaction, but only through relatively lengthy processes; developing intrinsic 
desires for means is one alternative to developing the ability to perform multi-step 
means-end reasoning. A related point is that on this proposal, we can better explain 
how humans come to have desires for outcomes that are apparently far-removed 
from the satisfaction of basic drives. 
 
The core claim about desire modification is attractive for three further reasons. 
First, this account of how desires are formed and updated seems to get the level of 
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responsiveness to reasons in these processes about right. It does not suggest that we 
desire at random, but instead explains our desires as products of a somewhat crude 
system, shared with many other animals, for getting us to desire things that tend to 
contribute to the satisfaction of our basic drives. If at least this level of 
responsiveness to reasons in desire-formation was not achieved, it would not be 
plausible that having desires at all would be more adaptive than lacking them. On 
the other hand, it also avoids the mistake of suggesting that our desires will always 
track our conscious, explicit judgments about what is good for us, biologically or 
otherwise. This is clearly not the case; for instance, someone who believes their 
doctor when they are told that eating cheese is bad for their health will not 
immediately lose their desire to eat cheese – they may never lose it. This point 
shows that desires are only responsive to evidence when it is made available in the 
right form. Getting sick after eating cheese may be less good evidence that it is 
unhealthy than the doctor’s testimony, but more effective in changing our desires. 
Also, it can often be hard to tell why we have the desires we do, and why our desires 
change (although not difficult to come up with plausible candidate explanations), 
and this shows that desires do not change as a result of conscious, explicit reasoning, 
but instead by some process of which we are only partially aware. On a related 
point, the origins of our desires often seem to reach back deep into our pasts, as the 
present account would predict, since its recursive form implies that desires may 
often be the products of complex and gradual processes of development. For 
example, I like to hike in the mountains, and although I can give the ‘desirability 
characterisation’ (Anscombe 1957) of this activity that it feels adventurous, I can 
only speculate about why adventure is attractive to me. 
Second, if dopamine is the reward signal that updates desires, then the account 
has the advantage of offering an attractive explanation of drug addiction. By various 
mechanisms, alcohol, nicotine, cocaine, opiates and amphetamines all boost the 
strength of dopamine signals. This means that if the present hypothesis about 
dopamine is right, then drug addiction is apparently the result of ‘hijacking’ of the 
system for desire-formation (Hyman 2005, Holton & Berridge 2014). On this view, 
because dopamine signals are reliably caused by addictive drugs, regardless of 
whether they are more rewarding than expected, the strength of standing desires for 
addictive drugs grows with every hit. In the presence of drug cues, therefore, addicts 
will experience extremely strong occurrent desires to take drugs. This explanation of 
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addiction has some independent advantages over its rivals, such as that drug-seeking 
behaviour is flexible and sophisticated, and consequently harder to explain in terms 
of distorted habits than distorted desires (Berridge & Robinson 2011, Holton & 
Berridge 2014). It therefore provides indirect evidence for the idea that dopamine 
updates desires, which would fit the present picture. Unfortunately, as we will see in 
the next section, there is considerable uncertainty about dopamine’s role. 
Third, the account can explain how we come to have the wide range of intrinsic 
desires that we typically attribute to one another. It is perhaps surprising that a 
mechanism that we share with rats and mice could explain our subtle aesthetic 
preferences and often abstract, specific ambitions, but the present account puts no 
limits on what can be desired except the agent’s representational capacities. Humans 
may be expected to have many, varied and sophisticated desires, given the following 
several points: we have sophisticated representational capacities; we can imagine 
outcomes in detail without having experienced them before, and we often exercise 
this ability; it is plausible that we have basic drives for social status and evidence of 
approval by those around us; and we live in remarkably rich and complex cultures. It 
is also worth noting that capitalist culture includes practices designed to exploit 
weaknesses of our desire-formation systems, to motivate us to work for things we 
may or may not otherwise desire. The point is that when we add these features of 
human psychology to the simple general-purpose system the present account 
describes, it is likely to result in our having many and varied desires. This is 
important because it supports the claim that what I am calling ‘desires’ really are 
desires, if they are likely to take the same sorts of objects. 
I endorse the core claim in its present, rather vague form. Its main deficiency is 
leaving some important and basic questions about desire-modification unanswered, 
as I will describe in the next section. 
 
3.5 Dopamine and Desire-Formation, Part 2 
 
The core claim about desire-modification outlined and defended in the previous 
section leaves two kinds of questions unanswered. First, it says nothing about the 
implementation of the desire-modification system in the brain – for instance, about 
whether the reward signal used to update desires is dopamine or something else. 
Second, the account it gives of how, in computational terms, the reward signal is 
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generated and used to update desires is really too vague to be satisfactory. 
Unfortunately, however, the current state of neuroscientific research on these topics 
does not permit the development of a more detailed account, largely because of 
uncertainty about the function of phasic dopamine signals. I will first discuss the 
debate about the function of phasic dopamine, then turn to computational issues. 
 
So far, we have seen that phasic dopamine signals may constitute RPE signals, 
and be used for habit learning. The evidence supporting this view includes Schultz’ 
classic studies showing that phasic dopamine signals transfer from occurring after 
rewards are delivered, to occurring after reward cues, and computational, anatomical 
and physiological evidence that if dopamine signals were RPEs, they would be 
suitable for updating habits (see section 2.4). We have also seen that the effects of 
drugs of abuse on dopamine levels are apparently responsible for their addictive 
nature, a point which indirectly supports the idea that dopamine signals update 
desires. However, the function of phasic dopamine signals has been a topic of 
intense research interest among neuroscientists for many years, generating a very 
large body of literature, and this literature remains inconclusive. Among the 
experimental results produced are some that appear to give fairly strong support to 
the idea that dopamine updates desires, and others that seem to contradict it. 
For example, studies show that the effect of blocking dopamine transmission on 
instrumental behaviour is similar to the effect of removing the reward (sometimes 
called ‘extinction mimicry’; see Wise 2004, Berridge 2007). If a rat is trained to 
press a lever to receive a food reward, and then allowed to press the lever without 
receiving the reward, then the rate at which it presses the lever will gradually fall. If 
it is given the same training, then allowed to press the lever after having been given 
a drug that blocks dopamine (called a ‘neuroleptic’), but with food still available, the 
rate of lever presses will also fall gradually. So the absence of dopamine, which 
according to the theory would be interpreted as a negative RPE signal, seems to 
teach rats to abandon learnt actions; this result could be explained if dopamine was 
used as a reward signal in either habit-learning or desire-updating. In another 
experiment, blocking dopamine receptors specifically in the nucleus accumbens 
prevented rats from developing approach behaviour towards initially neutral cues 
that were paired with rewards (Parkinson et al. 2002), which seems to favour the 
view that desires are updated by dopamine signals. Also, the phenomenon of 
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transreinforcer blocking (Burke et al. 2007) supports the view that desires are 
updated by prediction error signals. In the first phase of this procedure, a rat is 
trained to associate a neutral stimulus, such as a tone, with a rewarding outcome 
such as delivery of a food pellet. This training is sufficient to make the tone a 
conditioned reinforcer; afterwards the rat will perform an action such as lever-
pressing in order to hear the tone. Then in a subsequent phase, the tone and another 
neutral stimulus, such as a light, are presented simultaneously prior to the delivery 
of a food pellet. Although this combination of events is repeated, the light does not 
become a conditioned reinforcer for the rat; learning about the value of the light is 
‘blocked’, because the light only ever leads to a reward that is predicted by the tone. 
On the other hand, Wassum and colleagues (2011) found that allowing rats to 
consume sucrose after a 23-hour period of food deprivation led them to pursue that 
food more vigorously on a future occasion, when they were not so food-deprived. 
The apparent explanation is that the rats came to desire sucrose more, having 
experienced it in circumstances in which they were likely to find it particularly 
good. But the significant result for our purposes is that the experimenters conducted 
this test both on controls, and on rats that were treated with a dopamine-blocking 
drug at the time at which they consumed the sucrose when food-deprived, and found 
that the drug had no effect. The rats that had lacked dopamine when they had the 
opportunity to update their desire for sucrose had apparently strengthened it just as 
much as the untreated rats, suggesting that dopamine is not necessary for desire-
updating. 
As philosophers, we are not in a particularly good position to assess the 
significance of these and the many other relevant studies. But this brings us to a 
more serious problem for assessing the claim that phasic dopamine signals update 
desires, which is that this claim is not one of the main alternatives under discussion 
in the debate about what these signals are for. This means that we cannot benefit 
from the expertise and cumulative efforts of the neuroscientific community in 
evaluating it, which strongly suggests that we should suspend judgment on this 
claim. 
Instead, the two most prominent views in the debate about the function of 
dopamine are that it is an RPE signal for updating habits, and that it is for promoting 
action at the time of release, in response to cues that predict the availability of 
reward. The latter view is advocated by Kent Berridge and his colleagues (e.g. 
 60 
Berridge 2007), who use the slogan that dopamine is for ‘wanting’ rather than 
‘learning’ or ‘liking’ (they themselves use the scare quotes). Berridge’s view is that 
the classic experiments by Schultz described in section 2.4, which show that 
dopamine signals transfer from occurring subsequent to rewards, to occurring 
subsequent to reward cues, do not distinguish between the hypotheses that dopamine 
is an RPE signal for learning and a signal with the function of producing immediate 
motivation to exploit rewarding situations. He favours the latter view primarily 
because experiments on mutant mice suggest that the absence of dopamine does not 
wholly prevent habit learning (Cannon & Palmiter 2003, Hnasko et al. 2005), and 
that higher than normal levels of dopamine do not seem to boost habit-learning 
(Cagniard et al. 2006, Yin et al. 2006). Berridge does endorse the idea that dopamine 
updates desires in his paper on addiction co-authored with Richard Holton (Holton 
& Berridge 2014), but there is little discussion of this view in his papers in scientific 
journals. Meanwhile, neuroscientists who are positive about the suggestion that 
dopamine updates habits describe the idea that it also updates desires as 
anatomically attractive but computationally puzzling (Balleine et al. 2008); I will 
turn to some such computational puzzles next. 
 
There are three main respects in which the algorithm used for updating desires is 
underspecified by the core claim of the last section. First, the notion of a reward 
signal is deliberately vague. It is not specified whether this is a signal representing 
perceived reward or an RPE, and this issue is compounded because RPEs of 
different kinds are apparently suitable for updating habits and desires, respectively.8 
Second, there is a problem about how basic drives and desires should combine in 
measuring received reward. Third, given that we experience more than one outcome 
at any one time – and indeed that this may be a necessary condition for desire 
learning – it is not obvious exactly how reward signals should influence desires for 
outcomes represented at the time, and this appears to depend on the nature of the 
reward signal. I will give some more detail about these problems and about potential 
solutions, but my aim is not to defend any particular account. My view is that these 
are challenging but not insoluble problems, and that to solve them – that is, to give a 
more satisfactory account of desire modification – will require the full range of 
                                                
8 This point was brought to my attention by Nick Shea. 
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techniques of modern neuroscience, including computer modelling and simulation 
as well as behavioural, anatomical and physiological studies. Because the problems 
interact with one another, I will describe all three before discussing potential 
solutions. 
On the nature of the reward signal, matters would be relatively simple if the same 
kind of signal was suitable for updating both habits and desires. In that case, the 
only obstacle to concluding that phasic dopamine signals perform both of these two 
roles would be some awkward experimental results. However, the evidence suggests 
that phasic dopamine is some form of RPE signal, and RPE signals of different 
kinds are, at least on the face of it, required for the two roles. To update habits 
correctly the signal required is one representing the difference between the level of 
reward currently being experienced and the average level of reward that the action 
just performed has led to in the past, whereas to update desires correctly the signal 
required is apparently one representing the difference between the level of reward 
currently being experienced and the level of reward that the current outcomes have 
provided on average in the past. Because of this difference, an agent using one 
signal for both purposes would be subject to certain systematic failings. In 
particular, an agent which used an RPE signal adapted for habit-learning to update 
desires might dramatically overestimate the reward value of outcomes that are often 
delivered unpredictably. 
For example, imagine a creature for which strawberries are rewarding, which 
often discovers them when foraging, and suppose further that it calculates RPEs by 
subtracting the reward level predicted by its actions from the level received. On 
typical occasions on which it discovers strawberries, this creature will produce a 
positive RPE signal, because discovering strawberries is a better-than-average 
outcome from any given moment’s foraging, and we are assuming that it is difficult 
to predict. Also, because the creature’s desire for strawberries will itself be used in 
working out how much reward it is receiving at any given time, it will rarely 
produce negative RPEs when discovering strawberries, even if it expected to find 
them, and hence predicted a very high level of reward (such negative RPEs would 
only occur when discovering strawberries was concurrent with some aversive 
outcome). So the strength of the creature’s standing desire will enter a runaway 
feedback loop, spiralling upwards just in virtue of the fact that strawberries are 
somewhat satisfying to basic drives and that they are often discovered unexpectedly. 
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It is worth noting that this is not the only form the problem could take; if the same 
creature expected to receive strawberries as the result of some outcome, but actually 
received a similarly-rewarding novel foodstuff – say melon – it would not produce a 
strong positive RPE signal, and would therefore miss out on the opportunity to learn 
that melon is a worthy object of desire. It is possible that we do tend to overvalue 
rewards that are hard to predict – this might explain why we are so attracted to 
gambling and following sports – but that is only one of a number of possible 
responses to this challenge. 
Moving on to the next issue, it is in any case unclear how desire-updating avoids 
runaway feedback loops. Consider the desire to eat strawberries, and assume that 
strawberry-eating satisfies some basic drives. Assuming that there is a good way to 
measure the level of reward currently being received, it would make sense for the 
strength of this desire to be updated by a signal representing the difference between 
this level, and the average level of reward that eating strawberries has provided in 
the past. This is because the strength of the standing desire for strawberries should 
be proportional to the average level of reward the agent has received in the past from 
strawberries, and a running average may be maintained using the following formula: 
 𝑣! =  𝑣!!! +  1𝑛 (𝑟 − 𝑣!!!) 
 
where vt is the new average, vt-1 the old average, n the number of experiences of 
eating strawberries including the present one, and r the level of reward measured at 
t. So it looks like all we need to keep this desire at the right level is for it to get 
stronger or weaker according to the value of a signal corresponding to (r – vt-1), and 
to change less in response to this signal on each subsequent occasion (Holton & 
Berridge 2014). 
However, combined with the idea that reward is measured using both basic drives 
and existing desires, this proposal runs into trouble. For suppose that strawberries 
provide about the same amount of basic drive satisfaction on each occasion – call 
this value a – and that r is found by adding this level of drive satisfaction to the level 
of reward that the agent represents eating strawberries as providing. Then on each 
occasion when the agent eats strawberries we will get: 
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𝑟 = 𝑎 +  𝑣!!! 
 
because the level of reward r  that they perceive will be the sum of the reward they 
from drive-satisfaction and that which they get from having their desire to eat 
strawberries satisfied. Substituting in, we get the result that: 
 𝑣! =  𝑣!!! +  1𝑛 𝑎 
 
and hence that the strength of the agent’s desire for strawberries after n occasions 
will be given by: 
 𝑎1 +  𝑎2 +  𝑎3 +⋯+  𝑎𝑛 
 
assuming that the initial strength of the desire is 0. But this is a problem, because 
this series – called the Harmonic Series – is divergent. So if we assume that 
strawberries will always satisfy the agent’s basic drives to the same degree, the 
straightforward view described here implies that the desire for strawberries will get 
stronger every time they are consumed, with no limit to its potential strength. 
Turning now to the third problem, we are assuming that some outcomes are 
desired not because they satisfy the agents’ basic drives, but because they are 
associated with other desired outcomes. This suggests that agents must represent 
outcomes as occurring together, as we would expect – it is normal for more than one 
thing that one desires to be salient at a time. But this raises a range of questions 
about how reward signals should influence the strengths of desires for multiple 
simultaneous outcomes. For instance, if an outcome previously taken to be mildly 
aversive occurs at the same time as one that is desired, it is plausible that the reward 
signal should affect the valuations of each of these two outcomes in opposite ways – 
the former should become more liked, and the latter less liked. This does not fit the 
idea, which has so far been assumed, that one reward signal is produced at a time, 
and positive reward signals strengthen desires and negative ones weaken them. It is 
this kind of case in particular that I will from now on refer to as the ‘third problem’; 
it is the problem of how to use one reward signal to update multiple desires of 
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different current strengths. But there are also other difficulties in the area: what if it 
is obvious that one of the outcomes being represented, and not the others, are 
responsible for some basic drive’s being satisfied – will the way desires are updated 
reflect this? And another complication is that the desirabilities of some outcomes 
seem to be dependent on one another, while others are independent – for instance, 
for most people the value of having butter depends a lot on whether one has bread, 
but the value of having chocolate is not dependent in this way on other outcomes. 
A final complication which I will not attempt to address is that experiencing 
pleasure is plausibly both a consequence of desire- and drive-satisfaction, and itself 
an object of desire; experiencing pleasure is something we can represent, which is 
likely to be associated with reward. 
 
I now turn to some potential solutions to these problems. First, there is a simple 
solution to the second problem, which is for all desires to gradually lose strength 
over time, to compensate for the inflationary effect of using desires themselves to 
measure received reward. This weakening would only need to be gradual to make up 
for the effect described, because although the harmonic series is divergent, it grows 
slowly. The weakening would apply equally to all desires, and would have the 
potentially maladaptive effect of weakening desires for objects that were rarely 
experienced, and hence not subject to problematic inflation, as well as those for 
desires that were experienced frequently. So in principle it could cause standing 
desires to be lost, even when their objects had only ever been found to be positively 
rewarding. Our everyday experience arguably shows that this is possible. 
The first and third problems require somewhat more complicated solutions. I will 
describe two ways in which desire-updating could go, each of which seems to deal 
with (although not necessarily solve) both problems. These two ways that desire-
updating could go are distinguished by whether reward signals update desires for 
outcomes that are represented at the time of the signals, or for outcomes that are 
represented shortly before the signals. 
If the reward signal updates desires for outcomes that are represented at the time 
of the signal, and this reward signal is an RPE signal of the kind suited to updating 
habits, then the system will face the first problem: the agent will come to have 
disproportionately strong desires for hard-to-predict outcomes, and may also make 
some other ‘mistakes’ in updating their desires. Also, there will sometimes be 
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situations in which two outcomes are represented as occurring at a time, which 
ought to be updated in opposite directions, but which will be modified by the same 
reward signal. These two problems could both be solved, however, if the reward 
signal did not represent a reward prediction error, but instead the level of reward 
received at the time. This signal could then be used to update each desire 
individually, with desires being strengthened if the signal represented that a greater 
level of reward was currently being received than the average for that outcome in the 
past, and weakened if the signal represented a lower level of reward. The same 
signal would cause some desires to become stronger, and others weaker. This is in 
contrast to the way that RPE signals are thought to update habits, because under that 
hypothesis any positive RPE signal will strengthen the habit, regardless of its current 
strength. 
This approach would solve both problems for the same reason: in effect, desires 
would be updated according to the difference between the level of reward being 
received at the time, and the level that the outcome concerned had been associated 
with in the past. The most obvious apparent weakness of the approach is that if 
several rewarding outcomes were experienced at the same time, desires for them all 
might be strengthened considerably, even though none were better than they had 
been in the past (this assumes that the reward signal is calculated by adding the 
levels of reward that each feature of the situation is taken to provide). But this is 
simply another version of the same inflationary effect that I described as the second 
problem, and can be solved in the same way. It is important to bear in mind, too, that 
if desires are to change at all, they should get stronger when the desired objects are 
associated in experience with other rewards. It is a mistake to think that desires 
should not change when outcomes are in themselves the same as on past occasions – 
what matters for desire-updating is associations between outcomes. A less obvious 
potential weakness is that this kind of system may require a relatively sophisticated 
neural implementation. 
Finally, the second potential solution is that desires might not track the levels of 
reward that occur concurrently with outcomes, but instead the levels of reward that 
those outcomes predict. This would mean that they could be updated directly by the 
same kind of RPE signal that is suitable for updating habits. To learn how much 
reward an outcome predicts, the necessary signal is one representing the difference 
between the level of reward that occurs on occasions subsequent to the outcome’s 
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occurrence, and the average level of reward that has followed it in the past. If we 
think of actions as a special kind of outcome, this is a generalisation of the RPE 
signal that works for habits (see Barto 2007 for a more detailed formal treatment). 
This approach would solve the first problem, because while unpredicted rewards 
would boost the strength of desires for the features of the states of affairs that 
preceded them, these would be weakened again when the rewards failed to occur on 
subsequent occasions. It would not solve the third problem, because the desires for 
all of the outcomes that were salient prior to a given reward signal would be updated 
in the same way. But evidence for transreinforcer blocking, described above, seems 
to show that the desire-updating mechanism has this very flaw. In transreinforcer 
blocking, one outcome which is desired and another which is neutral simultaneously 
occur prior to the same reward, and neither is strengthened, even though it would 
plausibly be adaptive for the desire for the neutral outcome to be strengthened while 
the other is left alone. 
An interesting feature of this approach is that it would mean that desires are, or 
are similar to, Pavlovian values. Pavlovian values are psychological states which are 
usually thought of as guiding attention and unlearnt behaviours, such as approach 
behaviours. Consider a rat which learns to approach a certain corner of its cage 
when a light there turns on, because this is often followed by the delivery of a food 
pellet. This behaviour could be explained by either the habit system, or the goal-
directed system – the rat might have learnt either that approaching the light tends to 
be rewarding; or that it tends to lead to getting food, which is rewarding. But it 
could also be explained in the following way: that rats have an unlearnt tendency to 
approach stimuli which predict reward (e.g. things that look or smell like food), and 
the rat has learnt that the light predicts reward. This would be an instance of 
Pavlovian learning (as in the case of Pavlov’s dogs, the animal now performs an 
unlearnt action in response to a new stimulus) and would involve the acquisition of a 
new Pavlovian value. Pavlovian values may also have various important parts to 
play in the habitual and goal-directed systems (Balleine, Daw & O’Doherty 2008). 
Apparently, Pavlovian values are like desires in that they are supposed to track 
something about the reward values associated with features of states of affairs, but 
unlike them in that they do this for a different purpose; desires are primarily for 
assessing possible outcomes in the goal-directed system, whereas Pavlovian values 
are for guiding responses to perceived stimuli (Balleine & O’Doherty 2010). 
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The most obvious apparent weakness of this approach is that it would mean that 
outcomes that were consistently represented concurrently with very strong reward 
signals would not come to be desired. But this effect would be alleviated if the 
outcomes persisted through time, or were represented in anticipation by the agent. 
More generally, it is somewhat counterintuitive that we would work for outcomes 
that predict reward, rather than those that occur concurrently with reward, and 
therefore might be thought of as constituting or providing rewards. But it is 
important to bear in mind that on this view satisfying existing desires would still 
cause reward signals to be produced – desired outcomes would still be rewarding in 
themselves. It is also hard to think of a class of outcomes that we desire because 
they occur together with, rather than predicting, the satisfaction of our basic drives. 
 
In my view, the arguments and evidence of this and the previous section show 
that although we are in a position to give a rough account of how desires are formed 
and updated, we are not yet able to fill in the details of that account. However, even 
the rough account helps to support the idea that the inputs to the goal-directed 
system are appropriately thought of as desires, since they behave in the kinds of 
ways, and may take the kinds of objects, that we usually associate with desires. 
 
3.6 Diagram Showing Findings So Far 
 
In chapters 2 and 3 my aim has been to present a compelling overall account of 
the habitual and goal-directed systems, while focusing on those details that will be 
most important later. In this section, which concludes chapter 3, I present some of 
this information in a different way: figure 2 shows the architecture of the goal-
directed and habitual systems, as described in chapters 2 and 3. 
 
There are several points to notice. It is important to note that the diagram is based 
on the assumption that desires are like Pavlovian values, as suggested towards the 
end of the last section, and are updated by RPEs in the form of phasic dopamine 
signals. However, this should not be taken as an endorsement of this view (see 
section 3.5). Also, the green arrow from ‘Reward Prediction Error’ to ‘Action-
outcome contingencies’ reflects the view that dopamine signals are necessary for 
action-outcome learning. This view is not universal, but is defended by Horvitz 
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(2009), and I include it for the sake of showing a possible mechanism for the 
acquisition of these states. 
The red and blue arrows show the routes by which action is produced by the 
habitual and goal-directed systems, respectively. The habitual system is activated by 
environmental and internal states – such as occurrent basic drives – which are 
associated via habits with particular responses, and tends to cause the production of 
these responses. Or to put it a different way, the habitual system uses information 
about current environmental and internal states to directly assess the present values 
of a range of actions, and these value-representations are then consumed by the 
action selector. In the diagram, the ‘Action Selector’ box is a place-holder for the 
mechanism by which the outputs of the two systems are combined for the ultimate 
determination of action; see chapter 4 for more discussion of this mechanism. The 
action selector sends information about what action is to be performed to the system 
which generates RPEs. 
Meanwhile, the goal-directed process (blue arrows) can start in any of three 
ways: either internal states or perception of the environment can trigger occurrent 
desires, or the environment can cause the recognition of affordances. Occurrent 
desires and instrumental beliefs (representations of action-outcome contingencies) 
then interact to establish how to satisfy occurrent desires and what the other 
consequences of these actions would be, and/or to assess the consequences of the 
actions afforded by the environment. New desires become occurrent, and existing 
occurrent desires change in strength, in the course of these processes. These 
processes ultimately result in values being assigned to a range of actions, and again 




Fig. 2. A cognitive architecture for action learning and selection. SM = sensorimotor cortex; DLS = 
dorsolateral striatum; OFC = orbitofrontal cortex; VS = ventral striatum; mPFC = medial prefrontal 
cortex; DMS = dorsomedial striatum; VTA/SNc = ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra pars 
compacta. Different coloured arrows represent projections that form parts of distinct systems. Red 
arrows are for the route by which the habitual system drives action; blue arrows are for the goal-
directed control of action; and green arrows are for connections that are not directly involved in 
action-selection, but are crucial for learning. Black arrows are for connections that are essential to 
more than one of these three processes, or are not integral to any of them. 
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In this chapter my topic has been the neuroscience of desire and of goal-directed 
control. Among the most important points that have been established are: 
- that there is good evidence that human desires are located in the orbitofrontal 
cortex and ventral striatum, including some which is independent of my 
claim that desires are the value-representing inputs to the goal-directed 
system; 
- that for several reasons, it is important to distinguish standing and occurrent 
desires, and that it is occurrent desires, which are modulated in strength by 
many occurrent factors, as well as by their corresponding standing desires, 
that directly influence actions; 
- that basic drives, including physiological needs, influence action in the 
moment by acting as internal stimuli for habits, and causing the formation 
and affecting the strength of occurrent desires; 
- that basic drives and existing desires both also affect future action by 
contributing to the formation of reward signals; 
- and that desire-formation and -updating takes place when representations of 
currently-occurring outcomes are associated with reward signals. 
Together with the work of chapter 2, the results of this chapter make a great deal of 
progress in support of the three empirical premises that I am aiming to establish. 
However, I will not give my final word on these premises until the end of chapter 4, 
because we are yet to consider how the habitual and goal-directed systems interact 
with one another, and crucially how they fit into an overall account of human action-
selection. We cannot conclude that the inputs to the goal-directed system are desires 
without examining from a wider perspective what roles they do and do not play in 
determining human behaviour. That is the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Sources of Motivation and Action 
 
4.1 Action-Selection by the Two Systems 
 
In this chapter, I will address two questions that take a wider perspective on the 
systems that determine how we act. First, a missing piece of the picture outlined in 
chapters 2 and 3 is an account of what determines how animals with two systems for 
action-selection choose what to do, given that these two systems will not always 
recommend the same action. So I will consider various proposals that 
neuroscientists have made on this point. Second, I will discuss whether there are any 
other systems that are capable of driving action and motivation in humans and other 
animals, and if so, how they are related to the goal-directed system. This will 
involve considering a number of questions that have been discussed extensively by 
philosophers, including whether emotions or evaluative beliefs are capable of 
motivating action and how desires and intentions are related, but I will aim to give 
empirically-motivated responses. My approach will be to try to sketch answers to 
these questions that fit well into the overall picture of action selection that I am in 
the process of developing. To my knowledge, no scientific consensus exists about 
either of the two issues I will discuss in this chapter, although there are many 
interesting theories and results that bear on them. One point that bears on both 
questions is that neuroscientists typically assume that both systems work 
stochastically, meaning that the action predicted to be the most rewarding is not 
always taken – instead, it has the highest probability of being selected. 
Since this is the last of my three chapters on the empirical evidence relevant to 
my overall project, I will close by explaining how the evidence, theory and 
arguments I have presented support the three premises that I am aiming to establish 
in part I. Chapter 5, the last in part I, will be dedicated to showing why my account 
of the nature of desire is preferable to that developed by Tim Schroeder (2004, 
Arpaly & Schroeder 2014). 
 
Regarding the first question, it is not known whether there is some process that 
determines which of the two systems controls action, or whether the two systems 
merely assign values to actions, which are used by a downstream mechanism to 
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determine what is done. The difference between these two options is illustrated by 
cases in which three options are salient, with the following properties: one is 
strongly favoured by the goal-directed system but strongly disfavoured by the 
habitual system; the second is equally strongly favoured by the habitual system and 
disfavoured by the goal-directed system; and a third is moderately favoured by both 
systems. If the process of action selection was delegated to one or other system – the 
former option – then one of the first two ‘controversial’ actions would be most 
likely to be selected. But if a mechanism existed that could amalgamate the results 
of the two systems – the latter option – then a compromise might be most likely. 
One prominent account of how actions are selected, of the latter type, is the 
affordance competition hypothesis (Cisek 2007). Although Cisek does not frame his 
view in terms of the goal-directed and habitual systems, it is distinguished by two 
features that are relevant to the present discussion. These are that distinct ‘stages’ of 
action selection actually take place in parallel, and that action selection is achieved 
by a competition in which all represented aspects of a possible action are involved. 
As we interact with our environments, new affordances are continually being 
identified (primarily by the dorsal visual stream). The frontal and parietal cortices 
then go to work on these action possibilities, calculating both what their results 
would be, and how to perform them. Multiple sources of information are 
simultaneously recruited: the mPFC and OFC might model the actions’ 
consequences and the levels of reward they would provide, while the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) models the costs of performance, and habits represented in 
the DLS bias activity in the sensorimotor cortex. Actions that are favoured, or even 
merely salient, become associated with strong activity across these networks, while 
less favoured actions are inhibited. When some threshold level of activity is reached, 
the action that has reached it will be performed. A significant attraction of this 
picture is its coherence with the account of action selection by the basal ganglia 
given in section 2.3. It is also a flexible hypothesis; for instance, we could drop the 
claim that only affordances get the process of action-selection started in favour of 
the view that occurrent desires prompted by the enviroment can also play this role, 
without compromising the central claim that action-selection is achieved by parallel 
processes generating competing neural coalitions. 
The affordance competition hypothesis might be thought to make the unintuitive 
prediction that we cannot choose our goals prior to considering how to act to achieve 
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them. The intuition that this is possible is supported by a study by Wunderlich and 
colleagues (2010), who found neural evidence of choice between possible outcomes, 
before it had been revealed what actions could produce those outcomes. From one 
point of view, this is utterly unsurprising; it seems obvious that we can choose 
whether we would prefer an apple or an ice-cream without considering what it 
would take to get them. Some opponents of the affordance competition hypothesis 
(e.g. Padoa-Schioppa 2011) take the view that at least a significant proportion of 
action selection is achieved by selecting the most rewarding outcome, then 
considering what action to perform to obtain it. This process differs from that 
proposed by Cisek in that it divides action selection into stages, to be accomplished 
in series. It would also involve the selection of only one action by the goal-directed 
system prior to any competition with the habitual system, assuming that this 
competition does not take place before consideration of specific actions. However, 
we should take care to distinguish the capacity to run some processes relevant to 
action selection off-line, which is what we need in order to choose in principle 
between an apple and an ice-cream, from the separate capacity to use prior 
deliberation to constrain future action-selection processes. The latter would present a 
more serious challenge to the hypothesis, but is less obviously a real human trait 
(although it certainly seems that prior deliberation can bias future decision-making). 
A further prediction of the affordance competition hypothesis is that there is no 
dedicated neural system for arbitrating between the goal-directed and habitual 
systems. This is in contrast to a proposal by Daw, Niv and Dayan (2005), who 
argued that whichever system was more likely to be accurate at a given time would 
control action. They suggest that a particular brain area (the authors mention the 
ACC and the infralimbic cortex) would be responsible for tracking the uncertainty 
associated with predictions made by each system, and delegating control to the 
system exhibiting the lower uncertainty. Typically, the habit system would be 
uncertain regarding relatively novel circumstances and actions, since it learns 
slowly, while the goal-directed system would be uncertain regarding distant 
outcomes that require the construction of the most extensive models. As well as 
being an account of how the two systems might interact, the hypothesis put forward 
by Daw and his colleagues also says something about their relative advantages. 
Another example of a proposal of this sort is made by Keramati, Dezfouli and Peray 
(2011), who suggest that the habit system has an advantage in producing fast 
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responses, but that the goal-directed system is better at making accurate choices in 
changing environments (cf. Sterelny 2003). 
A further advantage of the approach taken by the affordance competition 
hypothesis is that it makes no difference to the theory if there are more than two 
systems involved in controlling action in humans or other animals. On that 
approach, the goal-directed and habitual systems are used in parallel to evaluate 
salient possible actions, with the evaluations provided by each of these systems 
contributing to the ‘scoring’ of a competition between those actions. It is entirely 
compatible with this approach that the ‘scoring’ of the competition could also be 
affected by other factors, and I will argue in the next section that several other 
factors do indeed influence action. There are also some other respects in which the 
ideas I will put forward there fit well with this approach, so I will assume that it is 
broadly correct, and that there is no higher-level system responsible for delegating 
control of action-selection to one or other of the two systems. 
 
4.2 Further Sources of Motivation and Action 
 
In this section, I will discuss three possible further sources of motivation and 
action. Humans and other animals may also be motivated by a drive to explore; by 
their emotions; or by evaluative beliefs, plans and intentions. In each case, it is 
plausible that there are processes or systems that are capable of causing action 
independently of the habitual and goal-directed systems, or at least of having a 
significant influence on which actions those systems select. As well as these three, 
there are also reflexes, which I will not discuss. In pointing out these possible 
sources of motivation and action, one of my aims is to show the variety of resources 
that an empirically-informed approach can draw on to explain human action. 
Philosophers take a particular interest in potentially puzzling aspects of human 
behaviour such as weakness of will, ‘desiring the bad’ (Stocker 1979), and playful 
or apparently purposeless action, and an important challenge for accounts of action-
selection is to show how these can be explained, given that the mind has largely 
been shaped by natural selection. My main aim in this section, however, is to further 




In order to maximise the amount of reward that they receive from their 
environments, agents typically need to engage in both exploration and exploitation. 
For many animals, exploration might involve going to new places, approaching, 
smelling, tasting or manipulating new objects, and behaving in new ways in 
interacting with conspecifics. The value of this sort of behaviour is obvious: it 
allows animals to learn about their environments, the consequences of their 
behaviour, and the reward values of outcomes. However, it is not obvious how such 
behaviour is generated. Both the habitual and goal-directed systems seem to be 
suited to producing exploitative behaviour; they cause the actions with the greatest 
expected reward, of those that the agent already has some experience of. But it 
would be wrong to conclude that these two systems are incapable of causing 
exploratory behaviour, for two reasons. First, if it is correct that both systems 
operate stochastically, it is possible for them to cause actions that are not represented 
as being particularly rewarding, and this would also allow them to cause actions 
even in novel environments, as long as possible actions can be identified. Second, 
exploratory behaviours are only worth performing if their probable reward value, 
over the long term, is higher than alternatives. For instance, the choice to abandon 
the exploitation of one food source in order to search for another should only be 
taken if (simplifying somewhat) the value of the new source, multiplied by the 
chance of finding it, is greater than the value of the known source. So the distinction 
between exploratory and exploitative behaviours is not as clear as it might at first 
appear, and an ideal goal-directed system would be capable of recognising the value 
of exploration. In practice, it may be that the property of being novel is associated by 
the goal-directed or habitual systems with some value, which could change as a 
result of learning, and which allows exploratory actions to be chosen above 
exploitative ones. 
However, there is also another way in which exploratory behaviour could be 
generated, which relies on the plausible idea that for an action to be selected, the 
activity-strength of a representation of that action just needs to pass some absolute 
or relative threshold. If this is correct, and it is also the case that the attentional 
salience of actions, outcomes and stimuli consists in the level of neural activity that 
is dedicated to them (Ruff 2011), then in principle actions could be selected just in 
virtue of capturing our attention to a sufficient extent. One might say that we 
perform them because they are fascinating, rather than because we are in the habit of 
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doing so, or because we believe they will lead to outcomes we desire. A process of 
this kind could lead us to perform actions with very little knowledge of their likely 
outcomes, because either the actions themselves or the objects we might act upon, or 
places we might go, attracted our attention. It might also motivate us to act without 
employing any representations of reward values associated with our actions. Such a 
process may contributing to explaining a wide range of phenomena, from many of 
the behaviours performed by human infants to the disconcerting motivation we 
sometimes feel to explore dangerous objects and places – to jump on to the railway 
tracks at stations, for instance. 
I suggested in section 3.2 that occurrent desires are influenced by attention, and it 
is very likely that we are innately disposed to attend to what is novel. So whether or 
not the goal-directed system learns about the value of pursuing the new – and there 
is no obvious reason why it shouldn’t – it is likely that the goal-directed system has 
an in-built bias to promote exploration. In my view, then, both the goal-directed 
system and the more basic process described in the last paragraph may be capable of 
causing exploratory behaviour. However, often exploratory actions are not driven by 
desires. An adult or child who picks up an unfamiliar object, inspects it, manipulates 
it, or puts it in their mouth may have some desire that they believe will be served by 
this action, but they may equally be motivated by a quite different, non-goal-directed 
process. If their action was caused by a simple process by which attention drives the 
manipulation of unfamiliar objects and other exploratory actions then it would be 
wrong to think of it as driven by desire. 
 
The second possible source of motivation to be discussed is the emotions. 
Philosophers have argued that some actions are correctly explained as expressions or 
other manifestations of emotion, rather than as the product of desires or habits 
(Döring 2011). A famous example is the action of a woman who scratches out the 
eyes of a photograph of a rival (Hursthouse 1991), which is notable for being 
particularly difficult to explain in other ways, since it does not seem to promote 
anything the woman would be likely to value. But actions need not have the same 
symbolic quality as this one to be plausibly driven by emotion. For instance, fear 
seems to drive us to take quite practical actions, such as retreating from the 
situations that scare us; we are motivated to express love in ways which are 
communicative as well as expressive (e.g. by kissing people we love); and we 
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sometimes communicate anger in person, verbally or even by physically assaulting 
those who offend us. There are many possible processes by which these actions 
could be generated, but it is plausible that they could be controlled by an emotional 
system independent of the habitual and goal-directed systems. Some expressions of 
emotion, such as facial expressions, exist in the same form across all human cultures 
(Ekman 1992), which suggests the existence of a specific mechanism by which 
emotions cause action. If this system could interact with some relevant general-
purpose mechanisms, it could be responsible for motivating many actions that might 
be thought of as expressions of emotion. 
For instance, the system may include an unlearnt drive to perform escape 
behaviours when we experience fear, and this could explain the way a rock climber 
behaves to get down from a route when they lose their nerve, provided it could 
interact appropriately with the climber’s relevant beliefs and skills. Similarly, a 
skilled fighter who attacked someone who offended her may be motivated to attack 
by their emotions, and led to attack in the specific way she did by her training in 
combat. In Hursthouse’s example, the woman may be motivated to hurt her rival, 
and scratch out the eyes of the photograph because this is an object with a strong 
learnt association with the rival. A person who kisses someone because they feel 
love for them at that time does so because their culture has taught them that kissing 
is an appropriate way to express love, perhaps in combination with an unlearnt drive 
to express this emotion. So the present hypothesis is that emotions may be capable 
of motivating us independently of desires, but in combination with our beliefs. And 
if an account like this is necessary in order to explain some actions which are hard to 
construe as caused by desires, since they do not seem likely to bring about any 
outcomes the agent would value – such as in Hursthouse’s example – then it may be 
the best way to explain other actions too. There is no doubt that rock climbers 
sometimes back off from routes because they judge quite coldly that they are 
unacceptably dangerous, and they want to avoid being hurt, but this does not mean 
that on other occasions when they retreat they may not be motivated wholly or 
partially by fear. 
Empirical studies of anger and aggression lend some support to this view. A 
picture is emerging according to which impulsive aggression is caused by activity in 
the amygdala, which can be controlled in healthy adults by serotonin signals from 
the prefrontal cortex, including the OFC (Davidson et al. 2000, Nelson & Trainor 
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2007). This view is supported by a study of patients with Intermittent Explosive 
Disorder (IED), which is specifically characterised by frequent, disproportionate 
displays of violence and aggression (Coccaro et al. 2007). Using fMRI, this study 
found hyperactivity in the amygdala in IED patients in response to emotionally 
salient faces, and diminished activity in the OFC. Second, it has recently been 
argued that amygdala activity causes rejections in the Ultimatum Game (Gospic et 
al. 2011). This is a game in which one player proposes dividing a pot of money with 
another; the proposer can suggest any way of dividing the pot that they like, but 
neither player receives any money unless the proposal is accepted. So in one-shot 
games, the second player will benefit by accepting any proposal except a 100%-0% 
split, but in studies of this game rejections of ‘unfair’ proposals are common and 
may be interpreted as expressions of anger. So there seems to be a quite different 
mechanism causing angry responses, as compared to normal goal-directed 
behaviour, since in angry behaviour response strength is related positively to 
amygdala activity and negatively to OFC activity, rather than positively to activity 
in the OFC and other prefrontal areas. Like exploratory actions, then, expressions of 
emotion may on some occasions be caused in ways that do not involve desires. 
 
The third topic to be discussed is how conscious reasoning and explicit evaluative 
beliefs can influence action. In addition to the habitual and goal-directed systems, 
humans seem to possess a planning system (Papineau & Butlin forthcoming). The 
habitual and goal-directed systems are both for deciding what to do now, but we also 
have the ability to think about what to do in the future, and to form plans, intentions 
and resolutions.9 In the process of doing so, and at other times, we reflect on our 
own desires and other psychological states, sometimes endorsing them and 
sometimes judging that they are harmful to us or bad in other ways. We also form 
evaluative beliefs which are to some degree independent of our desires, and which 
may affect what we are motivated to do either directly, or by influencing our 
                                                
9 A distinction is sometimes drawn between intentions for the future and the intentions with which we 
act. Intentions for the future, discussed by Bratman (1987) and Holton (2009) are akin to plans. 
These intentions are psychological states which can compete with desires and other sources of 
motivation in cases of temptation, and we often act without them. The intentions with which we act, 
discussed by Anscombe (1957) are thought to be present whenever we act out of choice. Our 
intentions in this sense are, roughly, what we take ourselves to be doing or trying to do. It is a matter 
of controversy how these intentions relate to the psychological states that cause actions. My concern 
here is only with intentions for the future. 
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intentions for the future. It is important in the present context to distinguish beliefs 
from states with (only) the mind-to-world direction of fit. My view is that desires 
have only the mind-to-world direction of fit, but now the question at hand is how 
states other than desires are involved in motivation. 
Although intentions and evaluative beliefs are usually thought of as states of 
different kinds, they are sufficiently closely related that I will address them together. 
One question is to what extent desires are involved in forming intentions and 
evaluative beliefs, and here the issues are intertwined in part because evaluative 
beliefs (or judgments) seem to play a major role in the formation of intentions. If 
this is correct, then if desires are involved in the formation of evaluative beliefs, they 
must also be involved in forming intentions. On the other hand, it is implausible that 
evaluative beliefs but not intentions could be formed independently of desires, 
because at least some evaluative beliefs seem sufficient alone to give rise to 
intentions (such as the belief that a particular course of action is by far the best 
available to one). So we can focus on evaluative beliefs in addressing this question. 
A second question is to what extent intentions and evaluative beliefs must interact 
with the goal-directed system in order to cause action, and it would be strange if 
evaluative beliefs but not intentions could cause action independently. This would 
mean that there was a separate system for motivation and action which could be 
controlled by conscious reasoning, but in which intentions played little or no part. 
Given that evaluative beliefs can give rise to intentions, this means that the question 
amounts to whether intentions can cause action independently, or only through 
interaction with the goal-directed system. So on this issue, I will focus on intentions. 
Both of these two questions are challenging and ultimately empirical. On the 
question of the role of desires in the formation of evaluative beliefs, I shall simply 
note some plausible relevant hypotheses (which are not in competition with one 
another). First, Velleman (1992) and Hawkins (2008) have suggested that desires are 
centrally involved in the acquisition of evaluative concepts. Even if this is correct, 
however, it leaves open the possibility that we can form new evaluative beliefs in 
ways that are wholly independent of desire. And indeed this does seem to be the 
case; for example, we can form new evaluative beliefs simply by accepting 
testimony. If somebody was told that sati is a very bad thing, without being told 
what it is, by someone they trusted, they would be likely to come to believe this (sati 
is the now-rare practice of Hindu wives self-immolating on their husbands’ funeral 
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pyres). More significantly, we often seem to form new evaluative beliefs from 
existing ones in ways that do not engage our desires. If I believe that being slim is 
good and eating swiss chard is an effective way to become slim, then I may well 
come to believe that eating swiss chard is a good thing to do. This process might 
engage my desires – for instance, I might see a picture of someone with an enviable 
physique munching chard, which would help to direct my attention to the link – but 
it is hard to see why this would be necessary, since presumably we draw comparable 
inferences concerning non-evaluative matters frequently without our desires being 
involved. 
However, even if this is correct, there are still good reasons to think that our 
settled evaluative beliefs are primarily the products of conscious reflection on our 
desires and how they relate to one another. One is that we cannot rely on our 
perceptual faculties to tell us what is good in the same way as we can when forming 
many other beliefs. Besides desire, this leaves testimony and a priori reasoning as 
possible sources of belief about what is good; and although we may sometimes 
accept others’ testimony about evaluative matters, we will more typically expect 
them to justify their evaluative claims by explaining how they relate to pre-existing 
shared evaluative beliefs. So unless other inputs are available, it seems that desires 
must play an important foundational role in our evaluative thought. Another possible 
input is moral intuitions; but even if we have a stock of moral intuitions which are 
distinct from desires with moral content, our desires would still be needed to play 
this role when we think about what is good for us. 
Turning now to how evaluative beliefs and intentions lead to motivation and 
action, we can assume that humans possess a planning system, which enables us to 
consciously reflect on our desires and form plans, intentions and resolutions. Some 
neuroscientific evidence exists suggesting that this system relies on the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, which has been implicated in both self-control (Hare et al. 2009) 
and planning (Kaller et al. 2011). It is clear that this system sometimes affects how 
we behave, but less clear how it does so; one possibility is that this system 
constitutes a further route to action, in addition to the habitual and goal-directed 
systems, and the systems for exploratory and emotional behaviour just discussed, 
but another is that plans and intentions affect our actions by influencing the 
operation of the goal-directed system. 
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To see this contrast, it is helpful to consider cases of temptation, in which our 
intentions conflict with strong occurrent desires at or just before the time of action, 
and specifically those in which we exhibit strength of will, acting on our intentions 
despite these strong occurrent desires (Holton 2009). If the planning system affects 
motivation and action independently of the goal-directed system, cases in which we 
resist temptation will be ones in which our actions are contrary to our strongest 
desires. But an alternative hypothesis is that in cases like this while our occurrent 
desires may initially motivate us more strongly to succumb to temptation, the effect 
of our intentions is to change the strengths of our occurrent desires, with the result 
that we end up acting in accordance with our strongest desires. 
Richard Holton (2009) has argued in favour of the former view, drawing on 
studies by Baumeister and colleagues (e.g. Baumeister et al. 1994, 1998). These 
studies suggest that we possess a domain-general, limited capacity for self-control, 
by showing that a certain class of tasks that intuitively involve concentration and 
resolve are effortful and that our performance on them diminishes over time, and 
when we are depressed, anxious or tired. Among the tasks that require self-control is 
resisting temptation – that is, sticking to a resolution in the face of desires to do 
otherwise. So Holton uses Baumeister’s work to support his claim that resisting 
temptation involves a struggle, and argues that this struggle must be a contest 
between the agent’s desires, on one side, and their resolutions, on the other. This 
argument is not wholly persuasive, however, because it is plausible that processes 
taking place within the goal-directed system could be extended over time, effortful 
and require self-control. A key reason to believe this is that we often make efforts to 
control what we attend to, and attention is an important factor in determining the 
strength of occurrent desires. So it may be that when we are tempted our intentions 
cause us to try to shift our attention away from whatever is tempting us, and towards 
the potential benefits of sticking to our plans. It is easy to imagine that such a 
process could sometimes have the character of a struggle. 
I therefore leave it open to what extent evaluative beliefs and intentions represent 
a further route to action, separate from the goal-directed system. But these points do 
show that on my account of desires as outcome values, desires may relate to 
evaluative beliefs and intentions in very much the ways that philosophers have 
suggested. Desires sometimes come into conflict with intentions, and these internal 
conflicts may be won by either side; desires may contribute to the formation of 
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intentions, but evaluative beliefs, which are distinct from desires, may also do so; 
and desires contribute to the formation of evaluative beliefs, and especially beliefs 
about what is good for us, but it can easily happen that our desires and evaluative 
beliefs do not coincide. 
 
Overall, then, while desires are of crucial importance for determining how we act, 
this importance may be overstated. Exploratory drives, emotional responses and the 
human abilities to employ evaluative concepts and plan for the future all affect how 
we act, resulting in a complex overall picture. The picture is made more complex 
still by the apparent interactions between various systems, such as the tendencies of 
desires to affect our emotions and evaluative judgments. 
 
4.3 Conclusions of Chapters 2-4 
 
In order to show that desires have only the mind-to-world direction of fit, I am 
arguing for the following five premises: 
 
I. Desires are outcome values. 
II. The goal-directed control system works by promoting the performance of the 
action that has the greatest expected reward value, based on outcome values and 
representations of action-outcome relationships. 
III. Outcome values are inputs to the goal-directed control system, which are 
produced and modified by a system which is to some extent responsive to 
evidence for the reward values of outcomes, and it is normal for more than one 
outcome value to act as an input to the goal-directed control system at any one 
time. 
IV. Biological representations with consumers that have discretion have only the 
mind-to-world direction of fit. 
V. It follows from I-III that desires are biological representations with consumers 
that have discretion. 
 
Of these, premises I-III are the targets of part I, while premises IV and V will be 
defended in part II. Since the positive work towards establishing premises I-III is 
now complete (chapter 5 will focus on a possible objection), in this section I will 
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explain how the account developed in chapters 2-4 supports each of them. Since the 
case for premise I relies substantially on premises II and III, I shall discuss the three 
premises in reverse order. 
Premise III is made up of three claims: that outcome values are inputs to the goal-
directed system; that they are produced and modified by a system that is to some 
extent responsive to evidence; and that is normal for more than one outcome value 
to act as an input to the system at any one time. The first of these follows 
immediately from the definition of a goal-directed system, as a system for 
behavioural control that relies on two kinds of states, that track the values of 
outcomes and contingencies between actions and outcomes, respectively. The 
second also follows from this definition, but I further discussed the mechanism 
which forms and updates outcome values in sections 3.4 and 3.5. Although we don’t 
yet have a clear picture of how this mechanism works, we can be confident that 
there is such a mechanism, which uses basic drives, existing desires, and a relatively 
unsophisticated associative learning procedure to update outcome values. So for 
these first two parts of premise III, the key question is whether the goal-directed 
system is real. 
The third claim in premise III also coheres well with the account of the goal-
directed system I developed in chapter 3. In section 3.2 I proposed that at any one 
time several outcome values are occurrent, and that the goal-directed system’s task 
is to use these outcome values to calculate expected reward values for possible 
actions. Apparent advantages of this picture include allowing the system to readily 
take into account the fact that any given action is likely to affect the likelihoods of 
many rewarding outcomes, and making sense of the plausible idea that occurrent 
desires sometimes change in strength in the course of a single process of action-
selection. However, I will also now give a more direct argument for this claim. 
Suppose that only one outcome value acted as an input to the goal-directed 
system at any one time. There are two ways that the goal-directed system could 
work, if this were the case. First, it could be that some other system would work out 
which outcome value the goal-directed system should try to satisfy, and then the 
goal-directed system would cause whichever action seemed likeliest to satisfy it. 
This way of dividing up the task of selecting an appropriate action is not only of 
dubious merit, but very different from the way in which goal-directed systems work, 
as a matter of definition. If things worked this way then the goal-directed system 
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itself would not take the value of the outcome into account. Second, it could be that 
the goal-directed system evaluates available actions and outcomes one at a time, 
taking only one outcome value as input when considering each action. It would 
continue doing this until it comes across an action that passes some threshold, then 
perform that action. We have seen little evidence so far that bears directly on this 
possibility, but it is very doubtful that animals with goal-directed systems never 
either directly compare two possible outcomes when considering how to act, or take 
into account more than one outcome to which an action is likely to lead when 
considering whether to perform it. For instance, in the Iowa Gambling Task 
(Bechara et al. 1997) humans learn to act in a way that takes into account the 
relative likelihoods of two different outcomes (winning money and losing money) 
when selecting cards from different piles, and a similar task has been developed for 
rodents (van den Bos, Koot and de Visser 2014). In this task rats learn to pull one 
lever that provides greater expected reward than another, when both levers have 
some chance of providing either a positive outcome (sugar pellets) or a negative one 
(quinine-soaked sugar pellets), even though the lever with the lower expected 
reward provides greater positive outcomes. So even rodents seem to use multiple 
outcome values as inputs to at least some goal-directed control processes. 
The details of premise II also follow from the definition of a goal-directed 
system, so again here the empirical evidence is important primarily for the support it 
gives to the claim that humans possess such a system. In the last three chapters, I 
have presented both direct and indirect evidence for this claim. The direct evidence 
includes the results of outcome devaluation and contingency degradation 
experiments, discussed in section 2.2, and the lesion studies on rats which show that 
the different patterns of behaviour revealed by these experiments are facilitated by 
distinct neural systems, working in parallel (sections 2.5 and 3.1). The 
neuroscientific evidence showing that the values of outcomes are represented in the 
OFC and employed in action selection, presented in section 3.1, also supports this 
conclusion. More generally, the work of all three chapters helps to show that the 
goal-directed system is real, by showing how such a system could work, and how it 
could cause, in combination with others, real patterns of human behaviour. Finally, 
an important point which I have not been able to demonstrate in detail here is that 
there is a substantial body of recent literature in cognitive science which relies on 
the existence of the habitual and goal-directed systems. We should believe in these 
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systems because they are among the central theoretical posits of a successful 
scientific research programme. 
This leaves premise I: the claim that desires are outcome values. I have assumed 
(chapter 1) that if there is some natural kind of psychological state that does enough 
of what desires are normally thought to do, then what it is to be a desire is to be a 
member of that natural kind. So the question at hand is whether outcome values 
form such a natural kind. The best evidence we can have that some class of 
psychological states form a natural kind is that they are treated as such by modern 
science, and this is true of the states I have been calling ‘desires’. When the brain is 
functioning normally, they play a clearly-defined role in the operation of the goal-
directed system, which is widely recognised as a distinct psychological unit. To 
show that these states do not form a natural kind it would be necessary to show 
either that some other psychological states also belong to the same, wider kind, or 
that the class is best thought of as made up of more than one distinct kind.10 The 
former is implausible, given that only desires are both inputs to the goal-directed 
system and used in assessing the reward value of present states of affairs for the 
purpose of generating reward signals (section 3.4), but I will discuss this issue 
further in chapter 5. On the latter, by far the most significant distinction between 
different kinds of desire that we have seen in the last three chapters is that between 
occurrent and standing desires (section 3.2), and it is fairly plausible that these form 
distinct natural kinds; they perform different roles, and belong to different 
ontological categories. But this point in no way undermines the case for identifying 
the states concerned as desires, since this distinction is also widely recognised by 
philosophers. Arguably, the fact that the inputs to the goal-directed system come in 
distinct standing and occurrent variants is an instance of striking similarity between 
the class of states that I have described, and desires as they are thought of by many 
philosophers. 
Finally, then, premise I turns on whether outcome values have enough of the 
properties usually associated with desire. The most important of these properties is 
combining with instrumental beliefs to cause a high proportion of human actions. 
Further to this, desires are usually thought to be both among the inputs to the 
formation of intentions for the future, and to be capable of interfering with the 
                                                
10 But not straightforwardly sufficient, in either case, since there are thought to be hierarchies of 
natural kinds. 
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execution of these intentions by tempting us to abandon or otherwise act contrary to 
them, and these points also seem to be true of the inputs to the goal-directed system. 
Because the strength of our occurrent desires is highly dependent on the details of 
the situation, it is not surprising that they can lead us to plan for one course of action 
in advance, then be strongly motivated to perform another when the time comes. 
Another very important point is that we usually take desires to have a wide range of 
objects, and I have explained (in section 3.4) why outcome values are likely to have 
a similar range of objects. Also, as I have said, there are occurrent and standing 
variants of outcome values, just as there are usually thought to be with desires, and 
the occurrent versions are sensitive to our physiological needs, our environment and 
to what we attend to, just as we would expect to be true of desires (sections 3.2 and 
3.3). It also reflects common sense and widespread philosophical views that in 
addition to the actions caused by the goal-directed system and hence by outcome 
values, there are also habitual actions and expressions of emotion which are not 
caused by this system. And although it is not certain exactly how the inputs to the 
goal-directed system are formed and updated, they do seem to be responsive to 
evidence about reward to about the same extent, and in the same ways, as we would 
normally think of desires as being. 
This does leave out some properties typically associated with desire, which I have 
not discussed. Perhaps the most notable is the putative relationship between desire 
and pleasure: that the satisfaction of desires tends to cause pleasure. Although I have 
not discussed pleasure, my account of the behaviour of outcome values does cohere 
well with this idea, because I have argued that they are used in assessing the levels 
of reward provided by our current circumstances. It is also important to note that, 
given my account of the sources of motivation and action, it is hard to see any 
natural kind of psychological state with a better claim to being desire than outcome 
values. Taking all these points together, and pending an objection to be discussed in 
the next chapter, I conclude that desires are outcome values. 
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Chapter 5: Schroeder’s Theory of Desire 
 
5.1 Outline of Schroeder’s Theory 
 
In this, the final chapter of part I, I address a possible objection to my view. 
Partly in collaboration with Nomy Arpaly, Tim Schroeder has developed a theory of 
desire that draws on a similar body of empirical evidence to mine (Schroeder 2004, 
Arpaly & Schroeder 2014). Schroeder’s work shares my aim of giving an account of 
desire as a natural kind, and he also shares my view that this is best achieved by 
using the results of psychology and neuroscience. These common features are no 
coincidence; Schroeder’s work has been a major influence on how I think about 
desire, and how I approach philosophy of mind more generally. But Schroeder’s 
theory differs from mine in some substantial ways, which raises the question: why 
should someone accept my view about what current neuroscience tells us about 
desire, rather than his? So in this chapter, I explain why my account is to be 
preferred. In this section, I outline Schroeder’s theory, and explain the principal 
ways in which it differs from mine. 
 
Schroeder states his theory as follows: 
 
To have an intrinsic (positive) desire that p is to use the capacity to perceptually 
or cognitively represent that p to constitute p as a reward. (Schroeder 2004, p. 
131) 
 
To have an intrinsic appetitive desire that p is to constitute p as a reward. (Arpaly 
& Schroeder 2014, p. 128) 
 
In his 2004 work, he also gives an explicit statement of what he takes ‘constituting p 
as a reward’ to mean: 
 
For an event to be a reward for an organism is for representations of that event to 
tend to contribute to the production of a reinforcement signal in the organism, in 
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the sense made clear by computational theories of what is called ‘reinforcement 
learning’. (Schroeder 2004, p. 66) 
 
Schroeder’s view, then, is that to desire an outcome is to have a certain kind of 
psychological disposition towards that outcome, which amounts to treating it as a 
reward. He characterises what it is to treat an outcome as a reward by saying that 
this means being disposed to generate a more positive reinforcement signal when 
one represents that outcome than when one does not, other things being equal. And 
his view is that what it is for something to be a desire is for it to be the categorical 
basis of such a disposition. This means that the states that I take to be standing 
desires would also count as desires on Schroeder’s view, since they are used for 
measuring present levels of reward for the purpose of generating reward signals. 
Schroeder takes phasic dopamine signals – which he says represent reward 
prediction errors – to be the only reinforcement signals in humans. So his theory 
implies that human desires are the categorical bases of the disposition to produce 
(positive) phasic dopamine signals as a consequence of representing outcomes. 
This theory differs from mine both in how it characterises desires, and in its 
extension. One difference in how desires are characterised is that in my view, what it 
takes for a psychological state to be a desire is for it to be a member of a particular 
natural kind. In contrast, Schroeder gives a single characteristic functional property 
which he claims is possessed by all and only desires. However, this difference will 
not be central to my critique of Schroeder’s theory. 
Another difference in how desires are characterised is that Schroeder’s theory 
focuses on the relationship between desires and reinforcement, whereas mine 
focuses on the relationship between desires and goal-directed behaviour. Part of the 
explanation for this difference may be that Schroeder takes desires to contribute to 
motivation and action by causing the production of dopamine signals, and hence by 
a similar mechanism to that by which they contribute to reinforcement learning. So 
for Schroeder, the roles of desire in reinforcement and in motivation and action are 
relatively closely related. In section 5.2, I argue against Schroeder’s account of how 
desires contribute to motivation and action, and show that his view has implausible 
consequences if this flaw is corrected. Schroeder also places much less weight than I 
do on the distinction between occurrent and standing desires, because his proposed 
mechanism allows standing desires to contribute to motivation and action directly. 
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Regarding the extensions of our two theories, a striking difference is that on 
Schroeder’s view, basic drives count as desires. This is because basic drives 
contribute to reinforcement learning in broadly the same way as desires: they 
dispose us to generate reward signals when we represent outcomes of specific kinds. 
I will argue in section 5.3 that this consequence counts against Schroeder’s theory, 
because desires and basic drives contribute to goal-directed control in different 
ways. Then in section 5.4 I will argue that it also counts against his theory in another 
way, which is that standing basic drives are fundamentally the wrong kind of 
psychological feature to be desires. A further difference in extension is that 
Schroeder’s theory entails that any creature capable of reinforcement learning must 
have at least some desires, even though some such creatures lack the capacity for 
goal-directed behaviour.11 
In the following three sections I will argue that these differences amount to 
relative advantages of my theory, and disadvantages of Schroeder’s. I will focus on 
the relationship between reinforcement learning and goal-directed control in section 
5.2, and on basic drives in sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
 
5.2 Reinforcement Learning and Goal-Directed Control 
 
One significant disadvantage of Schroeder’s theory is that he characterises desire 
with reference to its role in reinforcement learning, rather than its role in goal-
directed control. This generates two problems. First, Schroeder’s theory entails that 
creatures which are just too different from humans can have desires. Second, it 
seems to give the wrong account of what happens when creatures which are capable 
of both reinforcement learning and goal-directed control lose the former ability, but 
not the latter. This is a real possibility, because the mechanisms underlying these 
two abilities are less closely connected than Schroeder thinks; so in this section I 
will argue against Schroeder’s account of how desires contribute to goal-directed 
motivation and action, as well as his view about what desires are. 
The first problem with Schroeder’s theory is simply that because reinforcement 
learning is necessary for habitual control, Schroeder’s theory entails that creatures 
                                                
11 A third difference is that Schroeder’s theory allows that robots and aliens may have desires, 
whereas mine denies this – assuming that we cannot share psychological natural kinds with robots 
and aliens. 
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which possess habit systems but not goal-directed systems nevertheless have desires. 
In such creatures, these desires will typically be basic drives. In this case, it would 
be wrong to say that the creatures act on their desires, because they will not be 
sensitive to the outcomes their actions bring about. For instance, suppose some such 
creature acquired the habit of performing action A whenever it was hungry (treating 
this internal state in just the same way as a stimulus in the environment, as discussed 
in section 3.3). If a scientist arranged that whenever this creature was hungry and 
performed action A, an outcome would follow which satisfied another of its basic 
drives, but did not alleviate its hunger, then the creature would continue to perform 
the action when hungry. So it would be wrong to describe this animal as acting on a 
desire for food, because its tendency to act in this way would be wholly 
unresponsive to whether it received food as a result. Furthermore, there is nothing in 
Schroeder’s theory, or in the nature of reinforcement learning or habitual control, 
which implies that ‘purely habitual’ creatures must be capable of sensing their own 
physiological states or otherwise forming occurrent basic drives. So on Schroeder’s 
view, there could be creatures which had desires, but never initiated actions or 
changed their behaviour in response to anything other than environmental stimuli. 
It is also possible that there could be purely habitual creatures with acquired 
psychological states that would count as desires on Schroeder’s view. These would 
be standing states which are updated by reward learning and used in measuring the 
values of outcomes, but which do not contribute to action-selection more directly 
(see section 2.5). If anything, it is clearer still in this case that the states concerned 
are not desires. This is because actions learnt because they led to outcomes 
represented as valuable by such states would be insensitive to outcome devaluation. 
So if we were to say of these creatures that they sometimes acted on their desires, 
we would have to also accept that they could sometimes lose those very desires, and 
yet continue to behave in the same way. Schroeder’s theory seems to imply that 
there are creatures with desires on which they are constitutionally incapable of 
acting.12 
                                                
12 Schroeder accepts that his theory has this consequence, and appeals to Strawson’s (1994) Weather 
Watchers in suggesting that it is intuitive that there could be creatures with desires but no capacity for 
action. The Weather Watchers have beliefs about the weather, and feel pleasure or displeasure 
depending on changes in the weather, but cannot act. However, it is likely that the intuition that 
Weather Watchers have desires comes from imagining them as having conscious mental lives much 
like ours (or perhaps like parts of ours), and it is doubtful whether this is possible in creatures that 
cannot act. 
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In order to bring out the second problem with his theory, I need to explain why it 
is implausible that, as Schroeder claims, reinforcement signals in the form of phasic 
dopamine are a necessary part of the process that leads to goal-directed action. 
Schroeder’s account of goal-directed action is as follows: when we think of highly 
desired outcomes, this causes dopamine to be released, which in turn makes us more 
likely to immediately perform the actions we expect to lead to those outcomes. I will 
start by explaining why the evidence Schroeder offers in favour of this account is 
not convincing. He cites three forms of evidence which are directly relevant to this 
claim: studies suggesting that dopaminergic projections to the motor prefrontal 
cortex are necessary for maintaining motor intentions over time; the point that 
dopamine boosts action-selection by its effects on D1 and D2 receptors on medium 
spiny neurons in the striatum (see section 2.4); and the fact that loss of dopaminergic 
activity causes impaired motion in Parkinson’s disease (Schroeder 2004, pp. 116-
118). The problem with all of this evidence is that while it does show that dopamine 
is necessary for motivation and action, this is far from sufficient to show that phasic 
dopamine signals are the means by which desires affect how we behave. More 
specifically, a widespread view is that while phasic dopamine signals represent 
RPEs and are used for reinforcement, motivation and the ability to control 
movements (which is lost in Parkinson’s) are products of tonic dopamine levels – 
that is, the levels of dopamine release that obtain between phasic bursts (Niv et al. 
2007, Schultz 2007). So it is possible to explain the evidence that Schroeder 
describes just on the grounds that dopamine is necessary for the normal functioning 
of action-selection circuits, without making the much more specific claim that 
dopamine signals are the means by which desires influence goal-directed control. 
Also, as I have mentioned, there is an ongoing debate about the function of phasic 
dopamine signals, and neither of the two most prominent positions in this debate sits 
happily with Schroeder’s account. On one hand, the neuroscientist Kent Berridge 
has defended the view that phasic dopamine signals have the function of generating 
motivation to bring about desired outcomes, but he sees this as an incompatible 
alternative to the view that phasic dopamine signals are for reinforcement (Berridge 
2007). On the other hand, the orthodox view is that phasic dopamine signals are 
reinforcement signals, but do not play the role in motivation that Berridge proposes 
(Wise 2004, Balleine et al. 2008, Glimcher 2011). 
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What’s more, it is hard to see how the mechanism Schroeder describes could 
work. The problem is that dopamine release is not targeted at particular groups of 
cells, and carries little information about how it is caused, so there is nothing except 
timing to distinguish one dopamine signal of a given strength from another. This 
means that the only way in which desires could be connected, via dopamine signals, 
to the correct actions is if the goal-directed system worked by considering actions in 
turn. In order to choose between a number of available actions, the goal-directed 
system would have to represent them one at a time, use dopamine signals generated 
by desires at that time to associate these actions with reward values, and 
(presumably) store these reward values for later comparison. But this would be 
entirely at odds with the basal ganglia’s mechanism for action selection, and with 
the point that not only action selection, but many other cognitive processes, seem to 
be facilitated by competition between simultaneous coalitions of cortical activity 
(see sections 2.3, 3.2 and 4.1). We have excellent reasons to think that action-
selection involves the representation of possible actions simultaneously, rather than 
in turn. 
This argument shows that the process by which desires contribute to 
reinforcement learning is likely to be substantially distinct from that by which they 
contribute (most directly) to goal-directed control. It turn, this makes it very likely to 
be possible for humans to sustain brain damage which would prevent some or all of 
their desires from continuing to contribute to learning, while leaving their capacity 
for goal-directed control intact. This damage would mean that the objects of the 
relevant desires were no longer ‘constituted as rewards’ by the agent, as Schroeder 
defines that property, and were therefore no longer desired. However, it is not 
plausible that this damage would affect which natural kinds the agent’s desires 
belonged to, so they would continue to count as desires on my account. This is an 
advantage of my view, because someone who had suffered in this way would 
continue to perform actions that, prior to sustaining the brain damage, would 
undeniably have been motivated by desires, and these actions would still be caused 
in the same way. We should not deny that they still had the desires they did before, 





5.3 Desires and Basic Drives (I) 
 
As we have seen, Schroeder’s theory classifies basic drives as desires. One 
reason why this is problematic, as I have suggested, is that it is possible for creatures 
to have basic drives without having goal-directed control systems. In this section I 
will argue that even in rats and humans, desires and basic drives contribute to goal-
directed control in different ways. And then in section 5.4, I will describe a further 
important difference between desires and basic drives. 
In section 3.3, we saw that the process of incentive learning is necessary for 
occurrent basic drives to influence goal-directed behaviour (Balleine 1992, Niv et al. 
2006). For instance, rats that have been trained when hungry to press a lever in order 
to receive a specific foodstuff will continue to press the lever at the same rate when 
sated, unless they have previously experienced that food when sated. Conversely, 
rats that have been trained to perform an action like this when only slightly hungry 
will not increase responding when they are much hungrier, unless they have 
experienced the foodstuff concerned in the hungrier state. What these results seem to 
show is that levels of motivation to perform goal-directed actions are determined 
directly by the strengths of occurrent desires for the specific outcomes concerned, 
not by the strengths of occurrent basic drives. The role of occurrent basic drives is to 
modulate the strengths of occurrent desires, in a way determined by the individual’s 
experience of the relationships between the strengths of occurrent drives, and the 
values of outcomes. As in the habit system, occurrent basic drives play a similar role 
to environmental stimuli (which may also be associated with, and boost the strength 
of, particular desires). So occurrent basic drives and occurrent desires play different 
roles in goal-directed control: desires make a direct contribution to action-selection, 
and drives make only an indirect one. 
A particularly clear demonstration of this point comes from the contrast between 
outcome devaluation studies that devalue the outcome using specific satiety (e.g. 
Balleine & Dickinson 1998) and experiments on incentive learning that involve a 
transition from hunger to satiety (e.g. Balleine 1992). In studies of both kinds, rats 
are given the opportunity to press a lever to receive a novel foodstuff, and learn to 
perform this action, then taken away from the lever and fed until they are sated, 
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before being given the opportunity to press the lever again ‘in extinction’13. The 
only difference is that in the outcome devaluation experiment, the same food is used 
that the rat has learnt to get by pressing the lever. Surprisingly, rats that undergo 
these procedures will press the lever less when they have been fed to satiety on the 
same food, and will not reduce responding when they have been fed to satiety on a 
different food – unless they have undergone the necessary incentive learning. If the 
drive for food was directly affecting the rats’ behaviour, they would have reduced 
responding in both paradigms. These points show that although basic drives and 
desires contribute to reinforcement learning in the same way, they contribute to 
goal-directed control in different ways; so it is an advantage of my theory over 
Schroeder’s that I distinguish between these two importantly different kinds of 
psychological states. 
 
5.4 Desires and Basic Drives (II) 
 
The second difference between basic drives and desires is more fundamental. 
Standing basic drives are what I will call mental rules, whereas desires – both 
standing and occurrent – are mental states. Furthermore, it is a plausible desideratum 
on theories of desire that only mental states should count as desires. The distinction 
between mental rules and mental states needs to be drawn carefully, so I shall start 
by setting it out without reference to the present debate, before showing that 
standing basic drives are mental rules. 
Intuitively, if we assume that mental states such as beliefs, desires and perceptual 
states are representations that control our behaviour by interacting causally in ways 
that respect their semantic properties (Fodor 1975); or even if we make the weaker 
assumption that cognition relies on internal representations in some way; then there 
must be mental rules that govern how these representations interact. An argument 
closely analogous to that made by Lewis Carroll in ‘What the tortoise said to 
Achilles’ (1895) supports this point. Imagine we want to explain why someone has 
inferred a proposition Z from two others, A and B, which they believe. If we only 
appeal to mental states in this explanation, it seems we must attribute to them the 
further belief that Z follows from A and B. But then Carroll’s tortoise would ask us 
                                                
13 i.e. without any reward being delivered. 
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why the agent would infer Z from A, B, and the proposition that Z follows from A 
and B, and our only recourse – again assuming that we could only cite mental states 
– would be to cite a further belief, which is that Z follows from A, B, and the 
proposition that Z follows from A and B. There is something seriously wrong with 
this approach, and the mistake seems to be the practice of only appealing to mental 
states, which here manifests as an assumption that whenever someone acts as though 
they accept some proposition, this can only be explained by attributing to them the 
belief that that proposition holds. A much better approach would be to look at some 
point for a mental rule that the agent follows, perhaps of the form draw salient 
modus ponens inferences. In general, then, at the bottom of explanations of 
behaviour that appeal to mental representations, there must be explicit or implicit 
appeals to rules. It would be too quick to conclude that these rules cannot 
themselves be representations, but they must in some sense be built in to the system 
concerned – otherwise we would need to cite further rules to explain how they were 
acquired. 
It is not obvious how to make the intuitive distinction between representations 
and rules more concrete, and it is likely that different ways of drawing the 
distinction will be useful for different explanatory purposes. Here I will revise one 
version of a different, but closely related distinction, that between implicit and 
explicit representations.14 This distinction is closely related, because mental states 
are explicit representations, whereas if they are representations at all, mental rules 
are implicit representations. For example, we might think of a system with a ‘built-
in’ tendency to draw modus ponens inferences as implicitly representing the 
conditional claim that if p and (p→q), then q. The version of the implicit/explicit 
distinction I will employ is articulated by Shea (2015), who writes that implicit 
representations, ‘can have no impact on subsequent processing except via the 
representations which they connect.’ In contrast, explicit representations can act as 
inputs to many further processes (pp. 79-80). Shea’s idea is that the implicit/explicit 
distinction can be understood in terms of the degree of promiscuity exhibited by 
representations. Those that can enter into only one kind of process, in one way, are 
implicit, while those that can enter into more than one kind of process are explicit. 
                                                
14 I use the terminology of states and rules, rather than of implicit and explicit representations, 
primarily because the implicit/explicit distinction has previously been drawn in a number of different 
ways for different purposes. See e.g. Dennett 1983, Davies 2015. 
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My distinction between mental states and mental rules follows Shea’s in focusing 
on the range of ways in which features of the mind enter into psychological 
processes (their ‘promiscuity’), but removes the restriction to subsequent processing, 
and the idea that what matters is the way that features can act as inputs. Mental 
states can also be promiscuous in virtue of being the outputs of psychological 
processes – that is, being formed or modified by such processes. So as I think of 
them, mental rules are necessarily innate; that is, acquired in development rather 
than through learning. Mental states may be innate, but for this to be the case they 
must count as explicit representations in Shea’s sense – they must be capable of 
acting as inputs to psychological processes in more than one way. Thus: 
 
Mental rules are innate features of the mind, each of which causes exactly one 
kind of transition between mental states. 
 
Mental states are features of the mind which enter into psychological processes in 
two or more ways, one of which may be by being formed or modified by a 
psychological process. 
 
Before turning to the status of desires and basic drives, I will give two brief 
arguments for the interest and relevance of this distinction. 
First, one possible shortcoming of Shea’s distinction is that it seems that 
whenever a system is disposed to make a transition from one state to another, this 
transition could in principle be caused either by a ‘built-in’ rule, or by a further state 
which the system accesses and applies to the present situation. Shea’s criterion only 
distinguishes these two cases if the system is also capable of using the state that it 
accesses for purposes other than making transitions of this kind, but in principle it 
seems that access for other purposes could be prevented by the system’s 
architecture. By distinguishing between innate and learnt features, my distinction 
can account for this difference. 
Second, my distinction implies that mental rules will typically be close to 
universal among agents of the same species, while mental states will more often be 
idiosyncratic. Much of the time, the appropriate kind of explanation to give of the 
presence of a mental state will be psychological, whereas the best explanation of a 
mental rule will be broadly biological. In psychological explanations based on 
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causal generalisations, mental rules will typically provide the generalisations, while 
appeals to mental states will explain why, granted those generalisations, matters 
turned out the particular way they did on the occasion in question. These points are 
important because part of what makes desires interesting is the particular role that 
they play in explanations of behaviour of various kinds, both causal and rational, a 
subject which I take up in part III. So for my present purposes it is appropriate to 
draw a distinction between mental states and mental rules that divides two classes of 
psychological features which are apt to play different kinds of explanatory roles. 
It now remains only to show that standing basic drives are mental rules. By my 
criterion, for this to be the case they must cause exactly one kind of transition 
between mental states. Standing basic drives certainly dispose us to produce reward 
signals when we perceive certain kinds of states of affairs, such as our eating 
nourishing food, having sex, and being in the presence of smiling friends. It may be 
the case that the strength of these reward signals depends on the extent to which the 
object of the drive concerned is needed at the time; for instance, eating is plausibly 
more rewarding when we are hungrier (although desires will also contribute to this 
effect), and getting warmer is certainly more rewarding when we are cold. But this 
does not suggest that more than one transition is mediated by standing basic drives. 
It merely shows that they employ more than one input to generate outputs. The key 
question is whether standing basic drives do anything other than contribute to 
generating reward signals, and on this point there is a noteworthy disanalogy 
between basic drives and desires. Standing desires contribute to psychological 
processes both by generating reward signals, and by generating occurrent desires, 
but standing basic drives are not needed to generate occurrent basic drives. Instead, 
we simply perceive our own physiological states, and the representations of these 
states which are thus formed act as occurrent basic drives – they contribute to 
habitual and goal-directed control in the same way as perceptual representations of 
environmental stimuli, as I have explained (section 3.3). A further disanalogy 
between standing basic drives and standing desires is, of course, that standing 
desires are learnt – they are formed and modified by psychological processes – 
whereas standing basic drives are innate. I therefore conclude that Schroeder’s 
theory is unsatisfactory because it counts some features of the mind as desires which 
are not mental states, but are instead mental rules.  
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In this chapter, I have described Tim Schroeder’s empirically-informed theory of 
desire, and argued that my own theory is preferable. Schroeder’s theory is weaker 
because it links desire to reinforcement learning rather than to goal-directed control, 
and because it implies that basic drives are desires. This completes part I of this 
thesis, in which I have focused on the nature of desire. Relying on the assumption 
that desires form a natural kind, I have drawn on psychology and neuroscience to 
develop a detailed account of the role that desires play in our mental lives. Next I 
will turn to the other main topic of this thesis, which is representation, and in 
particular direction of fit. 
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Part II: Direction of Fit 
 
Chapter 6: The Case for a New Theory of Direction of Fit 
 
6.1 Introduction to Part II 
 
In this and the following three chapters, I will argue for a new theory of direction 
of fit, and show that in combination with the account of desire developed in part I, it 
implies that desires have only the mind-to-world direction of fit. So here in part II I 
argue for premises IV and V of my overall argument: 
 
IV. Biological representations with consumers that have discretion have only the 
mind-to-world direction of fit. 
V. It follows from I-III that desires are biological representations with consumers 
that have discretion. 
 
My theory of direction of fit will draw heavily on the framework of ideas and 
terminology provided by teleosemantic theories of representation, so I will also 
present extensive exposition and defence of this framework. This approach is in 
accord with my overall strategy for establishing the direction of fit of desire, which 
is to use a naturalistic theory of direction of fit that allows us to draw almost direct 
inferences from empirically-discoverable properties of desire, to conclusions about 
direction of fit. So once I have presented my argument for my theory, it will take 
little further work to reach my overall conclusion. It will, however, be a fairly 
arduous process to get that far, because of the need to explain the complex and 
controversial teleosemantic framework. This chapter and chapter 7 contain 
preliminary work for chapter 8; in chapter 8 I present and argue for my theory of 
direction of fit, which entails premise IV; and in chapter 9 I argue for premise V. By 
the end of chapter 9 my positive argument for the conclusion of this thesis will be 
complete, and in part III I will take on only the relatively minor task of describing 
how my views relate to the Humean Theory of Motivation. 
 In my view, direction of fit is very closely connected to representation. As I will 
explain, Ruth Millikan’s teleosemantics (1984, 2004) claims that what makes an 
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entity a representation, determines its content, and fixes its direction of fit is the way 
in which it mediates the interaction of producer and consumer systems, according to 
its function. Producers and consumers also have functions with respect to 
representations – producers are supposed to produce representations under certain 
circumstances, and consumers are supposed to behave in different ways, depending 
on the representations they consume – and these functions are crucial to direction of 
fit. According to my theory, what I will call biological representations have the 
mind-to-world direction of fit if and only if their producers have the function of 
producing them whenever some specific substantive condition holds, and have the 
world-to-mind direction of fit if and only if their consumers have the function of 
behaving in some specific way whenever they, the representations, occur. This 
means that desires lack the world-to-mind direction of fit, because what the system 
that consumes desires should do when any given desire occurs depends on what 
other desires the agent has at the time, and on their instrumental beliefs. Of course, I 
will develop these claims in much more detail later. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will give a more detailed introduction to the 
topic of direction of fit, outline the most familiar approach to the topic, and explain 
why it is not suitable for my purposes. This familiar approach lacks the advantages 
of the teleosemantic approach to direction of fit, which I will also describe. I will 
introduce some alternative terms for talking about direction of fit, and I will also 
explain some assumptions about how the notions of mental states, representations, 
content, attitudes, and direction of fit relate to one another. 
In chapter 7, I will describe a version of teleosemantics, and defend it against 
some well-known objections. The topic of this chapter will be representation in 
general, rather than specifically direction of fit, but my account of direction of fit is 
too dependent on teleosemantic ideas, and those ideas are too subtle, for it to be 
possible to avoid this preparatory work. The objections to teleosemantics that I will 
respond to concern functional indeterminacy, which has been widely discussed since 
this problem was first raised by Fodor (1990); the ‘swampman’ thought-experiment 
introduced by Davidson (1987); and the liberality of some versions of 
teleosemantics, which has been the subject of more recent work (e.g. Burge 2010). 
These objections are often thought to be devastating to teleosemantics, and if they 
succeeded they would be very damaging to my theory of direction of fit. The topic 
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of indeterminacy is particularly important, and it comes up again in the following 
chapter. 
In chapter 8, I state and argue for my theory of direction of fit. After stating the 
theory, which is inspired by a proposal by David Lewis (1969), I first set out the 
scope of my claims, by describing what I mean by ‘biological representation’. I then 
argue for the theory, and discuss challenges related to the indeterminacy problem. In 
essence, my argument is that my theory does a better job than existing accounts of 
direction of fit of identifying a deep difference between two kinds of representation. 
As I will argue, the two directions of fit correspond to two different jobs that 
representations can do – saying how things are, and saying what to do – or to put it 
another way, two ways in which representations can contribute to the functioning of 
wider systems. My account accurately categorises representations in this respect, 
while orthodox views fail to do so. 
Finally, in chapter 9 I return to the topic of desire. My main task in this chapter is 
to show that desires satisfy my criterion for the mind-to-world direction of fit, but 
fail to satisfy the criterion for the world-to-mind direction of fit. In the light of my 
argument from chapter 8, this reveals that desires contribute to action-selection in a 
fundamentally similar way to beliefs. In this chapter, I also discuss the nature of 
reward, because one possible objection to my view is that there are no suitably 
mind-independent facts about the reward levels of outcomes for desires to represent. 
So I show that it is possible to give a coherent account of reward which avoids this 
objection. In closing chapter 9, and with it part II, I recap my argument for my 
overall conclusion, that desires have only the mind-to-world direction of fit. 
 
6.2 Introduction to Direction of Fit 
 
Direction of fit is most often thought of as a property of mental states, which 
distinguishes beliefs and desires. However, the idea is applicable and important 
much more widely than this; many kinds of representation have directions of fit. 
In fact, the underlying phenomenon of direction of fit is applicable more widely 
still. Whenever two things are supposed to fit one another there are various 
possibilities about how this fit should be achieved. For example, we often try to find 
shoes to fit our feet, but in the Cinderella story the Prince tries to find a foot to fit a 
shoe. These are two different ways of getting shoes and feet to fit: by starting with a 
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foot and looking for a shoe that fits it, and vice versa. Sometimes fitting between 
pairs of entities matters, but neither of these approaches is taken, since neither entity 
is privileged in the right way – for instance, electrical plugs and sockets need to be 
designed to fit together, but are presumably usually developed simultaneously. So 
the situation is that when two entities fit one another in some way, there can only be 
a ‘direction’ to this fit if the entities are supposed, in some sense, to fit one another 
in this way. Also, it is not enough for them merely to be supposed to fit one another, 
but – as it were – the responsibility for achieving the fit must lie with one of the 
entities, and not the other. It must be the case that it is in some way correct or 
appropriate for one of the entities, and not the other, to be changed to achieve a fit. 
As many philosophers have noted, beliefs clearly satisfy these criteria for having 
a direction of fit. Beliefs fit the world when the states of affairs which are their 
contents are actual states of affairs (see section 6.3 for more on my assumptions 
about the structure of mental states such as beliefs).  Furthermore, they are supposed 
to fit the world – there is a sense in which beliefs succeed when they are true and fail 
when they are false – and the ‘responsibility’ for achieving this fit lies with the 
belief, not with the world. Beliefs that fail to fit the world should be abandoned and 
replaced with ones which do; it seems to get the point of believing wrong to try to 
change the world so that it fits one’s beliefs. With this idea in place, philosophers 
have theorised that desires have the opposite direction of fit – that they too are 
supposed to fit the world in virtue of having actual states of affairs as their contents, 
but that this fit is to be achieved by changing the world, not by changing desires. 
For example, consider my belief that Alpamayo is a mountain in Peru, and my 
desire to see it. Both of these mental states succeed in important ways if they fit the 
world, according to philosophical orthodoxy: my belief succeeds if Alpamayo is a 
mountain in Peru, and my desire succeeds if I see it. But the orthodox view claims 
that different kinds of action would be required if these conditions were not 
satisfied, and not just because of the practicalities. If my belief about Alpamayo was 
false, then I should abandon it, and it would be irrational for me to try to make it 
true by changing the world, just for the sake of having a true belief. That this is a 
matter of the nature of belief, and not of the practicalities of the case, can be 
illustrated by considering another: if I believe I will fail tomorrow’s exam, then I 
can easily make this belief true, but I have no reason (not even a defeasible one) to 
do so. On the other hand, if my desire to see Alpamayo was unsatisfied, then I 
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should not abandon it, but should travel to the Cordillera Blanca, other things being 
equal. So the thought is that beliefs are subject to, and perhaps defined by, norms 
concerning the circumstances in which they should be held, while desires are subject 
to, and perhaps defined by, norms concerning what those who have them should do. 
Among the best-known works discussing direction of fit in this tradition are 
Anscombe (1957), Searle (1983), Platts (1979), Smith (1987), and Humberstone 
(1992). 
The direction of fit traditionally associated with beliefs is called the mind-to-
world direction of fit, because in this case the ‘mind’ – in the form of some mental 
state – is supposed to be changed, if necessary, to fit the ‘world’. The direction of fit 
traditionally associated with desires is called the world-to-mind direction of fit, 
because the ‘world’ is supposed to be changed to fit the ‘mind’. 
 
However, while philosophers have been particularly interested in direction of fit 
in the context of belief and desire, it also seems to be a crucially important feature of 
many representations. For example, consider the descriptive sentence, ‘The door is 
shut,’ and the imperative, ‘Shut the door!’. These two sentences have different 
meanings, which are distinguished not by the states of affairs that we most naturally 
identify as their semantic contents, but by their directions of fit. Very plausibly, both 
of these sentences have the state of affairs of the door’s being shut as their content, 
but they differ in meaning because of the different complex relations in which they 
stand to this state of affairs. We might make a first pass at distinguishing these 
relations by saying that the description is supposed to occur when the state of affairs 
holds, and the imperative is supposed to occur when some action ought to be taken 
to bring about the state of affairs (in both cases, presumably, the sentence should 
only be produced if the speaker reasonably judges that it is worthwhile to convey 
this to the listener). In particular, this way of thinking seems to be necessary to 
distinguish imperatives like, ‘Shut the door!’ from normative declarative sentences 
like, ‘You ought to shut the door.’ 
Furthermore, direction of fit apparently figures in the same way in many simple 
representations. Animal signs, simple signals within many organisms, and human 
conventional signals all frequently seem either to say that some state of affairs 
obtains, or to tell the systems that consume them to behave in particular ways or 
bring about particular states of affairs, or to do both of these things. So the central 
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representational properties of these entities can be accounted for by identifying their 
directions of fit and the states of affairs which are their contents. For example, 
honeybee dances may be representations telling fellow worker-bees that nectar is 
available at a given angle and distance, and also telling them to go there. This can be 
analysed by saying that the dances have, simultaneously, the mind-to-world 
direction of fit towards states of affairs like there being nectar at angle A and 
distance x from the hive, and the world-to-mind direction of fit towards states of 
affairs like the other worker bees going to the point at angle A and distance x from 
the hive (Millikan 1995). Turning to human conventional signals, red traffic lights 
have the world-to-mind direction of fit towards the state of affairs that traffic on the 
road stops at the white line, and doorbells have the mind-to-world direction of fit 
towards the state of affairs that someone is at the door (either of these signals might 
have the other direction of fit as well; to find out we need a theory of direction of 
fit). And regarding signals within organisms, there is an ongoing philosophical 
debate about the direction of fit of pains qua representations. Some writers have 
recently defended the view that they have the world-to-mind direction of fit with 
respect to states of affairs like the person’s keeping their weight off their ankle, in 
opposition to the more immediately intuitive view that they have the mind-to-world 
direction of fit with respect to propositions like the left ankle’s being damaged (e.g. 
Klein 2007). Incidentally, these examples show the limitations of the terminology of 
‘mind-to-world’ and ‘world-to-mind’, and I will shortly revert to an alternative. 
As well as potentially distinguishing beliefs from desires, then, direction of fit 
seems much more generally to distinguish different kinds of representation – 
roughly speaking, representations which say how things are, and others which say 
what to do. Those which say how things are succeed when they fit the world, while 
those that say what to do seem to succeed if they prompt their consumers to change 
the world to fit them. The examples also illustrate that representations can have both 
directions of fit, with respect to different states of affairs; some representations both 
say how things are, and what to do. 
Not all representations are like this, however. Some representations lack direction 
of fit, because they are not supposed to fit the world at all. The clearest examples are 
individual words and concepts; these are contentful, but their contents do not 
correspond to states of affairs, so they cannot fit the world in the present sense. 
Imaginings and suppositions may also lack direction of fit, and it is hard to know 
 105 
what to say about the directions of fit of questions and fictions. But it is noteworthy 
that all of these representations enter into or are formed by relatively complex 
systems. Plausibly, the most basic forms of representation, requiring the lowest 
levels of sophistication, represent whole states of affairs in non-compositional 
fashion, and have one or both directions of fit. 
 
6.3 Representations, Mental States, and Direction of Fit 
 
In this chapter, my main aim is to argue that given my overall objectives, and 
given some points about the role of direction of fit in representation, teleosemantics 
offers the most promising way to think about direction of fit. However, before 
proceeding with this, I need to set out explicitly a number of assumptions about the 
relationships between representations, mental states, and direction of fit. Some of 
these assumptions just amount to terminological stipulation, but others are more 
substantive. 
A terminological point on the use of ‘representation’ is that this and cognate 
terms are sometimes used to denote only what I would call representations with the 
mind-to-world direction of fit. An attraction of this way of using the term is that it 
follows from the thought that representations are entities that represent things as 
being certain ways; that is, that purport to say how things are. In contrast, I use the 
term ‘representation’ more broadly, as I have already suggested, to cover entities 
including imperative sentences and questions (which do not ‘represent things as 
being certain ways’), similar entities outside human language, words and concepts, 
and other things besides. Very, very roughly, representations are things that are 
about other things. 
A more substantive issue concerns the structure of those mental states, such as 
beliefs and desires, that are often called ‘propositional attitudes’. It is very widely 
agreed that for an agent to believe that grass is green is for that agent to stand in 
some relation to the state of affairs of grass being green. We can call this state of 
affairs the content of the belief. Some readers may already be tempted to object that 
we believe propositions, not states of affairs, so believing that grass is green is 
actually a matter of being related to the proposition grass is green. But since I have 
not said that the relation that believers stand in to states of affairs is the believing-
relation (the relation denoted by ‘believes’), and since whatever is related in some 
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way to the state of affairs of grass being green is thus also related in an only slightly 
different way to the proposition grass is green, this objection is no threat to the 
position just stated. 
Now, some philosophers question whether the belief that grass is green requires 
the presence of a representation with the content grass is green (e.g. Schwitzgebel 
2002). I assume the opposite, that believing does require such representations. 
However, even among those who share this view, at least two substantially different 
accounts have been proposed of how representations are involved in relating agents 
to the states of affairs that they believe. I will first outline some more of my 
assumptions, then contrast them with a prominent alternative way of thinking about 
the same issues. 
I assume that beliefs and other similar mental states are representations with 
directions of fit. What makes these representations beliefs is the roles they play in 
agents’ minds. In humans, these representations are, at least typically, structures and 
instances of activity in our brains.15 So the relation that those who believe that grass 
is green stand in to the state of affairs of grass being green is the following: they 
have representations playing the appropriate role in their minds, which have the 
mind-to-world direction of fit with respect to the state of affairs of grass being 
green. The state of affairs that is the content of the belief, is also the content of the 
representation – the representation is the belief. Also, crucially, the direction of fit of 
the belief is the direction of fit of the representation – and what it is for a mental 
state to have a direction of fit is for it to be a representation with a direction of fit. 
These assumptions amount to one way of construing the idea that propositional 
attitudes such as beliefs are relations to propositions, via mental representations 
(Fodor 1975, Field 1978). However, another way of construing it does not identify 
mental states with representations, and therefore distinguishes the directions of fit of 
mental states from those of the mental representations that make them up. On this 
alternative view, the same representations may be involved in mental states with 
opposite directions of fit. For example, assuming for now the usual view that desires 
have the world-to-mind direction of fit, a mental representation with the state of 
affairs I am eating an ice-cream as its content could be part of a desire to eat ice-
cream, or of a belief that the agent is eating ice-cream, depending on the ‘attitude’ 
                                                
15 If the extended mind hypothesis (Clark & Chalmers 1998) is correct then non-neural 
representations may also be beliefs. 
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taken to that representation – as it is sometimes put, whether the representation was 
in the mind’s ‘desire box’ or its ‘belief box’. So the same representation could be 
part of a desire, with the world-to-mind direction of fit, or of a belief, with the mind-
to-world direction of fit. On this view the representation itself would presumably 
lack any direction of fit – it would merely stand for the state of affairs I am eating 
an ice-cream, rather than saying that I am eating an ice-cream.16 
This way of thinking of things may be a consequence of the thought that what it 
is to believe a proposition is to stand in a certain relation to a representation with 
that proposition as its content. However, this thought is also true on my 
assumptions; what it is to believe a proposition is to have a belief, which is a 
representation with that proposition as its content. Also, it is sometimes said that the 
content of a belief is a representation, and this way of putting things coheres 
relatively well with the present view. To say this, we would have to distinguish 
between the content of the belief, a representation, and the content of the 
representation, which would be a state of affairs or a proposition. But this last point 
is not crucial to the approach I am describing; what is crucial is that it distinguishes 
the directions of fit of mental states from those of mental representations. 
These assumptions matter because part of my overall strategy is to develop a 
theory of direction of fit for representations of a certain kind, then apply this theory 
to desires. This approach would fail if desires were not representations, or if 
direction of fit for mental states such as desires was in some way a distinct 
phenomenon from direction of fit for representations. But I do not assume that 
beliefs and desires are representations with directions of fit just for the sake of 
expediency; in my view, this picture is much more attractive than the alternative. On 
any plausible version of the alternative approach, what it would take for a 
representation to be in the ‘belief box’ would be for that representation to play a 
certain role in the mind, and playing this role would be, on any plausible theory of 
direction of fit for representations, sufficient to entail that the belief was a 
representation with the mind-to-world direction of fit. So it complicates matters 
                                                
16 Compare what the string ‘grass is green’ does in the sentences, ‘Grass is green’ and ‘If grass is 
green, then snow is white’. The former asserts that grass is green. The latter uses the same string to 
stand for the state of affairs of grass being green in the service of asserting a conditional. Both 
sentences have the mind-to-world direction of fit, but the string ‘grass is green’ in the latter sentence 
does not have a direction of fit.  
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unnecessarily to think of the belief as anything but the representation, and to 
distinguish the direction of fit of one from that of the other. 
 
6.4 Two Approaches to Direction of Fit 
 
In this section, I will argue for the use of a teleosemantic framework in theorising 
about direction of fit, by comparing that approach to another, more familiar non-
normative approach. 
So far, I have described the directions of fit in fairly imprecise, normative terms. 
For instance, in section 6.2 I suggested that representations with the mind-to-world 
direction of fit are those that are supposed to fit the world – meaning that their 
contents are actual states of affairs – with the ‘responsibility’ for achieving the fit 
lying with the representation, or perhaps more literally with whatever produces it. 
But I hope to provide a much more precise account of direction of fit than this, and 
also one that distinguishes the directions of fit without using normative terms. Such 
a theory would allow us to infer a conclusion about the direction of fit of desire 
relatively directly from the facts about desire described in part I. A non-normative 
theory is also an attractive goal because such a theory of direction of fit could help 
to show how apparently normative features of mental states and other 
representations (such as their being capable of forms of success and failure) are 
grounded in their non-normative properties. Both of the two approaches that I will 
describe have been taken by philosophers with aims of this kind: the teleosemantic 
approach as part of a reductive theory of representation, and the more familiar 
approach in the context of moral psychology. 
The familiar approach to direction of fit is exemplified by the work of Michael 
Smith (1987, 1994) and I. L. Humberstone (1992). Smith uses his account in 
defending a Humean theory of motivating reasons, and I will discuss this topic in 
much more detail in part III. According to Smith, the direction of fit of a mental 
state with content p depends on how it is affected when the agent has a perceptual 
experience with the content not-p: 
 
Smith’s Theory of Direction of Fit: A mental state has the mind-to-world 
direction of fit with respect to p if and only if it tends to go out of existence when 
not-p is perceived. 
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A mental state has the world-to-mind direction of fit with respect to p if and only 
if it tends to endure when not-p is perceived, and dispose the agent to bring about 
p. 
 
Meanwhile, Humberstone proposed the following theory, partly in response to 
Smith: 
 
Humberstone’s Theory of Direction of Fit: A mental state has the mind-to-world 
direction of fit with respect to p if and only if it is regulated by a conditional 
intention to have it only when p is the case. 
A mental state has the world-to-mind direction of fit with respect to p if and only 
if it is regulated by a conditional intention to bring about p when one has this 
mental state. 
 
These two theories have been criticised on various grounds (e.g. Sobel & Copp 
2001), but I will not discuss the specifics of either. Instead, I will argue that they are 
both instances of a general approach to direction of fit which is less promising than 
the teleosemantic approach. The two theories are both intended to distinguish the 
directions of fit of mental states – as Smith and Humberstone thought of it, to 
identify the fundamental difference between beliefs and desires, broadly conceived – 
rather than to apply to representations more generally. Both theories appeal to 
psychological states – perceptions and intentions, respectively, and Smith’s also 
appeals explicitly to representational properties, since it involves the notion of 
perceptual experiences with specific contents. 
The teleosemantic approach to direction of fit is very different. Teleosemantics is 
a group of reductive, naturalistic theories of representation, which have in common 
the idea that biological functions are vitally important for understanding 
representation. Several authors have proposed teleosemantic theories of 
representation, including Millikan (1984, 2004), Papineau (1984, 1993), Dretske 
(1988), Neander (1995, 2013), Price (2001) and Shea (2007), and many others have 
suggested revisions to these proposals. The teleosemantic project starts from 
something like the thought that what makes beliefs representations, which can 
succeed or fail by being true or false, is not the causal properties that they actually 
exhibit or are disposed to exhibit, but their biological functions; that is, what they 
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are for, from a biological point of view. This insight is thought to account for the 
apparent normativity of representation, while also facilitating the development of a 
non-normative, reductive theory, because teleosemantic theorists also adopt non-
normative theories of biological function. Most commonly, teleosemantic theorists 
argue that an entity’s biological function, if it has one, is to do what similar entities 
did in the past, that contributed to the survival and reproduction of wider systems in 
which those entities are embedded. Teleosemantic theorists do not claim that all 
representations should be understood in terms of specifically biological functions, 
but do suggest that this reductive account of biological functions can be generalised 
to functions of other kinds, and that a theory of simpler biological representations 
can be a valuable step towards a more complete theory of representation. 
Direction of fit takes a central role in this project, because representations with 
different directions of fit seem to be for different things; they seem to have functions 
of different kinds. Those with the mind-to-world direction of fit are for saying how 
things are – for making information about the world available to some co-operating 
system, perhaps – while those with the world-to-mind direction of fit are for saying 
what to do – for controlling the behaviour of co-operating systems. This would 
explain why truth seems to be the standard of success which is characteristic of 
representations with the mind-to-world direction of fit, and satisfaction seems to be 
the characteristic standard of success of those with the world-to-mind direction of 
fit. It also follows that, if representations are distinguished from other entities by 
characteristic functions, then the two directions of fit must be two ways of being 
representations. According to the teleosemantic approach to representation, one way 
for an entity to be a representation with the content p is for it and its producer(s) and 
consumer(s) to have the functions characteristic of the mind-to-world direction of fit 
with respect to the state of affairs that p. Another way is for the entity, its producer 
and consumer to have the functions characteristic of the world-to-mind direction of 
fit with respect to p. So an entity’s status as a representation, its direction of fit, and 
its content, are all determined by the kind of function it has with respect to some 
state of affairs. 
Teleosemantic theories of representation therefore typically take a disjunctive 
form. They say that representations are things that have one or other of two 
functions; representations with one direction of fit have one kind of function, and 
those with the other direction of fit have the other. These functions are not typically 
 111 
incompatible, so it is possible for representations to have both directions of fit on 
most teleosemantic theories. Teleosemantic theorists do not typically present 
themselves as giving theories of direction of fit, but instead of giving theories of 
representation in general – which for them implies an analysis of the directions of 
fit, as an indispensible part of the wider theory. 
The teleosemantic approach has three key advantages over the more familiar 
approach of Smith and Humberstone. First, the thought that what it is to have one or 
other of the directions of fit is to have a function or purpose of a certain kind is 
highly attractive, and the teleosemantic approach focuses very specifically on this 
idea. Humberstone’s theory shares some of this advantage, since it concerns the 
agent’s intentions for their own mental states, and thus, we might think, the 
functions or purposes to which agents put those states. But Humberstone’s theory 
cannot capture the plausible idea that sub-personal representations have functions or 
purposes, and that these are crucial to their properties as representations. For 
example, we do not intend to feel pain only when our bodies suffer damage. 
Humberstone’s theory also seems to entail that animals can only have beliefs or 
desires if they are capable of conceiving of, and forming intentions about, their own 
mental states. So the advantage of teleosemantics here is that it promises to analyse 
the directions of fit in a way which captures the idea that they are tightly connected 
to functions or purposes, but does not rely on agents’ attitudes towards 
representations in doing so. 
Second, a teleosemantic analysis of direction of fit has the potential to make a 
significant contribution to theories of content and of the status of entities as 
representations, as a result of the central place that teleosemantic theorists envisage 
for direction of fit in the theory of representation. In particular, the apparent 
normativity of representation may be explained by representations’ having 
characteristic functions or purposes, and theories of direction of fit should aim to 
illuminate these functions. One reason why the familiar approach cannot offer this 
advantage is that, at least in the theories proposed by Smith and Humberstone, it 
relies on claims about the contents of representations (perceptions and 
representations) in analysing the directions of fit. 
Third, the teleosemantic approach offers the chance to develop a more widely-
applicable theory of direction of fit. As I have suggested, direction of fit does not 
seem to be a property only of mental states, but of representations of many kinds. 
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The teleosemantic approach may allow us to give a unified theory of direction of fit 
for a relatively wide range of representations. This theory is unlikely to cover 
representations of all kinds, as I will explain in section 8.2, because the variety of 
kinds of representation is too great. But it will be possible to give a theory of 
direction of fit that is applicable both to desires, and to many representations which 
are not mental states, expressed in terms of their functions and those of their 
producers and consumers. This greater breadth, in connection with the previous two 
advantages, suggests that the teleosemantic approach will offer a deeper account of 
the nature of direction of fit than would be possible on the familiar approach. 
 
In this chapter, I have prepared the ground for the detailed examination of 
direction of fit to come in following two chapters. In introducing the topic, I have 
suggested that direction of fit is common to many kinds of representations, not just 
beliefs and desires. I have also explained my assumption that the directions of fit of 
mental states such as beliefs and desires are those of the representations with which 
they are identical. I have introduced the teleosemantic approach to direction of fit, 
and argued that it is more attractive than the more familiar approach – that it offers 
exciting prospects that the familiar approach does not. However, like my choice to 
investigate desire empirically, as a natural kind, this choice should be judged by its 
results. I hope to show in the remainder of this thesis the value of the insights that a 
teleosemantic approach can deliver in the study of direction of fit, and of desire. 
As I noted in section 6.2, ‘mind-to-world’ and ‘world-to-mind’ are not entirely 
satisfactory names for the directions of fit, because they are easily mixed up, and 
because direction of fit is not only a feature of mental representations. So from now 
on, I will turn to an alternative. Several other pairs of expressions are sometimes 
used for this purpose, of which ‘indicative’ and ‘imperative’ is most common in 
teleosemantics. I will adopt this terminology; representations with the mind-to-
world direction of fit will be called indicatives or said to have indicative content, 
while those with the world-to-mind direction of fit will be called imperatives or said 
to have imperative content. Representations that have only indicative content will be 
called pure indicatives, those that have only imperative content will be called pure 
imperatives, and representations with both directions of fit will sometimes be called 
bi-directional. An important point to bear in mind about this terminology is that it 
should not be taken to imply any particular claims about sentences in the indicative 
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or imperative moods; I am open to the possibility that, for instance, some sentences 
in the indicative mood could be pure imperatives as far as direction of fit goes. A 
further important point is that the expressions ‘indicative content’ and ‘imperative 
content’ should not be taken to imply that there are two different kinds of content. I 
am assuming that representations have both directions of fit with respect to states of 
affairs. Instead, these expressions are appropriate because the directions of fit are 
two ways of having content, and representations which have both directions of fit 
have both indicative and imperative contents, which need to be distinguished. 
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Chapter 7: Teleosemantics Described and Defended 
 
7.1 A Version of Teleosemantics 
 
In this chapter, I present a fairly orthodox version of teleosemantics, and defend it 
against three well-known objections. At the end of the chapter I will also briefly 
explain why other notable objections to teleosemantics are not relevant to my 
project. Among the various teleosemantic theories that have been proposed, the one 
I will present is most similar to Millikan’s original theory, from her Language, 
Thought and Other Biological Categories (1984). 
My objective in this chapter is not to provide a complete naturalistic theory of 
representation. Instead, I aim to introduce the technical terminology of 
teleosemantics, explain how its core ideas fit together, and show that the 
teleosemantic project as a whole is not defeated by any of the three objections I 
discuss. So at times in this chapter I will appear to advocate claims that I do not 
accept, or at least not without qualification. For instance, it will be convenient for 
me to discuss how the content of representations is determined, even though my 
concern is with direction of fit, not content, and even though the theory I will 
present would, in my view, have to be made far richer to amount to a plausible 
overall theory of content. I will hardly discuss concepts, let alone issues like sense 
and reference, vagueness or context-sensitivity. Something similar is true of 
representational status – that is, of what makes entities representations; my view is 
that the teleosemantic framework I will present here offers important insights on this 
issue, but needs to be qualified and supplemented with more detail to be plausible as 
a complete theory. Also, I will describe Millikan’s criteria for the directions of fit in 
this chapter, even though I will go on to argue in chapter 8 that her criterion for 
imperative content is not correct. 
 
The first component of teleosemantics is a naturalistic account of functions. As I 
have already suggested, theories of representation need to have some way of 
capturing the idea that representational status, direction of fit and content are all 
tightly connected to apparently normative facts about what representations are 
supposed to do, and teleosemantics uses its account of functions to do this job. 
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According to Millikan (1984), an entity has a direct proper function if and only if it 
is one of a set of similar entities that are reproduced from one another, and some 
explanation of the existence of current members of this set can be given by reference 
to the properties or behaviours of past members. The functions of such entities are 
the properties or behaviours that would be cited in these explanations. The paradigm 
example of an entity with a direct proper function is an adaptive biological trait or 
component, like a heart; hearts are reproduced in similar forms, and this can be 
explained by the contribution they make to animals’ survival and reproduction. The 
function of the heart, at least pending discussion of a very important objection below 
(section 7.2), is to pump the blood, because this is what past hearts have done which 
explains the existence of present hearts, by explaining how they have contributed to 
the survival and reproduction of our ancestors. The heart does not have the function 
either of doing things which hearts have done occasionally in the past, which 
contributed to survival and reproduction but only by chance, or of doing things 
which hearts have consistently done, but which have not made significant 
contributions to survival and reproduction (like making rhythmic thumping sounds); 
in both cases this is because describing these behaviours would not make for a good 
explanation of hearts’ present existence. So direct proper functions are very tightly 
related to teleological explanations, which are explanations of entities’ existence 
and properties in terms of what things of their type are capable of doing, but these 
functions are still determined by actual causal histories. 
However, many entities that are not components of biological systems which 
have been shaped by Darwinian natural selection also have functions. For one thing, 
behaviours (as opposed to components), both of whole organisms and of parts of 
organisms, can be adaptations and can therefore have direct proper functions. In 
addition to this, processes other than natural selection can arguably create the right 
conditions for teleological explanations, and hence for direct proper functions. An 
example of particular interest is reinforcement learning: if a response to a stimulus 
will tend to be repeated when it leads to reward, and not otherwise, then present 
states and processes that contribute to this response will have direct proper 
functions, because we will be able to explain their existence by explaining how they 
contributed in the past to getting reward, and hence to their own persistence. Also, 
as well as direct proper functions, entities may also have derived functions. Derived 
functions occur when systems with direct functions produce further items, that are 
 116 
themselves supposed – according to the functions of their producers – to do certain 
things. An example of an item with a derived function is an antibody for a novel 
pathogen; this antibody will have the function of binding to and contributing to the 
destruction of that specific pathogen, because the function of the system that 
produced it was to produce antibodies that behave in this way. This type of antibody 
thus has a function even though there are no ancestral antibodies of the same type. 
Functions from learning and derived functions are potentially important to 
teleosemantics, because representations are frequently novel. This account of 
functions rightly leaves open the possibility that devices (by which I mean, entities 
with functions) can have more than one function. For example, the human tongue 
has functions in both speech and eating; it makes more than one kind of contribution 
to survival and reproduction. 
Millikan’s next step is to claim that representations must have producers and 
consumers. This move is attractive on the grounds that representation seems to be 
fundamentally communicative, and it also helps in developing a clearly-specified 
criterion for indicative content that is not based primarily on the notion of 
information (the advantage this brings will become clearer shortly). Producers are 
devices which have the function of causing representations to come into existence; 
but the more important notion is that of a consumer. Consumers are devices that are 
not just causally affected by representations, but which have the function of 
behaving in different ways, depending on the occurrence and properties of those 
representations. Consumers are said to have relational functions with respect to the 
representations that they consume, and to be adapted17 by these representations, 
when they occur. To determine whether or not a given device or behaviour is a 
representation, we need to say whether it has a consumer, which means being able to 
distinguish devices with relational functions from those with constant functions. To 
illustrate this distinction, the skin, bones, ligaments and tendons all seem to have 
constant functions – they work just by holding things in place in various ways. 
However, the muscles have relational functions – what they are supposed to do 
depends on activity in the neurons that innervate them, or possibly on more distal 
                                                
17 This is a technical term, introduced by Millikan, that I will use repeatedly. Representations adapt 
their consumers when they occur, and the functions of consumers are described by saying what they 
are supposed to do when adapted by representations. It should not be confused with the more 
common biological use of ‘adapted’, as in ‘adaptation’, meaning a device or behaviour that 
contributes to survival and reproduction. 
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states, like the location of a target object. This means that firings of the neurons that 
innervate the muscles are at least candidates for representational status. For 
example, firing of the musculocutaneous nerve adapts the biceps, which has the 
function of contracting when adapted by events of this type. The biceps muscle has a 
relational proper function, and is a consumer of activity in this nerve, because it has 
the function of behaving in a different way when the musculocutaneous nerve is 
inactive. 
A consequence of the claim that representations have consumers is that 
representations must vary, or to be more precise, must have varied in ancestral cases. 
That is, any given representation must sometimes occur and sometimes not, or must 
have different properties from one occasion to another. Otherwise there could be no 
device with the function of varying its behaviour, depending on the state of the 
representation. The different behaviours that the consumer performs will contribute 
to survival and reproduction under different conditions, so for the systems 
concerned to work, representations must co-occur sufficiently reliably with these 
conditions, and this co-occurrence is achieved by the producer. So at this point we 
already have an interesting account of the nature of representation. According to this 
version of teleosemantics, representations are things which fulfill their functions by 
influencing the behaviours of consumers, and specifically by helping to calibrate the 
behaviour of the consumers to further conditions. In many cases, they contribute to 
the survival and reproduction of organisms in this way, and the ‘further conditions’ 
are things going on ‘out in the world’. 
This is the framework within which Millikan gives her criteria for the directions 
of fit, and her theory of content. If one of the functions of a representation is to 
cause its consumer to behave in a specific way or to bring about a specific outcome, 
then they have imperative content; they tell their consumers to behave in that way, 
or to bring about that outcome. So on the present view, honeybee waggle dances 
seem to be representations with imperative content. Their consumers are other bees 
which watch the dance, or perhaps systems within these bees; either the bees have 
the function of behaving differently depending on whether they see a dance, and on 
its properties, or systems within them have the function of causing them to behave 
differently depending on the dance. And these dances contribute to the survival and 
reproduction of the bees because they cause the watching bees to fly in search of 
nectar at specific directions and distances from the hive, which correspond to 
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features of the dance (the number of waggles and the angle at which it is performed). 
So the dances have the function of causing flights that correspond to them according 
to this pattern, and consequently have imperative content, according to the present 
criterion. They say things like: Fly to the place at angle A and distance x from the 
hive! 
The criterion for indicative content involves a further technical notion, which is 
that of a normal condition for a type of behaviour. Normal conditions are those 
under which behaviours have taken place in the past, which would be mentioned in 
the best explanations of the persistence of those behaviours. So they are the 
conditions under which the behaviours have typically succeeded – not those under 
which the behaviours are most often performed. A representation has indicative 
content if one of its functions is to occur at the same time as some specific normal 
condition for the behaviour it prompts in its consumer, and its indicative content is 
that normal condition. That is, indicative representations contribute to the success of 
the systems in which they are embedded by occurring at the same time as states of 
affairs that are relevant to what their consumers should do. They say that these states 
of affairs obtain, and are true when they do, and false otherwise. A key consequence 
of this account of indicative content is that it means that consumer behaviours in 
response to true representations will typically succeed, while those in response to 
false representations will typically fail. This criterion apparently implies that waggle 
dances also have indicative content, because there being nectar available at the 
places the dances direct co-operating bees to fly to is a normal condition for the 
success of their flights, and occurring when this condition holds is among their 
functions. 
One reason why normal conditions are interesting is that they figure in 
explanations of how producer-consumer systems come to be reproduced repeatedly 
(Godfrey-Smith 2013). Consumers evolve to respond to the behaviour of producers 
precisely when those producers behave in ways that sufficiently reliably correspond 
to conditions that make the difference to the success of the consumers’ behaviour. 
This can also influence the evolution of producers, since producers will be selected 
for if they behave in ways that facilitate successful behaviour by consumers, 
provided that the evolutionary interests of producers and consumers are sufficiently 
closely connected. Another reason is that on the present view representations will 
almost always carry information about the states of affairs they represent, in the 
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sense of making those states of affairs more likely (see Shea 2007), but will not in 
general represent what they carry most information about – the states of affairs with 
which they are most closely correlated. This is in part because false positives may in 
some cases be less costly than false negatives (Godfrey-Smith 1992). For example, 
the theory implies that beaver tail-slaps have the indicative content that danger is 
present, because the escape behaviour that these signals cause has the success 
condition that the beavers in the community are threatened; escape behaviours 
where no danger is present have small but real costs. However, beavers may have 
evolved to produce tail-slaps even when the evidence of danger is weak, if the costs 
of escaping when danger is not present are sufficiently small, relative to the costs of 
not escaping when danger is present. So tail-slaps may be better correlated with 
rustling in the trees than with the presence of danger, but still represent the latter on 
the teleosemantic view. 
 
A useful way to see the value of these ideas is to consider what they add to the 
thought that representation has something to do with information. For the purposes 
of this discussion, I will adopt the standard definition of information in this context, 
which is that one event or state of affairs carries information about another if it 
makes the other more likely (i.e. if the probability of the latter given the former is 
greater that the unconditional probability of the latter; Shannon 1948). I will also 
focus on indicative representations, which are widely taken to be paradigmatic. If we 
assume that this is the case – that indicatives are paradigmatic – then representation 
certainly does have something to do with information, because indicatives are only 
useful if they make what they represent more likely (leaving aside complex cases 
involving deception). But the naïve theory that whatever carries information about 
some state of affairs represents it is hopeless, because information is ubiquitous. The 
great strength of teleosemantics is that it helps with the problems this causes in an 
elegant, principled way. 
First, carrying information about some state of affairs is obviously not sufficient 
for representing it, because everything carries information about something, and not 
everything is a representation. Even carrying information that is used and useful is 
not sufficient; the presence of clouds carries information about the chance of rain, 
but does not represent it. Teleosemantics takes a major step towards solving this 
problem by appealing to functions. It is far from obvious that there are any entities 
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that have the function of carrying information about some state of affairs, but are not 
representations. And this move is highly intuitive, because it seems that what 
distinguishes representations from other phenomena which we (and other animals, 
and our sub-systems, and other things) use to draw inferences about further states of 
affairs is that representations are created for this purpose. Also, the idea that 
consumers are necessary for representations helps to clarify this thought. Nothing 
can contribute to the success of a wider system just by carrying information, unless 
the information-carrying event also causes further events that benefit the wider 
system, and these effects are mediated by some further system. It is the presence of 
consumers that makes it possible to identify information-carrying, rather than 
causing some beneficial effect at an appropriate time, as the distinctive function of 
representations. 
Second, thinking about what information a representation carries is not 
particularly helpful in identifying its content, but the notion of normal conditions 
helps to deal with this problem. Although the information carried by specific 
representations is important for understanding how they work (Skyrms 2010, Sutton 
2013), the consumer-focused approach advocated by teleosemantics allows us to 
both explain how producer-consumer pairs using representations to co-operate 
emerge, and state truth-conditions for indicatives. Any representation will carry 
information about many different states of affairs, for several reasons. For example, 
consider the beaver’s tail-slap. We have already seen that this carries information 
about the presence of danger, and about rustling in the trees. But it also carries 
information about more or less specific states of affairs, such as wolves being 
present and animals being present; about more proximal causes of the signal such as 
specific patterns of stimulation to the beavers’ sense organs; about effects of the 
signal, such as the beavers’ performing escape behaviours; about background 
conditions for the signal, such as the presence of oxygen in the environment; and 
about disjunctions of possible causes of the signal, such as danger being present or 
the wind rustling the trees. So if we are to identify the truth-conditions of 
representations from all of these, we need a principled reason to select one state of 
affairs over the others. Millikan’s idea offers such a solution. The normal conditions 
for consumer behaviours are different from the other states of affairs that 
representations carry information about because they explain successful behaviour; 
they make it the case that true representations explain success and false ones explain 
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failure. They are also good for explaining why producers and consumers are 
configured the way they are, because it is the fact that representations carry 
information about normal conditions that explains why it is useful for those 
representations to be produced, and for consumers to respond to them in the ways 
they do. So the three main innovations of Millikan-style teleosemantics – functions, 
consumers and normal conditions – all seem to be highly promising insights for 




In this section, I will discuss the first of the three objections to teleosemantics to 
be addressed in this chapter. Among the most challenging and best-known 
objections to teleosemantics is that it fails to identify determinate contents for many, 
if not all representations (Fodor 1990), and a similar problem also confronts 
teleosemantic accounts of direction of fit. So here I will explain why indeterminacy 
problems in general are not fatal for teleosemantics, showing how they arise both for 
accounts of content and accounts of direction of fit, and in the next chapter I will 
return to the issue as it applies to my own theory. Although there are various ways to 
develop this objection, they are all derived from the same problem, which is that for 
any device there is more than one way to explain how it contributes to the survival 
and reproduction of a wider system. Since functions are the properties or behaviours 
that are cited in such explanations, this variety of explanations seems to imply 
indeterminacy of function, which would in turn imply indeterminacy of content and 
direction of fit. For the sake of easier expression, I will write as though 
teleosemantics is only concerned with biological functions, but similar points are 
likely also to apply to non-biological functions. 
This objection is often discussed using the example, introduced by Fodor (1990), 
of a frog that is disposed to try to catch and eat any small dark object that flies near 
it. We assume that the frog produces internal states of a certain type when it sees 
things like this, that in some way encode the position, direction and speed of the 
objects, and that these internal states cause the frog to flick out its tongue in the 
appropriate direction. We can also assume for the sake of argument that this is a 
reflex, so no other internal representational states are involved in controlling the 
action, and we can ignore the question of how the internal states represent position, 
 122 
speed and direction, in favour of thinking about what they represent as moving in 
that way – so we will also ignore any potential imperative content. The question is 
whether a given internal state of this type – call it R – represents the presence of 
food, flies or small dark moving things, or perhaps something else again. 
At least looked at pessimistically, the problem is particularly acute because there 
are principled arguments concerning R’s content that seem to point in different 
directions. Recall that according to the theory, R’s indicative content is some 
specific normal condition for the successful performance of the behavior that R 
causes; that is, a condition that would be cited in a good explanation of how the R-
caused behaviour typically contributed to the frog’s survival and reproduction. So 
the content of R is something like there is a _____ at location x travelling with 
speed y and angle z, and we are interested in what fills in the blank. Among the 
possibilities are: 
 
i) fly: For the sake of argument, let’s assume that this mechanism was typically 
used to catch flies in the frog’s ancestral environment, and that flies are a natural 
kind. Then it seems to be a good explanation of how the tongue-flicking 
behaviour, as prompted by R, contributed to the frog’s survival and reproduction 
to say that Rs occurred when flies were present at locations systematically 
correlated with the different forms that R can take. Still, this explanation works 
because we have a certain amount of background knowledge: we know that flies 
are usually good food for frogs, and that flies are, in virtue of their size, solidity, 
colour, and typical rate of movement, fairly easy things to see – so we can 
understand the ability of the frog’s visual system to generate Rs. 
 
ii) small, dark moving thing: If we replace talk about flies with talk of small, dark 
moving things in our explanation of how tongue-flicking works, then we no 
longer need the background knowledge that flies are easy to see, so our 
explanation has the advantage that it makes it more transparent how the task to be 
performed is possible. This is, in general, an important theoretical virtue. 
However, this replacement does have the cost that the explanation now relies on 
the background knowledge that in the frog’s ancestral environment, small, dark 
moving things were often flies. 
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In order to see the full case for this line, we need to step back from the frog 
example, and notice that typically internal devices in biological systems 
contribute by working together with many others. They are parts of 
hierarchically-organised systems, with corresponding hierarchies of functions. 
For example, the molars ultimately contribute to our survival and reproduction by 
maintaining our health; they are part of a system that does this by ingesting 
nutrients; and also of a sub-system that takes food into the body and prepares it 
for the absorption of individual nutrients; and of a sub-sub-system that breaks the 
food into smaller and softer pieces; and of a sub-sub-sub-system that grinds the 
food; and within this system they act as the grinding surfaces, rather than 
producing the necessary movements. So among the things the molars do which 
contribute to survival and reproduction, and are hence among their putative 
functions, are maintaining health, ingesting nutrients, grinding food, etc.. Karen 
Neander (1995) points out that from this hierarchy, we can identify the function 
that is specific to a device, which is the one that it most immediately performs – 
perhaps acting as a grinding surface in  the case of the molars. A useful way to 
think about this, she suggests, is to think about what kind of failure would imply 
malfunction on the part of the specific device we are interested in. Now, if this is 
a good way to overcome functional indeterminacy, it pushes us towards using the 
most immediate function of R to fix its content, and Neander argues that the most 
immediate function of R is detecting small, dark moving things. This is 
something R does that requires minimal co-operation either from other parts of 
the system, or from a benign environment. 
 
iii) healthy frog food: An alternative way to adjust the explanation given in i) is to 
try to avoid using the background knowledge that flies are good food for frogs, 
by replacing talk of flies with talk of healthy frog food (Goode & Griffiths 1995). 
This makes it less transparent how the system concerned is able to detect the 
presence of what it represents, but more transparent how catching this thing will 
contribute to survival and reproduction. In addition to increasing the transparency 
of that aspect of the explanation, this also increases its robustness, because there 
are possible cases in which frogs catch flies but this makes them less healthy, or 
in which they catch things other than flies that make them more healthy. For 
example, Papineau (1998) mentions flies which are poisonous or cause allergic 
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reactions. Moving in this direction (which might take us further, to thinking of R 
as representing reproduction-enhancer – Papineau 1998) tends to make it the 
case that the truth of indicatives ensures the success of the behaviours they cause, 
and is therefore in keeping with the spirit of teleosemantics, which in its 
canonical form takes indicative content to be determined by success conditions 
rather than by the information that representations carry. 
 
In addition to these, a further possibility is that R represents the presence of a 
characteristic pattern of firing on the frog’s retina. A potential advantage of this 
view is that we might say that the function of the frog’s eye is to produce the 
characteristic firing pattern when flies are present, and that the function of the 
system that produces R is to produce it when this pattern occurs – this would be to 
think of the eye and the producer of R as co-operating sub-systems of a wider 
system, whereas the other proposals seem to treat the wider system as R’s producer. 
This is a slightly different version of the indeterminacy problem, because it takes R 
to represent a different event rather than the same event under a different 
description. Overall, in the face of this sort of example, it is hard for teleosemantic 
theorists to deny that there is a serious threat to their theory of representation from 
functional indeterminacy. The relevant phenomena admit of many good 
explanations backed up by principled explanatory strategies. 
Before giving a response to this objection, I will outline one further example, in 
less detail, in order to show that the same problem is also relevant to direction of fit. 
Imagine now that the frog also uses an internal state S, which causes it to croak, and 
that there are a range of different situations in which it does this: it does it whenever 
it sees a rival that might invade its territory, as a warning, and also when it gets dark, 
to advertise its presence to potential mates, and also when predators approach its 
spawn, as a way of distracting them. Now S clearly has imperative content on the 
teleosemantic account, in that it tells the frog’s motor systems to produce a croak. 
But whether or not S also has indicative content seems to be indeterminate, because 
some explanations of how it works would describe a normal condition for croaking 
with which it has the function of co-occurring, but others would not. One way of 
describing the normal condition for croaking would be disjunctive, giving S the 
indicative content: a rival is near or a potential mate is near or something is 
threatening the spawn; but a disadvantage of this is that there will be no system in 
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the frog for identifying when this disjunctive condition holds, other than the systems 
for detecting each disjunct. Another way of describing the normal condition would 
just be to say that the situation is such that croaking is appropriate, but this does not 
explain in any substantive way how croaking succeeds. We should be wary of 
indicative content like the situation is such that croaking is appropriate because if 
we allow it in all cases we risk having no account of how pure imperatives are 
possible. I discuss this kind of case and the issue of indeterminacy specifically in 
direction of fit further in the next chapter; the key point for now is that I cannot 
dismiss the present objection just by saying that my interest is in direction of fit and 
not content. 
A second point worth noting before turning to my main response to the objection 
is that it is not at all clear what level of determinacy of content a good theory should 
provide in any given case. We should not assume unquestioningly that 
representational content in simple biological cases will always be easy to capture in 
human languages, or that contents which can be described easily in such languages 
are therefore perfectly determinate, or that perfect determinacy is a virtue. In 
particular, the existence of vague predicates in human languages suggests that this 
issue is not straightforward. 
 
I turn now to my main response to this objection, which is that the objection only 
shows that biological functions have not yet been adequately defined by 
teleosemantic theorists, not that they are themselves indeterminate. So while the 
objection may show that teleosemantics needs to say more to specify exactly what 
determines the functions that ground content, it does not show that a radical change 
of direction is needed. In order to bring out this response, I will first describe how 
the teleosemantic account of functions could be strengthened to avoid 
indeterminacy, then argue that we do not currently have sufficient grounds to 
abandon realism about determinate biological functions. 
On the first of these points, attempts have already been made by Neander (1995, 
described above) and Carolyn Price (1998) to give more precise accounts of 
functions. I will describe Price’s work shortly, but first we should note that the 
present account of functions is weak – it says only that a function is any property or 
behaviour of a device that contributes to the success of a wider system, and hence 
explains its existence – and that resources are certainly available to strengthen it. In 
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particular, I described the case for indeterminacy made above as a ‘pessimistic’ 
perspective on the point that principled approaches to explanation pull us in different 
directions, and there does seem to be an optimistic interpretation of this point 
available as well. Given that there are a range of explanatory virtues that we can use 
to evaluate proposed functions, the materials are there for an account of function that 
maintains the connection with explanations, but gives more functional determinacy. 
We simply need to explain how to balance considerations like making it easy to see 
how systems contribute, making it easy to see how it is possible for them to perform 
their functions, and avoiding duplication of functions (for instance, not attributing 
the same functions both to systems and their own sub-systems). 
Price’s account follows broadly this approach, and while it may not entirely solve 
the indeterminacy problem, it at least shows us how to go about solving it. She 
claims that in addition to being cited in an explanation of how a device contributes 
to the survival and reproduction of a wider system, functions also satisfy the 
following four conditions: 
 
- Immediacy: if an activity a’ of a given device contributes to the success of a 
broader system only by facilitating a further activity a of the same device, 
then doing a’ is not part of the function of that device. For instance, growing 
is not part of the function of a flower, even though the flower’s growing is a 
condition of its contributing to the success of a plant. 
- Independence: the function of a device is something that device is capable of 
doing on its own. The function of the heart is not to distribute oxygenated 
blood to the muscles, because it can only do this with the co-operation of the 
lungs and blood vessels. 
- Abstractness 1: the function of a device is to produce an effect,18 rather than 
to produce that effect via a specific mechanism or process. The function of 
an axon is not to quickly propagate an action potential to a set of synapses 
using a myelin sheath, because axons could in principle make the same 
contribution to neural systems in a different way. 
                                                
18 Many teleosemantic theorists take the view that functions must involve producing effects, and 
therefore that representations cannot have functions like carrying information about, or occurring at 
the same time as, particular states of affairs (see Millikan 1990). They argue that functions must be 
constituted by causal contributions to successful outcomes. But in my view co-occurrence with 
normal conditions is the way that indicatives causally contribute to success, even though it cannot 
readily be characterised in terms of producing an effect. 
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- Abstractness 2: the function of a device is correctly specified in a way that 
assumes that the device’s fellow components are also performing their 
functions, whatever those functions are. The function of the heart is not to 
pump clot-free blood, because other mechanisms have the function of 
ensuring that the blood is clot-free. 
 
A notable feature of these four conditions is that with the exception of Immediacy, 
they are instances of a more general principle, which is that different devices that are 
parts of the same system do not have the same function.19 This principle has the 
obvious explanatory virtues that it avoids leaving any device apparently superfluous, 
or making any uninformative functional claims. Respecting this principle requires 
careful attention to the system/sub-system and fellow-component relations in which 
devices stand, as Price also emphasises. An example will illustrate the links between 
Price’s conditions and the general principle. 
The arteries, veins, and the heart all have distinct functions, which contribute to 
the functioning of the circulatory system, of which they are all sub-systems; and the 
circulatory system works together with the respiratory system. Independence tells us 
that the arteries, veins and heart have functions that they perform on their own, 
without relying on each other: so the heart pumps the blood, the arteries channel the 
movement of the blood to the muscles, and the veins channel the movement of the 
blood back to the lungs. Abstractness 1 tells us that the circulatory system as a 
whole does not just do the conjunction of these things, but instead does something 
more abstract, that could in principle be achieved in more than one way: it circulates 
the blood between the muscles and the lungs. And Abstractness 2 tells us that the 
circulatory system does not have the function of carrying oxygenated blood to the 
muscles, because if the circulatory system was already doing this, then the role of 
the respiratory system, which is not a sub-system of the circulatory system, would 
not be clear. The function of the respiratory system is to oxygenate the blood and 
remove carbon dioxide from deoxygenated blood; that of the circulatory system is to 
move the blood around; and the function of the wider system that involves both is to 
supply oxygen to the muscles. So together, Independence, Abstractness 1, and 
                                                
19 Apart from in systems that actually do have multiple distinct devices for doing the same thing; it’s 
important not to slip into Panglossian assumptions when thinking about biological functions. 
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Abstractness 2 allow us to identify with a high degree of precision just what roles 
each device plays in a complex system. 
Price goes on to argue that her account allows us to settle the dispute I described 
about the contents of R, the frog’s internal state. On her view, R represents the 
presence of flies. It does not represent the presence of small, dark moving things, 
because the function of the consumer of R is to catch flies, not small, dark moving 
things. The connection between being small, dark and moving and being nutritious 
for frogs is too contingent for the proposal that the consumer has the latter function 
to explain how it contributes to the survival of the organism. Also, the first 
abstractness condition rules out the possibility that the function of this consumer is 
to catch flies by catching small, dark moving things. R does not represent the 
presence of healthy frog food, because the second abstractness condition tells us that 
we should assume that the fellow components of a device are performing their 
functions successfully, and it is the performance of other systems within frogs that 
explains why flies are healthy food for them. However, it would be wrong to put too 
much stress on whether these arguments succeed, partly because we do not know 
what level of determinacy we should be aiming for in this particular case, and partly 
because it is only one of a huge number of possible cases. 
Instead, Price’s account shows that it is possible to be much more precise about 
which properties and behaviours of devices are their functions. As I have suggested, 
it focuses mainly on the relationships between the functions of different components 
of the same system, and it may be the case that further refinements could be 
achieved by focusing on other issues. For instance, it may be that there are important 
relationships between functions and natural kinds which are yet to be illuminated, 
and that this could tell us more about why R represents the presence of flies – if it 
does. But what is crucial for my purposes is not showing exactly how the 
teleosemantic account of functions should be modified, but showing that there is 
reason for optimism about its prospects, and Price’s account gives us good cause for 
optimism. 
The second part of my response to the indeterminacy objection is to argue that 
the objection does not succeed in undermining a robust realism about functions. One 
might think that the reason the indeterminacy objection arises is that functions are 
defined in terms of explanation, and that good explanations are a fundamentally 
pragmatic, discourse-relative matter. The thought would be something like this: that 
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biological devices have the functions they do, and therefore representations in 
biological systems have the contents they do, in virtue both of the ways that 
organisms are and their ancestors were, and in virtue of the way that we are, as 
observers and theorists. This would be because what makes a good explanation 
depends on who is interested and why. So functions and contents are indeterminate 
from our point of view, because what makes a good explanation for us is 
indeterminate, partly because we have various or indeterminate interests when 
thinking about biological systems. 
There is a good reason to be suspicious of this line of thought, because it 
threatens to show that evolutionary biology can only reveal facts about, at best, how 
we can understand how organisms came to have the traits they do, rather than 
straightforwardly about how they did come to have those traits. Scientists regularly 
study both what particular traits have been selected for, and what generalisations it is 
possible to make about patterns of selection. This means that they study functions, 
because the functions of devices are those properties and behaviours for which they 
have been selected. For example, a current debate in evolutionary biology concerns 
the early evolution of feathers, which was a crucial stage in the development of 
modern birds; it is debated whether the first function of feathers was aerodynamic or 
to do with display, insulation, or some combination of factors (Zhou 2014). To take 
another example, it has recently been argued that the phenomenon of ‘insular 
dwarfism’ – that is, the tendency of large mammals living on islands to develop 
smaller forms – is due to a fitness advantage caused by faster reproduction in 
smaller forms (Raia & Meiri 2006). So these authors suggest that small body size 
has the function, in this group, of allowing faster growth to reproductive maturity. A 
current debate in biology of particular philosophical interest concerns the proportion 
of the human genome which is functional, and again this illustrates that respectable 
scientists are concerned with functions in Millikan’s sense (Graur et al. 2013, 
Doolittle et al. 2014). So we should certainly not rush to conclude that there are no 
interest-independent facts about biological functions. 
However, it remains plausible that explanations are interest-relative, so it is 
important that we are able to give a historical definition of functions which does not 
mention explanation. Given the close relationship between functions and selection-




Selection-for: There is selection for trait T in a population if and only if having 
trait T causes organisms to have increased reproductive success in that 
population. 
 
Following Sober, we can define direct proper functions in this way: 
 
Direct Proper Functions: A direct proper function of a device is a property or 
behaviour of that device which causes the wider systems in which it is embedded 
to have increased reproductive success. 
 
This definition replaces the claim that functions explain success with the claim that 
they cause success, but apart from removing the appearance of interest-dependence, 
it does not obviously change the account very much. In particular, something like 
the indeterminacy problems can still be raised, although now they appear in a 
somewhat different light. Just as both co-occurring with the presence of flies and co-
occurring with the presence of small, dark moving things are candidate explanations 
of the contribution of R, so they are also both candidate means by which R may 
have caused increased reproductive success. Instead of a challenge about the 
plurality of explanation, the indeterminacy problems now appear as a challenge 
about distinguishing causation from correlation, and about correctly attributing 
causal contributions to the components of complex systems. These are certainly hard 
philosophical problems, but they are not distinctive to the present case, and it would 
be a radical response to them to argue that there are no objective facts about 
causation in cases of the present kind. 
Despite these points, it remains striking that thinking about explanation can be so 
productive in seeking to get a grip on functions. But this need not lead us to the 
conclusion that claims about determinate functions are significantly more dubious 
than other causal claims, because it is true in general that thinking about explanation 
is (at least) a useful heuristic for identifying causes. For instance, consider again the 
outcome devaluation experiments described in chapter 2; when we aim to identify 
the cognitive system that causes this pattern of behaviour, it makes sense for us to 
look for the features of the world that best explain it. Explanatory virtues are widely, 
and it seems rightly, taken to be a good guide to causation. So facts about biological 
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functions do not seem to be contingent on our interests, and we can therefore 
conclude that, as it stands, the indeterminacy objection fails to defeat the 
teleosemantic project. 
 
7.3 Liberality and Explanation 
 
After the indeterminacy objection, the next-most famous objection to 
teleosemantics is probably the Swampman objection (Davidson 1987). Before 
discussing Swampman, however, it will be convenient for us to consider a more 
recent objection, put forward by Tyler Burge (2010), Michael Rescorla (2013) and 
Peter Schulte (2015). Burge, Rescorla and Schulte are primarily concerned with 
teleosemantic claims about representational status; they argue that the version of 
teleosemantics described in section 7.1 is too liberal, alleging that many of the 
simpler representations that teleosemantics identifies are not representations at all. 
Although my commitment is to a theory of direction of fit, not of representational 
status, this line of objection does pose a threat to my view. The problem is that my 
theory of direction of fit is designed to apply to a particular class of representations 
which are (in some respects) among the simplest to satisfy the teleosemantic account 
of representational status. So if Burge, Rescorla and Schulte are right, it may be that 
none of the entities to which my theory of direction of fit applies are representations 
at all. To avoid the consequence that desires are not representations, they would 
have to also reject my account of desire. Alternatively, if the objection succeeds, it 
may be that many or most of the entities to which my theory applies are not 
representations, but a few are. That would also cast doubt on my theory, since it 
would imply that it is only narrowly applicable. 
The argument that these critics of standard teleosemantics present is simple: they 
claim that there is no explanatory advantage to using representational terms to 
describe the class of entities which teleosemantics implies are representations, but 
which they claim are not. Schulte (2015) gives the example of the hormone 
vasopressin. Vasopressin is produced by the hypothalamus in response to excessive 
blood osmolarity and transported to the kidneys, where it causes an increase in the 
amount of water reabsorbed into the blood. Since vasopressin apparently has a 
function, a producer and a consumer, and it causes its consumer to do something 
that is beneficial only if a further condition holds, vasopressin counts as a 
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representation on the version of teleosemantics described in section 7.1. But, Schulte 
claims, describing vasopressin as a representation, or talking about its content, truth 
or falsity, or direction of fit, can add no explanatory value to the kind of explanation 
just given; he writes that thinking of vasopressin as a representation does not help us 
to understand either its effects, or why it is present. Since vasopressin has no 
obvious claim to be a representation other than that it satisfies the teleosemantic 
criteria, it makes a good test case. If it is possible to identify ways in which using 
representation-talk to describe vasopressin is valuable, then the objection fails, but if 
not, then it will apparently succeed. 
In my view, the objection fails. There are two ways in which describing 
vasopressin as a representation can contribute to good explanations. First, Papineau 
(1993) and Shea (2007) argue that talk of representations is explanatorily valuable 
because we can explain how systems succeed by saying that they acted on true 
representations. Papineau focuses on cases involving belief and desire, so he has 
explanations of this kind in mind: Eric succeeded in getting a beer by going to the 
fridge, because he truly believed that there was beer in the fridge. But we can 
construct a similar explanation involving vasopressin: On this occasion, the 
behaviour of the kidneys succeeded in maintaining a healthy concentration of solute 
particles in the blood plasma, because the vasopressin signal accurately represented 
the osmolarity of the blood. Both authors emphasise the distinction between 
explanations of this kind, which explain outcomes that happen as a result of 
behaviours, and explanations of behaviours themselves. They suggest that 
explanations of the latter sort do not rely on talk of representations, since the internal 
states concerned could be functionally characterised, as tending to cause particular 
behaviours when tokened in particular combinations, and equally adequate 
explanations of the behaviours would be available. In contrast to this, explanations 
of outcomes in terms of internal states require attention to the co-ordination of those 
internal states with external conditions. So for example, to explain why the kidneys 
increased water reabsorption, we only need to mention that vasopressin was 
released, and to know that vasopressin release tends to have this effect. But to 
explain why the action of the kidneys led to a good outcome, we also need to know 
that the vasopressin was released under the right circumstances, and one way to 
capture this is to describe vasopressin as truly representing that those were the 
circumstances. 
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One might think that this use of representation-talk is still unnecessary; we can 
explain the success of the kidneys’ action just by saying that on this occasion, the 
blood osmolarity was too high. However, while it is correct that in order to explain 
the fact that a given process produced a particular outcome on a particular occasion, 
it is sometimes crucial that an element of that process co-occurred with some 
external condition, that is only one aspect of the form of explanation that I am 
describing here. Explanations of success that make use of representation-talk also 
have other significant implications. In general the co-occurrence of some event with 
an external condition, which leads to a beneficial outcome, might take place by 
accident. But in contrast, an explanation that describes an entity as a true 
representation also implies that the entity was supposed to co-occur with the external 
condition that it is said to represent, and therefore says something about how the 
process in question works. For example, saying that the release of vasopressin truly 
represented that the osmolarity of the blood was too high goes beyond just saying 
that the vasopressin release occurred at a time when this was the case. So these 
explanations both identify the outcomes they explain as having been produced by 
mechanisms of a certain kind, and show that they are successes, rather than just 
beneficial outcomes. 
We explain successful outcomes, then, by indicating the functions of crucial parts 
of the processes that lead to these outcomes, and saying that they have been 
successfully performed. One variety of this form of explanation cites the 
employment of true representations; this specific variety is valuable because it 
identifies the successful outcome as having been produced by a process involving 
elements with the function of co-occurrence with external conditions, which 
influence the behaviour of consumers.20 
Second, describing vasopressin as a representation can help explain what it is for, 
and how it contributes to the operation of a wider system – although this does 
                                                
20 One potential problem with this response to Burge, Rescorla and Schulte is that on the standard 
teleosemantic account of representation, explanations of this kind are arguably rather shallow 
(Godfrey-Smith 1996, Shea 2007). The problem arises because according to that account, what it is 
for a representation R to have content C is for the behaviours that past instances of R caused in their 
consumers to have typically succeeded when state of affairs C obtained. This means that when we 
say that a behaviour succeeded as a result of a true representation that C, what we are saying amounts 
to just that it succeeded as a result of things being as they were on past occasions when behaviours of 
the same type were successful. As Shea puts it, the explanation is of the ‘dormitive virtue’ type – it’s 
like explaining why a sleeping tablet works by citing its dormitive virtue. However, as Shea explains, 
this problem can be ameliorated by an adjustment to the teleosemantic account that makes little 
difference to which entities are counted as representations. 
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depend on how much the person being given the explanation knows in advance. 
Still, to someone who had heard that there is a hormone called ‘vasopressin’ but 
knew nothing else about it, it would be very informative to be told that it is a signal 
which represents high blood osmolarity, and causes an appropriate response by the 
kidneys. To someone who had no idea at all what vasopressin was, it would be very 
informative to be told just that vasopressin is a certain sort of chemical signal found 
in the human body – much more so than being told just that it is a chemical in the 
body. 
These explanations work primarily by identifying vasopressin as a member of a 
very general functional category, which is the category of things that work by co-
occurring with conditions that are relevant to the behaviours of their consumers. So 
it is worth emphasising that this is a significant category, by showing that there are 
some things with functions, that have the function of causing co-operating devices to 
undergo certain changes, but which are not members of this category – that is, which 
are not representations according to standard teleosemantics. For example, 
contractions of the biceps cause the angle between the forearm bones and the 
humerus to become more acute, and these contractions arguably only perform their 
function when they do this at the right times – when they are caused to do so by 
firing in the musculocutaneous nerve. But contractions of the biceps are not 
intuitively representations, and teleosemantics gets this result, because the bones of 
the forearm do not count as consumers. This is because the forearm bones do not 
change what they do when they are acted on by biceps contractions; the definition of 
a consumer is of something that has the function of changing its behaviour under a 
certain condition, and the forearm bones do not satisfy this definition. They are 
merely acted on by biceps contractions. In contrast, the kidneys do have the function 
of changing their behaviour when vasopressin is released. So the second way in 
which representation-talk is useful in the case of vasopressin is that it identifies 
vasopressin as member of a significant functional category, and thereby helps to 
explain what vasopressin is, and the nature of the contribution that it makes to the 
system of which it is a part. 
My response to the liberality objection offered by Burge, Rescorla and Schulte is 
therefore that even in the simplest cases where teleosemantics identifies entities as 
representations, there is something to be gained from describing them as such. 
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Representation-talk can help explain why successful behaviours succeed, and what 




We can now turn to the third objection to teleosemantics, which was proposed by 
Donald Davidson (1987), although anticipated by both Millikan (1984) and 
Papineau (1984). The objection asks us to consider Swampman, a perfect physical 
replica of Davidson, formed by chance in a swamp, who emerges and takes 
Davidson’s place in society. Since neither Swampman nor any of his parts have any 
history of selection, teleosemanticists are apparently committed to claiming that 
nothing going on in his ‘brain’, nor any of the sounds he produces or marks he 
makes, have any representational content. Swampman presents a challenge to 
teleosemantics not just because it is intuitive that he has beliefs, desires and the rest, 
but because any account of Davidson’s behaviour that used representational notions 
would seem to work just as well for Swampman. If such explanations really would 
work just as well in Swampman’s case, then there may be something that 
Swampman has in common with the rest of us that accounts for this, and we might 
think that this feature – whatever it is – is more fundamental to representation than 
teleology. Since my account of direction of fit relies on the teleosemantic notion of 
function this objection presents a real challenge to my view; if swampman has 
internal states with directions of fit, then direction of fit may reduce to something 
other than historically-derived functional properties. 
Among the premises that the Swampman objection relies on are the claims that 
Swampman’s internal states lack functions, and the claim that explanations 
employing representational notions work just as well for Swampman as for his 
physical duplicate Davidson. On closer observation, however, both of these 
premises are questionable, so two possible responses to the objection are available; I 
will discuss them in turn. 
It is clear that when he first emerges, Swampman’s internal states lack the 
historical properties that are necessary for functions on the present account. 
However, Paul Griffiths (2009) has argued that the very possibility of biology shows 
that there must be biological functions that supervene only on organisms’ present, 
non-historical properties. If Griffiths’ argument succeeds, it may show that 
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Swampman’s internal states do have functions, and hence that a version of 
teleosemantics could be formulated that would avoid the objection. 
Griffiths’ argument has two parts. First, he accepts Millikan’s (2002) view that in 
order to investigate how biological systems work, why they are the way they are, 
and how they interact with one another, a notion of function is necessary that goes 
beyond the brute causal dispositions of systems and their parts (sometimes called 
‘Cummins functions’; Cummins 1975). This is because without such a rich notion of 
function, it does not seem to be possible to distinguish parts of organisms from parts 
of the environment, parts of organisms from one another, or normal from 
pathological processes. To take one of Griffiths’ examples, there would be no reason 
to privilege how and why kangaroos eat grass as a subject of biological study over 
how and why they are consumed by bushfires. In order to draw these distinctions, he 
claims, we need to take an evolutionary perspective – to consider the contributions 
that different processes make to organisms’ survival and reproduction. Second, he 
claims that among the subjects of study for which such a perspective is necessary is 
the study of selective histories; that is, the very subject that standard teleosemantics 
takes to be necessary to reveal biological functions. Specifically, he suggests that if 
facts about functions could only be known by studying history, then we could not 
study any given period in the history of selection, because to do so we would first 
have to know about prior history. So Griffiths claims that there is an irresolvable 
tension between two of Millikan’s ideas, because if she is right that functions are 
necessary to identify the objects and processes which are biology’s subject, then she 
cannot also be right that it is necessary to do historical biology in order to learn 
about functions. 
In Griffiths’ view, then, the success of biology as a discipline shows that it must 
be possible to identify biological functions just by studying how things are the 
present. He therefore proposes a forward-looking account of biological functions, 
according to which the functions of components and behaviours are the things they 
do that currently promote future survival and reproduction. Given that Swampman is 
a physical duplicate of Davidson, then, Griffiths’ view seems to imply that 
Swampman’s internal states do have biological functions (although the Swampman 
objection is not the target of Griffiths’ work). 
Unfortunately, this is not a wholly satisfactory response to the objection. I 
suspect that many readers, like me, will feel uneasy at the suggestion that having 
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come into existence entirely by chance, Swampman’s organs and behaviours and 
internal states could have functions. This unease is vindicated by another aspect of 
Griffiths’ view, which means we have no need to assess his argument for the 
importance of forward-looking functions in biology. Griffiths also claims that our 
ability to make sense of biological phenomena is contingent on our understanding 
that organisms are the products of, and continue to be subject to, evolution by 
natural selection. It is because kangaroos have been shaped by these forces that we 
are right to pay greater attention to their dispositions to eat grass than to their 
dispositions to be burnt in fires, even though we can recognise the difference 
between these dispositions without knowing anything specific about kangaroo 
history. So Griffiths’ argument may show only that the components and behaviours 
of systems with the right kinds of histories have functions, even though what those 
functions are is determined in a forward-looking way. Swampman is an unusual 
case, because he and his possible descendents will behave in the future as though 
they were ordinary humans, but it would still seem to be a mistake to treat him as a 
normal object of biological study – in particular, we cannot explain why he has a 
‘heart’ by saying how this object will contribute to his survival and reproduction. At 
least pending further argument, we should conclude that Swampman’s organs and 
internal states do not have functions, even though they are very much like 
Davidson’s, which do. 
The second premise needed to sustain the Swampman objection is the claim that 
explanations that employ representation-talk work just as well for Swampman as 
they do for Davidson. The thought behind this premise is something like the 
following: assuming that Swampman has beliefs and desires, and that the sounds he 
produces are words, would help us to predict and understand his behaviour just as 
effectively as the same assumptions would for Davidson. But this thought is 
questionable, because while we can be confident that Swampman’s behaviour could 
be predicted just as effectively as Davidson’s, it seems to beg the question to 
suggest that we could understand it equally effectively. This is because false claims 
with true consequences do not constitute good explanations of those consequences. 
If I explain why a saucepan is hot by saying that it is burning, I have not given a 
good explanation, not because burning things are not generally hot, but because the 
saucepan is not burning; its heat has a different cause. Similarly, if we explain why 
Swampman goes to the fridge by saying that he wants a beer, this will be a good 
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explanation only if Swampman actually does want a beer. This line of thought is 
relevant even if the only way of determining which things are representations is to 
appeal to explanatory considerations, because predictive power may not be the only 
factor that makes representational explanations valuable. So if there are explanatory 
advantages to refraining from attributing content to Swampman’s internal states, 
then contrary to appearances, it may be that explanations that employ representation-
talk do not work as well for Swampman as for Davidson. This suggests a bullet-
biting strategy for responding to the objection – accepting that Swampman lacks 
beliefs and desires – which has been adopted by teleosemantic theorists including 
Millikan (1996) and Neander (1996). 
Millikan argues that, roughly, there is no possible theory of representation that 
does not refer to history, and that there is no ‘real kind’ that unites human 
psychological states with Swampman’s psychological states. If this is correct, then 
using representational terms to describe Swampman would be a poor form of 
explanation, because it would categorise together entities that are in fact very 
different. Neander argues along somewhat similar lines, that since teleosemantics 
identifies an interesting, real kind its advantages outweigh the apparent disadvantage 
of excluding Swampman. However, it is also possible to go beyond these arguments, 
and detail some further ways in which attributing beliefs and desires to Swampman 
fails to offer the same explanatory value that it does in Davidson’s case. These 
points rely on the assumption that Swampman’s internal states lack functions, but 
this is an assumption we can legitimately make, because if it is false then the 
objection fails anyway. 
In the previous section, I argued that among the distinctive advantages of 
representation-talk are explaining success and failure in action, and explaining what 
representations are and what they are for. Focusing first on the latter point, it is clear 
that if Swampman’s internal states lack functions then we cannot explain what they 
are for, never mind why he possesses them, by describing them as representations of 
any sort. There is no reason except chance why Swampman is the way he is, and no 
part of him is for anything. But what’s more, this is also relevant to explanations of 
Swampman’s behaviour. When we say that Davidson went to the fridge because he 
wanted a beer, we do not imply just that he had some set of internal states which 
were disposed to cause this kind of action; instead, we put the action in a much 
broader context. We imply that some mechanism in Davidson working roughly as it 
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is supposed to caused him to go to the fridge. We imply that his action will succeed 
if and only if he gets a beer, not just because he has an internal representational state 
which makes getting beer his goal, but because what states like this are for is setting 
goals for action. We allude to the fact that Davidson is the kind of thing whose 
movements are rightly seen as purposive, because of the way he has come to exist. 
And none of this is true of Swampman. So ultimately the Swampman objection and 
the liberality objection fail for the same reason: that representation-talk has rich 
implications, which go beyond causal dispositions and co-occurrence relations. For 
the liberality objection this matters because it applies even to simple signals, and for 
the present objection it matters because despite Swampman’s apparent 
sophistication, the objection can only succeed if he lacks functions, so the rich 
implications are not available in his case. 
 
Two further objections to teleosemantics are similarly well-known, but not 
relevant here because they focus on content, rather than direction of fit or 
representational status. Paul Pietroski (1992) describes a group of creatures, the 
kimu, who develop a mutation that allows them to see red via some internal state K. 
For some reason, they become attracted to the colour red, and those with the 
mutation tend to gather at the tops of hills at dawn to see the sunrise. This behaviour 
happens to protect them from predatory snorfs, so the mutation spreads through the 
population. According to Pietroski, Millikan’s theory implies that K represents the 
absence of snorfs, but this cannot be right, he claims, since if snorfs and red things 
occurred together, kimus that encountered this scene would token K and would be 
drawn to it. Even if it succeeds, this objection suggests at most a shift in emphasis 
from the consumer’s needs to the producer’s abilities in the theory of indicative 
content. Christopher Peacocke (1992) argues that teleosemantics implies that we 
cannot think about matters that have not, and could not have, had any impact on our 
evolutionary history. But in fact we do have thoughts about such matters, such as 
my belief that the pole star is 434 light years from Earth. The issues this claim raises 
are quite distant from those I am concerned with, since our ability to think about 
such remote matters seems to be connected to our capacity for conceptual thought, 
and I have not touched on the role of concepts in representation. If this objection 
succeeded, it would not imply that teleosemantics is ill-suited to providing a theory 
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of direction of fit, but only that it is not up to the task of analysing the contents of 
representations produced by sophisticated thinkers. 
 
In this chaper, I have described the three key components of the teleosemantic 
framework: the theory of functions, the claim that representations mediate between 
producers and consumers, and the proposal that normal conditions for consumer 
behaviour can be used to pick out contents. I have argued that these ideas all provide 
major steps forward in thinking about representation, and I have defended 
teleosemantics against three objections, each of which has been thought to show that 
these steps take us in the wrong direction. Next, I will argue for a novel theory of 
direction of fit within this framework. 
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Chapter 8: The Discretion View 
 
8.1 The Discretion View and The Canonical View 
 
The new theory of direction of fit which I advocate is called the Discretion View, 
and premise IV of my overall argument is an immediate consequence of this theory. 
In this chapter I describe the Discretion View, and argue that it is superior to what I 
will call the Canonical View, which is the standard teleosemantic theory of direction 
of fit. The Discretion View accurately captures a distinction between two ways in 
which representations can work, which correspond to the directions of fit, while the 
Canonical View does not. More specifically, there are some representations which 
the Canonical View identifies as having both directions of fit, but which in fact work 
in the same way as pure indicatives; so the Canonical View ascribes imperative 
content too readily. In this section I introduce the Discretion View, and in section 
8.2 I specify its scope, by defining the class of biological representations. Then in 
section 8.3 I give my argument for the Discretion View, and in section 8.4 I address 
two ways in which issues relating to indeterminacy affect the theory. 
Before we start, it may be useful to recall the standard teleosemantic theory of 
direction of fit: representations have imperative content if and only if they have the 
function of causing their consumers to perform specific behaviours (or bring about 
specific states of affairs), and have indicative content if and only if they have the 
function of co-occurring with specific normal conditions for the behaviours they 
prompt in their consumers. These are the claims that I am now calling the 
‘Canonical View’.21 
 
The Discretion View is inspired by a proposal by Lewis (1969). Lewis’s subject 
is systems of signals that have been set up by explicitly-agreed conventions. His 
proposal can be illustrated by a simple example: 
 
                                                
21 See footnote 25 for discussion of the place of this theory of direction of fit in the teleosemantic 
canon. 
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Hero and Leander are lovers who live on opposite banks of the Hellespont. 
They arrange that on nights when Hero is alone, she will light a lamp, and 
Leander will swim across.22 
 
The lamp’s being alight is a representation, and we can ask about its direction of fit. 
Does it say something about Hero’s condition – I’m alone, say – or about what 
Leander should do – come and see me – or both? Lewis answers that it depends on 
whether either party was supposed to use their discretion in using the signal, 
according to the convention by which it was established. There are three 
possibilities: 
 
If Hero is to use her discretion about when to light the lamp, but Leander is 
always to come when he sees it, then it has only imperative content – it says 
only something like come and see me. The thought here is that since Leander 
knows that Hero is using her discretion, the lamp doesn’t tell him anything 
specific about her circumstances; but since he is not supposed to use his 
discretion, it does tell him what to do. 
 
If Leander is to use his discretion about what to do when he sees the lamp, but 
Hero is always to light it when she is alone, then it has only indicative content – 
it says only I’m alone. The lamp’s being alight tells Leander something specific 
about Hero’s circumstances, but does not tell him what to do. 
 
If neither party has discretion, then the signal has both directions of fit – it says 
both I’m alone and come and see me. 
 
The criterion for indicative content that Lewis is proposing is therefore that the 
producer lacks discretion about when to produce the signal, and the criterion for 
imperative content is that the consumer lacks discretion about what to do when they 
receive the signal. According to Lewis, when both criteria are satisfied, the signal is 
‘neutral’ – it may equally well be described as either imperative or indicative. But I 
will take it that such signals have both directions of fit. 
                                                
22 In the myth of Hero and Leander as it’s now told, the lamp was not used for this purpose, but to 
guide Leander across the channel. I’m changing the story. 
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To make Lewis’s proposal applicable to the case of desire, we need to 
reconfigure it in teleosemantic terms. The criterion for indicative content is that the 
producer lacks discretion; we might put this in more teleosemantic terms by saying 
that there is some specific state of affairs under which the producer is supposed to 
produce the signal. This is equivalent to the canonical criterion for indicative 
content, which is that the representation has the function of co-occurring with a 
specific normal condition for the behaviour it prompts in its consumer. There are 
two apparent differences; one is that the discretion criterion concerns the function of 
the producer, while the canonical criterion (as I have presented it) concerns the 
function of the representation itself, and the other is that the canonical criterion cites 
normal conditions. But neither of these is more than apparent. First, a representation 
will have the function of occurring under some condition if and only if its producer 
has the function of producing it under that condition. And second, the point about 
normal conditions does not substantially change the criterion, because it can only be 
the function of the producer to produce the signal under a certain condition if its 
doing so would be mentioned in the best explanation of how it works, and that will 
only happen if the signal co-occurs with the condition on typical occasions on which 
it contributes to the success of the system. So these conditions have to be relevant to 
explaining successful behaviour in any case, which is to say that they have to be 
normal conditions.23 It follows that the criterion for indicative content suggested by 
Lewis’s proposal is the same as the canonical one. 
Because the Discretion View adopts this criterion, the dispute between the two 
views only concerns the nature of imperative content.24 Lewis’s criterion for 
imperatives is that their consumers must lack discretion. In teleosemantic terms, that 
comes to the claim that the consumers of imperatives must have the function of 
behaving in specific ways, whenever they are adapted by those signals. (Recall that 
in Millikan’s terminology, a consumer is said to be adapted by a representation 
when the representation occurs, and this occurrence cuts down the range of things 
                                                
23 Both Millikan and Papineau insist on describing indicative content as fixed by normal conditions, 
and this might seem to be a unnecessary complication in light of the argument of this paragraph. 
Their approach is explained by their view that the function of a device must be one of its effects, and 
that co-occurrence cannot be an effect (e.g. Millikan 1990, Papineau 1998). I don’t share this view 
about functions, but the normal conditions approach in any case has the advantage of making it more 
explicit that indicatives represent success conditions. 
24 Price (2001) also criticises the canonical criterion for imperative content, but retains the indicative 
one. 
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that the consumer might do in accordance with its function.) In contrast, the 
canonical criterion is that a representation has imperative content if it has the 
function of causing some specific behaviour in its consumer. This is weaker than the 
Discretion View’s criterion, as we will shortly see. First, however, I will give 
statements of the various criteria for the directions of fit, for ease of reference: 
 
Indicative Criterion (both views): A representation has indicative content if and 
only if it has the function of co-ocurring with some specific normal condition for 
the behaviours that it causes its consumer to perform, in accordance with the 
consumer’s function. 
 
Imperative Criterion (Canonical View): A representation has imperative content 
if and only if it has the function of causing some specific behaviour on the part of 
its consumer. 
 
Imperative Criterion (Discretion View): A representation has imperative content 
if and only if its consumer has the function of behaving in some specific way 
whenever it is adapted by the representation. 
 
One point of clarification in order is that any given behaviour can be accurately 
described in many ways – just as an intentional action can be described as moving 
one’s arms, working a pump, or drawing water – but the behaviours caused by an 
imperative only need to be of one type under some description, as long as that type 
would be mentioned in the best explanation of how the representation contributes to 
the wider system. For example, suppose that a simple organism has a number of 
different feeding strategies, but pursues feeding in general when and only when a 
certain internal state occurs. This internal state might well have imperative content 
on both views, even though the organism would perform different behaviours when 
it was tokened, because they would all be feeding behaviours. In stating the 
Discretion View’s criterion for imperative content, I have used the expression 
‘behaving in some specific way’ (rather than ‘performing some specific behaviour’), 
because my intention is that a representation can have imperative content even if its 
consumer only has the function of entering into some mode of behaviour when 
adapted by that representation (see section 8.4). 
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A typical case in which the Discretion View and the Canonical View have 
different consequences is the following. Consider a neural system that causes a 
simple organism either to feed, to drink, or to seek warmth, according to a fixed-
priority rule. Imagine that this system is the consumer of three signals – a food 
signal, a water signal, and a warmth signal – produced by other systems, and that 
when it receives more than one of these signals at the same time, it always gives 
feeding priority over both drinking and seeking warmth, and drinking priority over 
warmth-seeking. We can further assume that all three signals have indicative 
content; they say food is needed now, water is needed now, and warmth is needed 
now respectively. This example distinguishes the two views, because all three 
signals have imperative content on the Canonical View, but only the food signal 
does on the Discretion View. On the Canonical View, what it takes for a signal to 
have imperative content is that it has the function of causing the consumer to bring 
about a specific outcome. This is true of all three signals, because each of the three 
typically contributes to the organism’s survival and reproduction when and only 
when it causes the consumer system to do something specific: to get food, water and 
warmth respectively. On the Discretion View, though, the water and warmth signals 
lack imperative content, because when they occur the consumer system does not 
always have the function of behaving in one specific way. Instead, how it should 
behave according to its function depends on other factors, such as whether the food 
signal is also occurrent. So in the sense I have defined, the consumer has discretion 
about what to do when adapted by the water and warmth signals. The Discretion 
View thus implies that these signals do not tell the consumer what to do – they 
merely inform it about the organism’s needs. 
In general, then, the kinds of representations that distinguish the Canonical and 
Discretion Views are ones that sometimes fail to perform their functions, even 
though their consumers function perfectly, and the functions in question are to cause 
the consumers to behave in particular ways. To get representations of this sort, a 
fairly complex recipe of features is required: the consumers must be capable of 
being adapted by more than one input at a time (not necessarily all representations); 
the representations must have the function of causing the consumer to behave in 
specific ways; yet the consumer’s function must require it to behave in those ways, 
when adapted by the relevant representations, only under a proper subset of the 
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possible ways in which they may be adapted by other events at the same time. 
Clearly, though, the example shows that such cases are possible. 
A noteworthy feature of the example is that the Canonical View arguably handles 
it better than the Discretion View. On the Canonical View, all three signals are bi-
directional, whereas on the Discretion View, the feeding signal is bi-directional and 
the other two are pure indicatives. This is a mildly awkward result, but my argument 
is not based on the ability of the Discretion View to get neat or intuitive results in 
specific toy cases. Instead, I will argue that the Discretion View accurately picks out 
a deep distinction between two ways in which representations can work. 
Finally, to get a more complete picture of the relationship between the Discretion 
View and the Canonical View, we need to see whether there are any representations 
that have imperative content on the Discretion View, but not on the Canonical View. 
Combined with the example just given, the answer to this question will tell us 
whether the discretion criterion (as I shall call it) is strictly more demanding than the 
canonical criterion, or just different. The answer is that there are no such 
representations. For consider a representation with a consumer that has the function 
of behaving in a specific way, whenever the representation adapts it. Then there is 
some specific form of behaviour by its consumer which is caused by the 
representation, and which would be described as such in the best explanation of how 
the system works; so it is a function of the representation to cause this behaviour. So 
the discretion criterion is strictly more demanding, in the following sense: every 
representation that has imperative content on the Discretion View also has 
imperative content on the Canonical View, but not every representation that has 
imperative content on the Canonical View also does so on the Discretion View. 
Given that every representation of the kind we are concerned with has either 
imperative content, indicative content, or both, what this means is that there are 
some representations that are pure indicatives on the Discretion View, but bi-
directional on the Canonical View. The two views agree about which representations 
are pure imperatives, because this is determined by their shared criterion for 
indicative content.25 
                                                
25 On first glance, Millikan’s (1984) canonical statement of teleosemantics may appear to endorse the 
Discretion View, not what I am calling the Canonical View. Millikan writes that, ‘In the case of 
imperative intentional icons, it is a proper function of the interpreter device, as adapted by the icon, to 
produce something onto which the icon will map in accordance with a specific mapping function…’ 
(p. 99). However, in a later account of her view, Millikan (1995, p. 189) writes that, ‘A representation 
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Fig. 3. The Canonical View and the Discretion View. Because the Discretion View has a stricter 
criterion for imperative content, more representations are pure indicatives, rather than having both 
directions of fit. 
 
8.2 Biological Representations 
 
The Discretion View is a partial theory of direction of fit, in the sense that it does 
not aim to say what characterises the directions of fit in all cases; instead, it is 
concerned only with a specific class of representations. In my view, the most 
promising way to develop a good overall theory of direction of fit (and of 
representation more generally) is to start by developing such partial theories, and 
then try to put them together. This is appropriate because the range of properties we 
can appeal to when theorising about representations in human languages, for 
instance, is very different from the range we can appeal to when theorising about 
representations in many other biological systems, and the challenges that theories 
will face in the two areas may also be very different. For example, in the case of 
language we might – possibly – appeal to grammatical properties or speakers’ 
intentions, and face challenges arising from the variety of human languages and 
                                                                                                                                    
is directive [i.e. imperative] when it has a proper function to guide the mechanisms that consume it to 
produce its satisfaction condition,’ and immediately goes on to describe desires as directive 
(/imperative), a result which follows only on the Canonical View (see also 1984, p. 140). This 
apparent discrepancy can be resolved by noting an ambiguity in the technical term ‘adapted’. 
Millikan’s original definition of this term does not clearly distinguish between two possible 
meanings, respectively entailing that: (i) a representation adapts its consumer whenever it occurs; and 
(ii) a representation adapts its consumer whenever it will be causally responsible for the consumer’s 
behaviour, provided the consumer acts according to its function. I am using ‘adapts’ with meaning 
(i), and Millikan’s statement of her criterion for imperative content is equivalent to the canonical 
criterion, providing that she is using ‘adapts’ with meaning (ii). It is also a foundational tenet of 
Papineau’s teleosemantic theory that desires have imperative content (1993, 1998), and he writes that 
teleosemantics in general identifies imperative contents with ‘the conditions that [representations] are 
biologically supposed to produce’ (1998, p. 1). 
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cultures. In other biological cases we might appeal to functions derived from natural 
selection, and face challenges from indeterminacy claims and swampman-like 
thought experiments. 
This approach might raise concerns either that there is no one phenomenon of 
direction of fit – since different theories of direction of fit can be correct in different 
areas – or, conversely, that partial theories of direction of fit will not generally be 
correct, but merely useful stepping stones towards the correct universal theories. But 
neither of these results need follow. It is quite possible that there is a single 
phenomenon of direction of fit, and that partial theories could correctly characterise 
parts of it. These theories would be co-extensive with parts of the true universal 
theory of direction of fit, but likely expressed in different terms. For the sake of 
comparison, consider what would be involved in giving a theory of what it is to be 
responsible for some outcome, in the sense of being an apt object of the reactive 
attitudes as a result of that outcome (Strawson 1962). Since both individuals and 
institutions can be responsible for outcomes, one would wish to give a theory that 
covered both. But it would be reasonable to give distinct theories of individual and 
corporate responsibility first, then try to work out what they have in common, even 
on the assumption that responsibility in this sense is a single phenomenon. 
The cases to which the Discretion View is intended to apply are biological 
representations. Biological representations are those to which teleosemantic theories 
in general are most naturally suited. They have clearly-identifiable producers and 
consumers, with specific functions, which co-operate with one another to promote 
the success of some wider system. Their functions and those of their producers and 
consumers come from biological selective processes, rather than from the explicit 
intentions of designers or from analogous processes within human cultures; 
however, these functions may be derived rather than direct, in the senses described 
in section 7.1. Because they have consumers – which by definition are systems with 
functions that involve behaving differently, depending on whether they occur – 
biological representations are all at least candidates for having directions of fit, 
rather than merely standing for objects, properties or states of affairs. Biological 
representations include both many representations that occur within organisms, and 
many that are used for communication between organisms. 
One might think that there would be many borderline cases of biological 
representations, since many representations are the products of interactions between 
 149 
biological and cultural factors. For instance, one might ask whether the desire for 
one’s country to become a democracy is a biological representation or not, since 
some aspects of its function – those it shares with desires in general – seem to come 
from biological processes, whereas others – those that give it its distinctive content – 
seem to be as culturally-determined as those of any representation. But here I am 
defining a technical notion of biological representation for a specific purpose, and I 
stipulate that it is the aspects of the functions of representations, producers and 
consumers that are relevant to determining direction of fit that must be derived from 
biological processes. Typically, these will be more general aspects of the functions 
of producers and consumers, rather than those which are concerned with specific 
representations. 
A relatively clear example of a class of representations which are not biological 
in the present sense is sentences in human natural languages. This is not because 
natural language is not a biological phenomenon, but because the functions of 
producers and consumers with respect to sentences of natural languages are not 
fixed by biology to a sufficient extent to ground theorising about types of natural-
language representation. The theory developed here is not suitable for understanding 
direction of fit in natural language sentences. 
It would count in favour of the Discretion View if similar theories of direction of 
fit for other kinds of representation were also successful, but I will not attempt to 
develop such theories here. In particular, there are significant obstacles facing the 
discretion approach even in the context of conventional signals like those discussed 
by Lewis; I describe some of these obstacles at the end of section 8.4. The subject of 
the next section is biological representations, but for convenience’s sake I will often 
drop the ‘biological’. 
 
8.3 An Argument for the Discretion View 
 
My argument for the discretion view consists of three steps. First I will argue that 
all biological representations (and many others) work by co-occurring with states of 
affairs that are relevant to the behaviour of their consumers. Then I will argue that 
there are two kinds of such states of affairs, which correspond to genuinely different 
ways in which representations can work, which in turn correspond to the directions 
of fit. Finally, I will show that the Discretion View accurately captures this 
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taxonomy of ways in which representations can work, but the Canonical View does 
not. So as I have said, my argument will work by showing that the Discretion View 
accurately captures a deep distinction between two ways that representations can 
work. 
 
First Step: All representations work by co-occurrence with relevant states of affairs 
 
It is uncontroversial that indicative representations work by co-occurring with 
relevant states of affairs. What it is for a representation to have indicative content, 
on the account agreed by all parties, is for it to have the function of co-occurring 
with normal conditions for the behaviours it causes its consumer to perform, and 
normal conditions are by definition relevant states of affairs. This idea is also 
attractive from outside the perspective of teleosemantic theory: indicatives are true 
when they co-occur with the states of affairs which are their contents, and false 
otherwise, and they are useful insofar as they convey information about these states 
of affairs to other systems that may profitably use it to modify their behaviour. 
At least some imperatives also seem to have this feature. Consider a simple, 
conventional signal which is intuitively a pure imperative: a bugle call which tells 
the soldiers in a camp to muster on the parade ground. This bugle call might be 
blown whenever the relevant officer thinks the soldiers need to be brought together, 
either in specific situations in which it is agreed convention that they should muster 
(like at dawn every morning to begin their day), or in quite unexpected ones, that 
nonetheless justify this action (like alien invasions). But it remains the case that the 
signal will only be useful if it sufficiently reliably co-occurs with states of affairs of 
a specific kind: those which have the property of making it appropriate for the 
soldiers to muster in the parade ground, given the unit’s projects and aims. It will 
also only be useful if the ability of the soldiers to independently recognise such 
circumstances does not match the ability of the responsible officer to do so; if the 
soldiers could all tell when they should muster by themselves, then the signal would 
be otiose. So some representations that appear to be pure imperatives work by co-
occurring with states of affairs that have the following two properties: they are 
relevant to determining what the consumer should do, and in some sense the 
producer has better access to them than the consumer does. 
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The kind of division of labour that makes the imperative useful in this case can 
also occur in biological cases. For instance, an organism might have two complex 
sub-systems in its cognitive architecture; one for determining what sort of action to 
perform, and another for executing actions. The first system would need to be good 
at identifying situations in which specific action-types are appropriate, while the 
second system would need to be good at generating actions of these types. It could 
be that the only signals sent between these systems were imperatives; the first 
system telling the second what to do. But these signals would be useful because of 
their correlation with the different sorts of situations identified by the first system. 
They would work by making the behaviour of the second system sensitive to states 
of affairs that were relevant to determining what it should do, which only the first 
system was suited to detecting. 
More generally, imperatives are typically thought of as representations with 
satisfaction conditions that concern the behaviour of their consumers, subsequent to 
receiving the signal. They call for specific responses from their consumers, and thus 
contribute to the success of wider systems by causing their consumers to behave in 
specific, valuable ways. But the point I wish to call attention to is that this cannot be 
done at random, unless the behaviours would be equally valuable whenever they 
were produced; and in this unusual situation, the contribution of the randomly-
produced representations to the successful functioning of the system would be 
minimal. So in general, an important part of the way that even pure imperatives 
contribute to the success of wider systems is by co-occurring with states of affairs 
that are relevant to the behaviour of their consumers: specifically, by occurring 
when matters are such that specific behaviours by the consumers are appropriate. 
An argument on similar lines follows from the definition of a consumer. What it 
is for a device to be a consumer of a representation is for the device to have a 
relational function with respect to that representation, and what this means is that 
what the consumer has the function of doing depends on whether or not the 
representation is occurrent at the time. From this, it follows that the behaviours that 
representations cause in their consumers must be appropriate under some 
circumstances, and not under others – because otherwise there would be no reason 
for the behaviour of the consumer to be conditional on anything else; the 
representations would be of no value. Given that this is the case, and that the 
consumers have the function of behaving differently in response to the 
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representations, it must be that case that the representations co-occur sufficiently 
reliably with the states of affairs that make the consumers’ behaviours appropriate 
that the consumers’ functions are adaptive. And furthermore, this co-occurrence 
must be a large part of what the representations contribute to the system, because the 
consumers rely on it when they adapt their behaviour to the representations, and the 
producers’ role is to generate the representations at the right time. 
The value of both indicatives and imperatives therefore depends crucially on their 
co-occurring with states of affairs that are relevant to the behaviour of their 
consumers. Co-occurring sufficiently reliably with these states of affairs is a 
necessary condition for its being adaptive for representations to be produced, and for 
consumers to adapt their behaviour to them. Even if there are some representations 
that make other substantive contributions to the successful operation of the systems 
of which they form parts, it is in virtue of this co-occurrence property that they are 
useful qua representations.26 
 
Second Step: Ways in which representations can work 
 
So far I have argued that in some sense, the representations I am concerned with 
all work in the same way: by co-occurring with relevant states of affairs. There is a 
prima facie tension between this idea and the idea that representations can have 
either of two directions of fit, because it is natural to think that the two directions of 
fit are two different ways in which representations can work. This tension is 
resolved, however, when we notice that there are two different kinds of relevant 
states of affairs, and hence two different ways in which representations can work. 
The two kinds of relevant states of affairs are: (i) normal conditions for consumer 
                                                
26 A possible objection to this claim is that some representations are useful primarily because they are 
isomorphic to what is represented. As it stands this suggestion is ambiguous: it could mean that there 
is an isomorphism between meaningful parts of the representation and parts of the thing represented 
(as on a map), or it could mean that there is an isomorphism between the members of a set of possible 
repreesentations and a corresponding set of possible contents (as in Millikan’s example of the 
honeybee’s waggle dance). Either way, I suspect that such isomorphisms are useful because they 
make it possible for representations to be interpreted by their consumers – that is, for consumers and 
representations to be mutually configured so that representations will affect consumers in adaptive 
ways. But this is necessary in every case, and even the simplest signals (like beaver tail-splashes) are 
trivially isomorphic to what they represent. On the other hand, it is also no use for a representation to 
be isomorphic with something if it occurs at the wrong time. So while it is correct that in some cases 
signals are more remarkable for occurring at the right time (like beaver tail-splashes), and in others 
they are more remarkable for being interpretable (like maps), it is far from clear that isomorphism is 
an alternative function to co-occurrence. For more on this see Shea (2013). 
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behaviours; and (ii) states of affairs of the form X’s being appropriate, where X is 
some behaviour the consumer can perform. I will first explain how these two kinds 
of states of affairs relate to each other, then how they ground genuinely different 
ways in which representations can work, and finally how these correspond to the 
directions of fit. 
As I will use the term, the state of affairs of a particular behaviour’s being 
appropriate is the state of affairs of that behaviour’s being the correct one for the 
consumer to perform, given how it and co-operating systems work. This means that 
appropriateness is a property that only one behaviour can have on any given 
occasion. It does not mean that the appropriate behaviour is always the most 
biologically beneficial one that the consumer could perform, because there could be 
a more beneficial behaviour available in some circumstances which it would not be 
adaptive for the organism to attempt to discriminate – because either the processing 
costs or the risks of failure would be too great. It also does not mean that it is 
appropriate for a system to behave in a given way when and only when it is the 
function of that system to behave in that way, because in general functions depend 
on what co-operating systems are doing, rather than how things are in the 
environment, and co-operating systems may fail to perform their functions 
successfully. Most pertinently, if the producer of a representation that works by co-
occurring with the state of affairs of some behaviour’s being appropriate produces 
this representation at the wrong time, then it will be the function of the consumer to 
perform the behaviour concerned, but it will not be appropriate for this behaviour to 
be performed. 
Given this definition, the state of affairs of a behaviour’s being appropriate 
cannot be a normal condition for that behaviour, unless this type of state of affairs 
can also be characterised in another way. Normal conditions are, by definition, states 
of affairs that have obtained on typical past occasions on which behaviours 
succeeded, which explain that success. But it can never explain the success of a 
behaviour B to say that the state of affairs of things being such that B is appropriate 
obtained at the time, because it is close to trivial that if the behaviour succeeded then 
it was appropriate in the circumstances. Normal conditions are substantive success 
conditions for consumer behaviours. 
However, many representations do work by co-occurring with states of affairs 
which are both normal conditions, and make particular behaviours appropriate, 
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because they form parts of systems that use relatively simple techniques for working 
out what to do. For example, the beaver’s tail-slap works by co-occurring (not on 
every occasion, but sufficiently reliably) with the presence of danger, which is a 
substantive success condition for the behaviour of making for the lodge. But as we 
imagine the case, the presence of danger is also sufficient to make heading for the 
lodge appropriate; beavers don’t, we imagine, take anything else into account in 
working out whether to do this. As I will explain shortly, it is in virtue of this point 
that there are biological representations with both directions of fit. 
The alternatives to this kind of case are for representations to work by co-
occurring with (substantive) normal conditions, which are not sufficient to make 
specific behaviours appropriate; or for them to work by occurring when specific 
behaviours are appropriate, but for the systems that produce them to determine this 
in sufficiently complex ways that they should not be described as co-occurring with 
normal conditions.27,28 In the former case, what it is the function of the consumer to 
do must depend on other inputs, so the consumer must be relatively (but only 
relatively) sophisticated. In this kind of case we can think of producer systems as 
serving the consumers of representations, because they provide information that the 
consumers need, but do not thereby control what the consumer does. This way of 
thinking becomes more attractive as consumer systems become increasingly 
sophisticated relative to producers. However, representations that work in this way 
are common. Even the fixed-priority system that I described in section 8.1 uses 
representations that work in this way – for instance, the ‘water’ representation which 
could be trumped by the ‘food’ signal. 
In the latter case, what the consumer must do does not depend on other inputs, so 
at least to this extent it should not be sophisticated (although it may use 
sophisticated methods to execute the appropriate behaviour). On the other hand, the 
producer of the signal must have a fair degree of sophistication, since it must be 
                                                
27 Is it also possible for representations to work by co-occurring with states of affairs which are 
neither normal conditions, nor make specific behaviours appropriate? If there could be such 
representations, this would imply that my account of direction of fit is too restrictive, since it wrongly 
leaves some representations with neither direction of fit. I argue that this is not possible, clarifying 
my view in the process, in section 8.4. 
28 Any biological system that determines whether a specific behaviour is appropriate will do so by 
determining whether some substantive condition holds; but it is not always the case that this 
condition should be given in stating the function of the representation or its producer, because it may 
be that to do so would involve explaining how the producer works, and the function of a system must 
be distinct from means by which the system performs that function. This is roughly the condition on 
functions that Price (1998) calls Abstractness 1. For more see sections 7.2 and 8.4. 
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capable of working out what behaviour on the part of the consumer would be 
appropriate in a way that goes beyond just establishing whether some normal 
condition holds. In this kind of case we can think of producer systems as controlling 
the systems that consume their representations, although again the attractiveness of 
this way of thinking depends on the degree of difference in sophistication between 
the systems. 
We can see, then, that representations can work either by occurring when specific 
behaviours are appropriate, or when specific conditions relevant to behaviour obtain, 
or (usually in simpler systems) by doing both of these things simultaneously. We 
only get this clean taxonomy of functions if we insist on a notion of appropriateness 
which means that only one behaviour can be appropriate at a time. Otherwise there 
would be some representations which we would describe as working in the first 
way, but which actually determined behaviour only in combination with other 
inputs, like those that work by co-occurring with normal conditions; while others 
would themselves be sufficient to determine consumer behaviour. 
It is hard to resist using the language of direction of fit to describe representations 
of these three kinds: those that work by occurring when specific behaviours are 
appropriate tell their consumers what to do; those that work by occurring with 
substantive normal conditions tell them how things are; and those the work in both 
ways, do both. Since co-occurrence with normal conditions is the commonly-agreed 
criterion for indicative content, there is no reason not to think of representations that 
work in that way as indicatives. These representations have clear accuracy 
conditions. Also, it makes sense to think of representations that work by co-
occurring with states of affairs of the form X’s being appropriate as imperatives. 
They certainly tell their consumers what to do, and we can also specify how these 
representations work by stating that they are imperatives, and giving their imperative 
content – that is, specifying behaviours that their consumers can perform, or states 
of affairs that their consumers can bring about, that have a special connection to the 
representations. Saying that they are imperatives implies that they work by co-
occurring with some behaviour’s being appropriate, and giving their content says 
which behaviour this is. Representations that work this way have satisfaction 
conditions, because they call for specific behaviours to be performed. It is also an 




Third Step: The two views and the ways that representations can work 
 
As I have noted, this taxonomy of ways in which representations can work fits 
neatly with the shared criterion for indicative content. So all that remains to be 
shown is that it also fits neatly with the Discretion View’s criterion for imperative 
content. After that, I will conclude my argument by briefly explaining what is wrong 
with the Canonical View. 
First, suppose that a representation satisfies the discretion criterion, so its 
consumer has the function of behaving in a specific way whenever it is adapted by 
this representation. This means that when the representation occurs, the consumer 
will do its part in promoting the success of the wider system by performing this 
specific behaviour. So the role of the representation must be to occur at times at 
which the consumer’s behaviour is supposed to occur, given the way that the co-
operating producer and consumer systems work. In other words, the representation 
itself must work by co-occurring with the state of affairs of the behaviour’s being 
appropriate. Now suppose that some other representation works in this way; if this 
really is the nature of its contribution to the system, it must be that this 
representation alone is sufficient to prompt the consumer to perform a specific 
behaviour. So it follows that the consumer lacks discretion with respect to this 
representation, and hence that the representation satisfies the discretion criterion. 
Representations work in the way constitutive of the imperative direction of fit if and 
only if they satisfy the Discretion View’s criterion. 
To see the contrast with the Canonical View, we can consider its criterion for 
imperative content. On that criterion, it is sufficient for a representation to have 
imperative content that it has the function of causing its consumer to behave in a 
specific way. Crucially, this criterion is weaker than the discretion criterion, because 
it only requires that the representation causes the consumer to behave in a specific 
way on those occasions on which the representation itself causes the successful 
behaviour, whereas the discretion view’s criterion requires that the representation 
causes the consumer to behave in a specific way on every occasion on which the 
representation occurs, and the consumer performs its function. Consequently, on the 
Canonical View there can be representations which have imperative content even 
though on most occasions on which they occur it would be extremely costly for their 
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consumers to behave in the way they say, because other much better alternatives are 
available. This is possible because on those occasions, provided things go well, 
other representations will be causally responsible for the consumer’s behaviour, 
overriding the influence of the so-called imperatives. 
The more general objection that the present argument generates to the Canonical 
View, however, is that those representations that satisfy the canonical criterion but 
not the discretion criterion work in the same basic way as pure indicatives. They 
contribute by co-occurring with states of affairs that are relevant to how their 
consumers should behave, but do not determine this – do not suffice to make 
specific behaviours appropriate. So the Canonical View attributes different 
directions of fit to some representations that should be classified together. As well as 
this, for the same reason, the Canonical View attributes both directions of fit to 
some representations that do suffice to make specific behaviours appropriate, and 
also to others that do not – it classifies as belonging to the same group two sets of 
representations that in fact work differently. The Discretion View offers a superior 
account of direction of fit, because unlike the Canonical View it accurately 
distinguishes fundamentally different ways in which representations can work. 
This completes my argument for the Discretion View; in the next section, I 
elaborate further on the theory, in the course of defending it against two related 
objections. 
 
8.4 Challenges Relating to Indeterminacy 
 
The indeterminacy objection to teleosemantics is the claim that biological 
functions are insufficiently determinate to ground representational properties, 
because many equally good explanations are possible of how biological systems 
work. It constitutes a challenge to teleosemantic theories of direction of fit, just as 
much as to theories of content. Although I have already given my main response to 
this objection in section 7.2, and that response was sufficiently general to apply to 
issues concerning direction of fit, part of how teleosemantic theorists should respond 
to this objection is by clarifying and adding detail to their theories. So I will discuss 
the indeterminacy objection in this section, partly for the sake of further developing 
the Discretion View. I will also discuss a further, closely related challenge, which 
suggests that because the Discretion View’s criterion for imperative content is 
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relatively demanding, it wrongly implies that some representations lack either 
direction of fit. Finally, I will outline how similar issues arise for Lewis’ theory of 
direction of fit in conventional signals, and explain the significance of this point for 
my own theory. 
 
To see how the indeterminacy objection applies to the Discretion View, we can 
consider the simple system for selecting actions that I described in section 8.1. That 
toy system consists of a producer which is capable of detecting whether the 
organism is in need of food, water or warmth; a consumer that is capable of 
generating actions suitable for satisfying these needs; and three possible 
representations that mediate between them. The consumer works according to a 
fixed-priority rule: its function is always to seek food if it receives the feeding 
signal, and to seek water and warmth only when the signals for these needs occur, 
but the feeding signal does not. As I described things then, the Discretion View 
implies that the water and warmth signals only have indicative content, because 
what the consumer should do when it is adapted by these representations depends on 
other inputs. In contrast, the Canonical View implies that these representations have 
both directions of fit, because they contribute to the organism’s success only when 
they cause specific behaviours. 
Incidentally, we can now see why the Discretion View does better than its rival in 
analysing this case: it is because there is an important difference between the 
feeding signal, which determines the behaviour of its consumer, and the water and 
warmth signals, which do not. When the producer generates the water and warmth 
signals there is only an extremely limited sense, if any, in which it is working out 
what the consumer should do, as opposed to detecting substantive states of affairs 
which are relevant to the consumer’s behaviour. But when it generates the feeding 
signal, it is working out whether the organism should seek food. That said, the 
contrast is less stark here than it would be in cases involving more sophisticated 
systems. 
The indeterminacy objection arises here because there are other possible ways to 
describe this system. Most pertinently, it might be objected that there is a specific 
behaviour that the consumer has the function of performing whenever it is adapted 
by the water signal: the behaviour of seeking water, unless the feeding signal is also 
received. Unless there is some principled way of deciding whether the consumer has 
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this conditional function, it will be indeterminate whether the representation 
concerned satisfies the discretion criterion, and hence indeterminate whether it has 
the imperative direction of fit. Although the present example does not allow it to be 
demonstrated so easily, the very same issue also affects the Canonical View. Also, 
the problem generalises. For any representation that appears to lack imperative 
content, it will be possible in principle to give a conditional or disjunctive 
description of a specific way that its consumer should behave, whenever it is 
adapted by this representation. And equally, for any representation that appears to 
lack indicative content, it will be possible in principle to give a conditional or 
disjunctive description of a specific, substantive condition under which its producer 
has the function of producing it. Why doesn’t this mean either that direction of fit is 
indeterminate on the present account, or that every representation has both directions 
of fit? 
In the case of the fixed-priority action-selection system, I suspect that it is in fact 
indeterminate whether the water and warmth signals have imperative content. It may 
be that the distinctions between the different ways in which representations work 
begin to break down in the simplest cases. In this case, the Discretion View implies 
that whether the water signal has imperative content is a matter of whether the 
consumer’s function is best described by a look-up table, one line of which reads 
when adapted by water signal, seek water unless food signal is also occurrent, or by 
the combination of a general principle: always perform the behaviour with the 
highest priority, of those associated with occurrent signals, and a list of behaviours 
and signals in order of priority. If the former is correct, the consumer will lack 
discretion, but if the latter is correct, it will have discretion, in the sense that the 
Discretion View defines. Which of these is the consumer’s function depends on 
which more accurately describes the property of the consumer that has caused it to 
be reproduced, by contributing to the success of the organism of which it is a part. 
But in this particular case we seem to have two descriptions of the very same 
property, so there may be no fact of the matter whether the discretion criterion is 
satisfied. This signal may be ‘neutral’, in Lewis’s sense. Still, because this is a very 
simple case, this indeterminacy does not pose a threat to the Discretion View. To 
test (and perhaps refine) the Discretion View, we need to see whether the 
indeterminacy persists more generally. 
 160 
To this end, we can consider a new example. Suppose that the entire human 
action-selection system produces representations as outputs, which are consumed by 
a further system which is responsible for directly controlling the muscles to produce 
the required movements. The representations would, we can imagine, stipulate that 
motor programmes should be performed – for instance, that the consumer should 
cause the body to pick up a pen, throw a ball, or walk downstairs. At first pass, both 
the Discretion View and the Canonical View imply that most of these 
representations will be pure imperatives. They lack indicative content, because there 
is no specific normal condition under which they have the function of occurring. The 
challenge facing the teleosemantic approach to direction of fit is that this may be 
indeterminate; that there may be a good sense in which these representations do 
work by co-occurring with specific normal conditions. So we can consider whether 
the walk-downstairs representation (as we might call it) has the function of 
occurring together with any specific normal condition. 
To try to construct such a condition, let us suppose further that the human action-
selection system consists solely of sub-systems for habitual and goal-directed 
control, and a further sub-system that converts their outputs into a single instruction 
for the motor-control system. In this case, the walk-downstairs representation should 
only be produced when the current situation is either (i) of a type that has been 
associated in the agent’s experience with walking downstairs leading to reward, or 
(ii) of a type that the agent believes implies that walking downstairs will contribute 
to the satisfaction of his or her desires more than other actions currently available, or 
both. So it might conceivably be suggested that it is the function of the action-
selection system to produce the walk-downstairs representation when this complex 
condition holds. This would mean that the walk-downstairs representation would 
have indicative content, because this appears to be a substantive normal condition 
for walking downstairs. However, there are at least two problems with this proposal. 
First, in this particular case the proposal cannot be correct, because it involves 
conflating the function of the action-selection system with the functions of its sub-
systems. If the action-selection system tests whether the agent has a habit 
conditioned on current stimuli, and examines what actions would currently best 
promote the agent’s desires, what is there left for the habitual and goal-directed 
systems to do? This is part of the point of Price’s Abstractness 1 condition: that the 
functions of systems are to do things, rather than to do them by specific means, 
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because this allows us to identify accurately the contributions of different parts of 
complex systems (see section 7.2). In this case, the function of the system is to 
produce the walk-downstairs representation when walking downstairs is appropriate, 
rather than to test for its appropriateness of this action in a specific way. The 
problem with the proposal is particularly clear in this case because of the way that 
the present system combines the results of two sub-systems, but the point also holds 
more generally. 
Second, although the proposed indicative content for the representation is both 
distinct from the state of affairs of the behaviour’s being appropriate, and capable of 
explaining the success of this behaviour, closer scrutiny shows that it is not a normal 
condition for walking downstairs. To see this, it is helpful to compare the present 
example to the case of the beaver’s tail-slap, which is genuinely bi-directional. Let’s 
say that the proposed normal condition in the present case is that the environment is 
such that the agent’s desires and habits imply that she should walk downstairs; this 
is supposed to be the normal condition for walking downstairs. In the tail-slap case, 
danger’s being present is the normal condition for the beavers’ action of making for 
the lodge. These two conditions do not stand in the same relationship to the two 
behaviours. The normal condition in the tail-slap case is the success condition for 
the subsequent behaviour that the producer aims to detect, whereas the putative 
normal condition in the action-selection case is a more proximal condition, that is 
relevant to the means by which the producer detects the state of affairs that really 
matters. It is analogous to there being rustling in the trees, if we imagine that this is 
how beavers detect predators. This means that it could much more easily happen that 
the ‘normal condition’ is satisfied in the action-selection case, but the agent does not 
benefit from walking downstairs, than that there could actually be danger about in 
the forest, and the beavers not benefit from going to the lodge. 
For these two reasons, the overall function of the human action-selection system 
is simply to work out which action would currently be most beneficial for the agent. 
Its function with respect to the walk-downstairs representation is to produce it when 
walking downstairs would be most beneficial. This pattern is typical of general-
purpose mental systems that produce and consume a range of representations: they 
have general functions, of which their functions with respect to specific 
representations are instances. These considerations also show, crucially, that the 
teleosemantic approach to direction of fit does imply that there are representations 
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with determinate directions of fit, including pure imperatives. The existence of pure 
indicatives follows from similar considerations about how to understand consumer 
functions. 
 
We can now turn to the second challenge to the Discretion View. As I have often 
noted, the Discretion View’s criterion for imperative content is significantly more 
demanding than the Canonical View’s criterion. A natural way to argue against the 
Discretion View is therefore to argue that this criterion is too demanding. Also, it is 
not obvious that there couldn’t be biological representations with both producers and 
consumers that had discretion – that is, that were both produced and consumed in 
flexible ways, sensitive to a variety of factors. If there were such representations, the 
Discretion View would imply that they lacked direction of fit, perhaps showing that 
the Discretion View’s criteria were too stringent. So I will now consider a case that 
appears to be of this form. 
Imagine that blue tits have a dedicated internal system for determining when and 
whether they should engage in nest-building, which produces a signal that 
influences the behaviour of a general-purpose action-selection system. When 
adapted by this signal, the action-selection system has the function of causing the 
bird to gather and arrange nesting material at all times during daylight hours, except 
when a particularly urgent need or fine opportunity arises to do something else – for 
instance, to feed or to escape from a predator. And imagine further that the producer 
of the system does not follow a simple rule to determine whether the time is right to 
build a nest – instead, it takes into account the weather, day-length, presence of 
potential mates, and availability of food and nesting resources in the area in a 
complex way. Given the considerations I just presented regarding the human action-
selection system, it looks as though the producer in this case will have the function 
only of producing the signal when conditions are suitable for nest-building, rather 
than when some substantive normal condition for nest-building holds, so the signal 
will lack indicative content. But at the same time, what the consumer should do 
when adapted by the signal depends on other inputs – it should cause nest-building 
behaviour only at times when feeding, for instance, is not a better option. 
 How things work out in this kind of case depends primarily on the function of 
the consumer; specifically, on how the consumer uses the signal. First, it could be 
that the consumer performs more than one kind of behaviour that is typically 
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adaptive only under the conditions with which the signal has the function of co-
occurring, in which case these would amount to a normal condition. In our example, 
it could be that the tit’s action-selection system both causes nest-building, and a 
particular style of faster, riskier feeding behaviour when it receives the signal. In this 
case, the signal would have indicative content, even though produced by a relatively 
sophisticated process. Second, it could be that the consumer enters a particular mode 
of behaviour when it is adapted by the signal, in which case it would have 
imperative content. In our example, it may well be appropriate to describe the tit’s 
action-selection system in this way; and also it’s possible that the alternative feeding 
style would be part of this mode of behaviour, in which case the signal might have 
both directions of fit. In that case, its content would be something like conditions 
are good for nest-building; go into nest-building mode. 
The key question now is whether these possibilities are exhaustive, and not just in 
the blue tit case but more generally. It seems that there is one further possibility: that 
the consumer would have only one behaviour available to it to which the signal is 
relevant, but that it should have discretion about whether to perform this behaviour. 
For instance, it might be that the only difference the nest-building signal makes to 
the blue tit’s behaviour is that it causes it to engage in nest-building when no other 
action promises much reward, whereas without the signal it would never do this. In 
this case, however, the representation will have the function of co-occurring with a 
normal condition for the behaviour it causes in the consumer, because it can’t be the 
case that the condition with which it co-occurs is sufficient for that behaviour to be 
appropriate – if it were, the consumer would not have discretion. In the case of the 
blue tit, the signal would have indicative content like conditions are generally 
suitable for nest-building, which is a normal condition for nest-building at specific 
moments, if nest-building at specific moments is also adaptive only when further 
conditions are also satisfied. In general, where the consumer has discretion, the 
representation will always have the function of co-occurring with a genuine normal 
condition. 
 
This completes my defense of the Discretion View. One further obvious 
objection to the Discretion View remains, which is that it implies that desires are 
pure indicatives, and the remaining two chapters will each be concerned, in part, 
 164 
with versions of this objection. I complete this chapter by briefly returning to Lewis’ 
theory of direction of fit in conventional signals. 
If Lewis’ theory was correct, that would lend support to the teleosemantic 
Discretion View, since we should expect the correct theories of direction of fit in 
different domains to be broadly similar. However, I am agnostic about Lewis’ 
theory, for reasons analogous to some of the points already discussed in this section. 
We can return to the example of Hero and Leander. 
To make things concrete, suppose that the explicit convention the lovers agreed 
gave neither of them discretion: they agreed that Hero would light the lamp 
whenever she was alone for the night, and Leander would swim across whenever he 
saw it. Now suppose that they both followed this convention, and as a result Leander 
was killed attempting to swim the Hellespont in a storm. Even if this was they had 
said they would do, Hero should not have wanted or expected Leander to set out in a 
storm, and they might both have been glad if, on the night of the storm, either Hero 
had chosen not to light the lamp, or Leander had chosen to ignore it. So a question 
arises about how the theory should deal with the possibility that the convention 
should conflict, to the parties’ knowledge, with their shared interests. One option for 
answering this is of course to say that the signalling system could be thought of as 
inadequate or poorly-chosen. Another is to say that in this case one or other of the 
lovers really did have discretion, according to the convention, even though this went 
unsaid when it was agreed, so the signal only had one or other direction of fit; more 
generally, the approach would be to allow tacit clauses in conventions. A third is to 
say that in this case either the imperative content, the indicative content, or both, 
were conditional or conjunctive (come and see me if you can or I’m alone and the 
strait is safe, say), but that again this depended on tacit clauses. And yet a fourth 
would be to argue that all human conventions include tacit clauses to the effect that 
they should only be followed if no major unexpected obstacles arise, and that these 
should be distinguished from other forms of discretion and are not relevant to 
determining content and direction of fit. These points certainly show that the theory 
needs to be developed in more detail, especially because it is plausible that human 
conventions often involve tacit clauses. But it is particularly noteworthy that it will 
be possible to describe these tacit clauses either as attributing discretion to one or 
other party, or as implying that the parties have fixed tasks, which are more complex 
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than is explicitly stated; so the theory risks indeterminacy between these 
possibilities, and hence indeterminacy about direction of fit. 
In addition to this, Lewis’ theory also needs to be further developed to deal with 
cases in which both parties seem to have discretion. Lewis (1969, p. 146) chooses 
not to engage in analysis of cases of this kind. So I am unable to claim support for 
my Discretion View from this source. 
 
In this chapter, I have presented and argued for the Discretion View, a theory of 
direction of fit for biological representations. According to this view, representations 
have imperative content when their consumers lack discretion, and indicative 
content when their producers lack discretion. So the Discretion View entails my 
premise IV, that biological representations with consumers that have discretion have 
only the mind-to-world direction of fit. My argument in favour of the Discretion 
View is that it accurately distinguishes two ways in which representations can work 
– either by occurring when some specific behaviour on the part of the consumer is 
appropriate, or by occurring when some substantive condition, relevant to the 
behaviour of the consumer, holds. The Discretion View makes the difference 
between saying how things are and saying what to do a real difference in kind. 
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Chapter 9: The Direction of Fit of Desire 
 
9.1 Desires are Pure Indicatives 
 
In this chapter, I combine the results of part I, concerning the nature of desire, 
with those of the last three chapters, on direction of fit, to bring my argument to a 
conclusion. In this section, I argue that desires are pure indicatives. Then in the 
following section, I discuss the content of desires; that is, what they say about how 
things are. The principal problem here is to get a clearer grip on the notion of 
reward. In the third section, I recap the argument of parts I and II. 
 
In part I, I defended an account of desire which yielded the following three 
premises: 
 
I. Desires are outcome values. 
II. The goal-directed control system works by promoting the performance of the 
action that has the greatest expected reward value, based on outcome values and 
representations of action-outcome relationships. 
III. Outcome values are inputs to the goal-directed control system, which are 
produced and modified by a system which is to some extent responsive to 
evidence for the reward values of outcomes, and it is normal for more than one 
outcome value to act as an input to the goal-directed control system at any one 
time. 
 
These three premises outline the key features of desires which are relevant to their 
direction of fit. In addition to this, in the chapter just gone I argued for the 
Discretion View, which is the conjunction of the following two criteria for direction 
of fit in biological representations: 
 
Indicative Criterion: A representation has indicative content if and only if it has 
the function of co-ocurring with some specific normal condition for the 




Imperative Criterion: A representation has imperative content if and only if its 
consumer has the function of behaving in some specific way whenever it is 
adapted by the representation. 
 
The imperative criterion entails my fourth premise: 
 
IV. Biological representations with consumers that have discretion have only the 
mind-to-world direction of fit. 
 
So to complete my argument it remains only to show that desires are biological 
representations with consumers that have discretion – that is, that they fail to satisfy 
the imperative criterion. For the sake of completeness, though, it will also be 
worthwhile to show explicitly that desires do satisfy the indicative criterion. In this 
section I will first explain why desires count as biological representations, then show 
that they satisfy the indicative criterion, then finally show that they fail to satisfy the 
imperative criterion. 
However, things are a little more complicated than that might make them sound, 
because desires come in two forms: standing and occurrent. So before we can 
address the issue of their directions of fit, we need to establish what the relationship 
is between these two kinds of desire, considered as representations. For example, 
consider my desire to visit Yellowstone National Park in the United States. Is my 
standing desire to do this the same representation as the occurrent desire(s) to do so 
that I sometimes experience? 
The answer to this question is ‘no’, because standing and occurrent desires are 
produced and consumed by different systems, exist for different periods of time, and 
contribute in different ways to adaptive action-selection. The role of standing desires 
is to store information about the levels of reward provided by outcome-types over 
relatively long periods, and they are produced and modified by reward signals, 
according to the process discussed in sections 3.4 and 3.5. It is interesting to note 
that the producer of standing desires may not be localised within the brain, or even 
an integrated, dedicated system. It may be that standing desires are formed and 
updated just in virtue of the way that the OFC responds to receiving perceptual 
signals and reward signals. If the same parts of the OFC are involved in maintaining 
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standing desires and generating occurrent ones, and if the perceptual signals and 
reward signals are also used for other purposes (such as updating habits), then all of 
the elements of the producer of standing desires also have other functions. However, 
this is not a problem for teleosemantic analysis, since this system, such as it is, does 
have a distinct function with respect to the production of standing desires. 
Standing desires are consumed in the production of occurrent desires. Occurrent 
desires are produced by a mechanism which causes activity in the OFC and ventral 
striatum, which represents the reward value of currently salient outcomes. The level 
of this activity is influenced by the strength of the relevant standing desires; by the 
level of salience of the outcomes; and also by factors such as the organism’s 
occurrent basic drives and the degree to which the outcome concerned is currently 
represented as associated with other desired or aversive outcomes. It appears, then, 
that occurrent desires do not represent the average reward values of types of 
outcomes, but instead the levels of reward that outcomes are expected to provide on 
specific occasions. This is another reason to see them as distinct representations. The 
primary consumer of occurrent desires, meanwhile, is the goal-directed action-
selection system. This system uses occurrent desires and instrumental beliefs to 
calculate predicted reward values for salient possible actions. It does not control 
action directly, but instead produces many outputs representing the values of 
actions, which are used together with the outputs of the habit system and perhaps 
other signals in the ultimate determination of behaviour (see ch. 4, especially section 
4.1). Desires are also consumed in the process of generating reward signals, which 
in turn are used to update desires and habits, but it is not clear whether standing or 
occurrent desires are used for this purpose. 
There is also no particular reason to assume that standing and occurrent desires 
will have the same direction of fit, so I will consider them separately. However, the 
discussion of the last two paragraphs does show that desires are biological 
representations. Desires have producers and consumers, which have functions 
determined by biological selective processes; and in order to establish their 
directions of fit we need only look to biologically-determined aspects of their 
functions. For instance, although understanding the object of my desire to visit 
Yellowstone may require us to consider the influence of language and culture on my 
mind, understanding the direction of fit of this mental state is a purely biological 
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matter. So we can now turn to the main task of this section, which is to use the 
Discretion View to establish the direction of fit of desire. 
 
According to the Discretion View, representations have indicative content if and 
only if they have to function of co-occurring with normal conditions for the 
behaviours they cause in their consumers. Occurrent desires satisfy this criterion 
because the goal-directed system normally performs its function, which is to 
accurately predict the level of reward that salient actions will provide, when the 
strengths of the occurrent desires that it consumes correspond accurately to the 
levels of reward available from the outcomes which are their objects. For example, 
suppose I was trying to decide whether to take a trip to Montana. In that case, 
booking a flight to Montana would be a possible action for me, that was salient at 
the time, and the function of my goal-directed system with respect to this action 
would be to calculate how much reward I would get by taking it. This value would 
be calculated by multiplying the strengths of my occurrent desires by the credences 
that I held that these desires would be satisfied if I took the flight, and adding up the 
results. If my desire to visit Yellowstone was occurrent at the time (which it should 
be, since it would be rational for me to associate going to Montana with visiting 
Yellowstone), then this desire would affect the output of the goal-directed system, 
and normally (in the teleosemantic sense) this output would only be correct if the 
amount of reward I would actually get from going to Yellowstone corresponded to 
the strength of this desire. Things could work out well otherwise, but only if the 
error in my desire was, by good fortune, compensated for elsewhere – for instance, 
if my desire to go to Yellowstone was a little too strong, this could be compensated 
for if I underestimated the chances that I would get to Yellowstone by exactly the 
same degree.  
There are two crucial points to notice here, both of which relate to my talk of 
‘accuracy’. First, the outputs of the goal-directed system are capable of being 
accurate or inaccurate only because they are themselves representations with 
indicative content. These representations are consumed by what we might call the 
ultimate action-selection system, which directly controls human behaviour. The 
ultimate action-selection system normally causes adaptive behaviour only when the 
signals it receives from the goal-directed system and others co-occur with the right 
states of affairs of the form things being such that action A will lead to x units of 
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reward. If the outputs of the goal-directed system do not correspond with how 
things are in the world, then it can only be by good fortune if the ultimate action-
selection system, and therefore the organism, behaves in the most adaptive way 
available at the time. This is where the accuracy conditions for the outputs of the 
goal-directed system come from, which in turn determine the accuracy conditions 
for occurrent desires. 
Second, these accuracy conditions also depend on the existence of a systematic 
code, which relates physical properties of the various signals involved to states of 
affairs ‘in the world’. Consider again my occurrent desire to visit Yellowstone, and 
suppose that it involves a specific level of neural activity y (y here is taken to be the 
value of some physiological parameter). If this occurrent desire is to represent some 
outcome’s having a particular reward value z for me, then there must be something 
about me that makes it the case that y stands for z, rather than some other level of 
reward, or something else entirely. What makes this the case is that through my 
evolution and development, my brain has come to employ a particular code when 
using levels of neural activity to represent reward values; it is the fact the my 
occurrent desire is a signal in this code that makes it the case that it represents my 
visiting Yellowstone as having reward value z. The outputs of the goal-directed 
system must also use a similar, but distinct code. The case is comparable to that of 
the honeybee’s waggle dance, which is widely discussed in the literature on 
teleosemantics; in that case, even novel dances have determinate content, because 
they represent the location of nectar via a code that has been established by the 
operation of selective processes on dances of the same kind (Shea 2013). 
It is worth noting too that while occurrent desires have the function of co-
occurring with normal conditions, these are not normal conditions of the most 
typical kind. Returning again to our example, consider the output that my goal-
directed system generates when it is adapted by my occurrent desire to go to 
Yellowstone; this output is a signal representing the predicted reward value of 
booking a flight to Montana. This behaviour on the part of the goal-directed system 
could normally contribute to adaptive behaviour even if I entirely lacked the desire 
to go to Yellowstone, and even if going to Yellowstone would be in no way 
rewarding for me, because booking a flight to Montana could be rewarding for me to 
the same degree for quite different reasons. So this case is somewhat more 
complicated than the case of the beaver’s tail-splash, for instance, in which there is 
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one straightforward normal condition for the behaviour the representation causes. 
However, we can resolve this issue by re-describing the behaviour of the goal-
directed system. Although there may be no fixed normal condition for representing 
the action of booking a flight as having a particular reward value, there is a fixed 
normal condition for producing this representation in response to an occurrent 
desire to go to Yellowstone, of a given strength. The normal condition is that going 
to Yellowstone will be rewarding to the corresponding degree. This normal 
condition arises from a general description of how the goal-directed system works; 
because the way it works in general relies on the accuracy of occurrent desires, a 
normal condition for its operation on particular occasions is always that outcomes 
actually will be as rewarding as the occurrent desires say they will. This issue cannot 
be taken to be an objection to the claim that occurrent desires have indicative 
content, because the same points are also true of beliefs. 
Occurrent desires, then, have indicative content because part of how they 
contribute to the overall action-selection process is by co-occurring with states of 
affairs of roughly the form outcome O has reward value x. 
Standing desires also have indicative content, because they too work by co-
occurring with states of affairs of roughly this form, although they make their 
contribution at a different stage of the process. For example, consider my standing 
desire to visit Yellowstone. The consumer of this standing desire is the system that 
generates occurrent desires, and its behaviour will be affected by the standing desire 
only when visiting Yellowstone is a salient outcome. When that outcome is salient, 
this system will produce an occurrent desire to visit Yellowstone, with a strength 
determined by the strength of the standing desire, together with a range of other 
factors. Normally, this occurrent desire will only be of the correct strength when the 
standing desire too is of the correct strength; it would take good fortune for this to 
happen otherwise. So in my example, visiting Yellowstone’s being of a certain 
reward value for me is a normal condition for the production of an occurrent desire, 
of a certain strength, for that outcome. The existence of this convoluted system, in 
which one representation is used in the production of another with almost the same 
content, is explained by the value of having both standing and occurrent desires, 
detailed in section 3.2. 
Like occurrent desires, standing desires have indicative content as elements in a 
sequence of representations that eventually leads to behaviour, and it is important 
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that token standing desires belong to a type that represents using a fixed code. In 
addition to these points, it is also important that both standing and occurrent desires 
are produced by systems which are sensitive (to some extent) to the states of affairs 
that seem to be normal conditions for the behaviours they prompt in their 
consumers. This claim is closely related to one part of premise III, stated above and 
defended in part I, and I will discuss it in more detail in the next section. The reason 
for putting it off until then is that it requires a more precise account than any I have 
given so far of the nature of reward. 
 
We can now turn to the question of whether desires have imperative content on 
the Discretion View. This will be the case if and only if their consumers have the 
function of behaving in specific ways, whenever they are adapted by specific 
desires. As I have argued in chapter 8, this would also mean that any given desire 
would have the function of co-occurring with a state of affairs that made a specific 
behaviour on the part of its consumer appropriate. 
Occurrent desires lack imperative content, because how the goal-directed system 
should behave when adapted by a given occurrent desire also depends on the other 
inputs that it receives at the same time. Whether or not a particular representation of 
the value of an action should be produced, when a given occurrent desire adapts the 
system, depends on whether that action is salient at the time; what instrumental 
beliefs are present concerning that action; and on the strengths and objects of other 
occurrent desires, since the action may affect the chances of many outcomes. This is 
true even in cases in which the actions and outcomes concerned are extremely 
tightly linked, or even identical – which is possible since there is no reason why the 
performance of an action should not itself be a desired outcome. Even in this case, 
the agent will typically have other occurrent desires, and beliefs about how the 
action concerned will affect the chances that these desires will be satisfied, either of 
which could vary and affect the output. 
Standing desires also lack imperative content, because the system that consumes 
them is the producer of occurrent desires, and we know that at any one time the 
goal-directed system should only be adapted by a small number of occurrent desires, 
relative to the number of standing desires that are stored. This is a significant part of 
the point of occurrent desires, as I argue in section 3.2. So whether a given standing 
desire should cause the production of a corresponding occurrent desire depends on 
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whether its object is salient at the time – the standing desire exists, and adapts the 
consumer, whether or not this is the case, and continually over long periods of time. 
Also, the strength of the occurrent desire does not depend solely on the strength of 
the standing desire. So it is not the case that the consumer of standing desires has the 
function of behaving in a specific way, whenever it is adapted by a given standing 
desire. 
These conclusions are striking, and it is clear that they would not have been 
reached without the Discretion View’s strict criterion for imperative content. 
However, I have argued for that criterion in detail in chapter 8. So instead we should 
turn to a different issue, which is the extent to which the claims that standing and 
occurrent desires lack imperative content are contingent on the details of the account 
of desire developed in part I. Are my conclusions robust in this sense? I will discuss 
one change to my account which would not affect these conclusions, and another 
more radical one which would. 
First, in section 4.1 I consider two different ways in which the goal-directed and 
habitual systems might interact. On one model, which I tentatively defend in that 
section, the two systems each calculate reward values for a range of possible actions, 
and these values are amalgamated in determining how we act. I have so far assumed 
this model in the present chapter. On the alternative model, though, there is a further 
system which is responsible for delegating control of behaviour at any given time to 
one or other of the two systems. On this model, the goal-directed system would 
produce only a single output, which would be a signal capable of driving action. So 
this model is closer to how desires are usually thought of; as inputs to a system the 
outputs of which are actions themselves. However, even if the alternative model is 
correct, occurrent desires still lack imperative content (and the situation concerning 
standing desires is unaffected). This is because when a given occurrent desire adapts 
the goal-directed system, on the alternative model, which action the goal-directed 
system has the function of causing depends on the other occurrent desires and 
instrumental beliefs present at the time. In personal-level terms, what we as agents 
should do when we experience desires always depends on what other desires we 
have at the time, and on our beliefs about the causal structure of the situation. So if 
the Discretion View is correct, the conclusion that desires lack imperative content is 
robust across a range of possible accounts of desire. 
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However, one limit of this robustness is that my conclusion does rely on the truth 
of the claim in premise III that more than one desire can be an input to the goal-
directed system at any one time. If it were the case that only one occurrent desire 
could adapt the goal-directed system at a time, then depending on some other 
details, it may be the case that this representation would have imperative content – 
would tell the goal-directed system to bring about the desired outcome in the best 
available way. My argument for this claim – which I take to be highly plausible in 
any case – is given in section 4.3. 
 
This completes my argument for premise V, which was the claim that if premises 
I-III are correct, then desires are biological representations with consumers that have 
discretion. So I have now presented arguments for all of the following five premises: 
 
I. Desires are outcome values. 
II. The goal-directed control system works by promoting the performance of the 
action that has the greatest expected reward value, based on outcome values and 
representations of action-outcome relationships. 
III. Outcome values are inputs to the goal-directed control system, which are 
produced and modified by a system which is to some extent responsive to 
evidence for the reward values of outcomes, and it is normal for more than one 
outcome value to act as an input to the goal-directed control system at any one 
time. 
IV. Biological representations with consumers that have discretion have only the 
mind-to-world direction of fit. 
V. It follows from I-III that desires are biological representations with consumers 
that have discretion. 
 
From these premises, it follows straightforwardly that desires have only the mind-to-
world direction of fit. 
An apparent implication of this result is that desires are capable of being true or 
false. I accept this implication, although I admit that it sounds strange to describe 
desires in this way. Several factors may contribute to this strangeness, but one which 
is worth emphasising is an important difference between beliefs and desires. This is 
that the content of beliefs as representations is the same as what is believed, but the 
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content of desires as representations is not the same as what is desired. We refer to 
desires by describing the outcomes that we desire, in sentences such as ‘I want to 
visit Yellowstone’. I do not deny that what is desired here is the outcome that the 
agent visits Yellowstone; I simply claim that this is distinct from the content of the 
desire, which is something like My visiting Yellowstone has reward value x, for 
some value x. This means that truth and falsity for desires, unlike for beliefs, is not a 
matter of the truth or falsity of what is desired. For this reason, I distinguish between 
the content of desires, which is the way that they represent things as being, and the 
objects of desire, which are the outcomes that desires concern - the things which we 
desire. Desires have both truth-conditions – given by their content – and 
satisfaction-conditions – given by their objects – so we have no need to radically 
change the way in which we talk about desires.29 
 
9.2 The Nature of Reward and the Content of Desire 
 
In this section, I discuss desires’ representational content. According to the 
orthodox view, desires are pure imperatives with propositions describing outcomes 
as their contents. For example, on the orthodox view the desire to eat ice-cream is a 
pure imperative with the content: I am eating ice-cream. On my view, in contrast, 
this desire is a pure indicative with the content: My eating ice-cream has reward 
value x, for some value x (abstracting away here from differences between occurrent 
and standing desires). My focus in this section will be on the nature of reward. 
Specifically, I will try to show that there is a property of rewardingness which 
outcomes possess, and which desires might track. For my purposes it is particularly 
important to show that there is a way of understanding the rewardingness of 
outcomes for agents other than as the degree to which those outcomes are desired; if 
this was the only plausible way to understand reward, my view about the direction 
of fit of desire would be very seriously undermined. 
                                                
29 The fact that when we talk about desires we usually only mention their objects might be thought to 
be evidence against my view, and in favour of the view that desires have only imperative content. In 
particular, we explain behaviour by describing the objects of agents’ beliefs and desires. But this line 
of thought is not compelling, because to give a full explanation of someone’s behaviour in belief-
desire terms it is necessary to describe the strengths of their desires, as well as the objects of those 
desires. So if we can infer what desires represent from what we need to say about them to give belief-
desire explanations, then the strengths of desires must also contribute to their contents – and it is hard 
to see how this could be possible, if desires were pure imperatives. 
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My aim in this section is only to show that it is possible to give a plausible and 
cogent account of reward that satisfies some basic criteria. I will not attempt to give 
a full defence of the claim that desires represent levels of the property I will 
describe, because I do not have a theory of content to hand, and because there is 
presently too much uncertainty about how standing desires are formed and modified 
for this task to be completed (see section 3.5). I will also leave aside a further very 
important question about the content of desires, which is what determines their 
objects – for instance, what it is about certain instances of activity in my OFC that 
makes them desires to eat ice-cream, rather than, say, to go to the moon. 
 
Being rewarding is a property that outcomes have relative to individuals at times; 
and rewardingness is a matter of degree. Actions can also be described as rewarding, 
depending on their tendency to cause rewarding outcomes, and both types and 
tokens of both outcomes and actions can be rewarding to determinate degrees. It is 
normal in psychology and neuroscience to describe outcomes and even objects as 
rewards when they are, or their consumption is, positively rewarding, but this talk of 
rewards tends to collapse the distinction between outcomes which the individual 
takes to be rewarding, and those which actually are rewarding. My approach will 
maintain this distinction, while also entailing that the rewardingness of an outcome 
for an agent may be significantly (although not directly) affected by the strength of 
the agent’s desire for that outcome. 
We can begin by considering the hypothesis that what it is for an outcome to be 
rewarding is for it to be biologically beneficial; that is, conducive to the individual’s 
survival and reproduction. This hypothesis is attractive in part because reward is a 
‘common currency’ for comparing actions and outcomes that have advantages and 
disadvantages of different kinds. Reward signals update desires and habits, and the 
goal-directed and habitual systems are general-purpose systems for behavioural 
control. These systems are responsible for much of our behaviour, and this 
behaviour will be maximally biologically beneficial if our desires and habits 
accurately represent the level of biological benefit that outcomes and actions will 
bring us, provided that the systems also work correctly in other ways. So it is 
tempting to conclude that the normal condition for successful action on a desire of a 
given strength is that the biological benefit available from its object corresponds to 
that strength. Assuming that orthodox teleosemantics gives the correct theory of 
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content for representations such as desires, this would mean that reward is biological 
benefit. 
However, there are powerful arguments against this view. Crucially, it looks as 
though the function of the entire brain is to control the organism’s behaviour so as to 
generate the maximum possible biological benefit. So to attribute the same task to 
the desire and habit systems seems to confuse the relationship between systems and 
sub-systems (Price 1998; see section 7.2). For instance, consider the role of standing 
basic drives: these seem to be features of the brain and body that cause us to direct 
our actions towards outcomes which are of particular importance for survival and 
reproduction. But standing basic drives co-operate with the desire and habit systems 
in the overall process of behavioural control; so it would more accurately describe 
their relationship to think of drives as dispositions to find beneficial things 
rewarding, and reward itself as something like drive-satisfaction. 
Thinking of reward as biological benefit also makes some features of the way 
reward signals are generated, and hence of how desires and habits are formed, rather 
puzzling. Because reward signals are generated when desires are satisfied, as well as 
drives, it is possible for us to acquire strong desires which have only tenuous 
connections with either drive-satisfaction, or biological benefit, without any 
malfunction occurring. Humans in particular commonly have strong desires for 
outcomes which seem to have very little impact on our ability to survive and 
reproduce – desires for certain kinds of aesthetic experience, for instance. The point 
here is not that the contents of a representation must be such that misrepresentation 
would involve malfunction (Neander 1995) – that would rule out the hypothesis that 
beaver tail-slaps represent the presence of danger, since the mechanism used to 
produce tail-slaps presumably does not malfunction when it responds to mere signs 
of danger, and have similar effects in many other similar cases. Instead, the point is 
that there is room for an account of reward that better explains what the system that 
produces reward signals is doing. 
For these reasons, a more promising approach is to think of reward in the 
following way: what it is for an outcome to be rewarding for an agent is for it to 
promote the aggregate satisfaction of that agent’s desires and basic drives. This 
approach has the significant virtue of making sense of how the goal-directed and 
habitual systems work. In particular, reward signals used in updating desires and 
habits measure current levels of reward by measuring aggregate levels of desire- and 
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drive-satisfaction. I will first give a more precise, formal presentation of this view, 
then explore some of its properties. 
First, let us define some expressions. Noting that both types of outcomes and 
token outcomes have reward values, let 𝑅!,!!"#$(𝑜) be the function that takes outcome 
types to the reward values of those outcome types for agent 𝐴 at time 𝑡 (using the 
letter 𝑜 for outcome types), and let 𝑅!,!!"#$% 𝑢  be the function that takes outcome 
tokens to the reward values of those outcome tokens, again for agent 𝐴 at time 𝑡 
(using u for outcome tokens). Let 𝑑!,!(𝑜) be the strength of 𝐴’s standing desire or 
standing basic drive for outcome type 𝑜 at time 𝑡, and let 𝛼! be a parameter 
modifying the function 𝑑 according to the strength of the agent’s occurrent desire or 
drive for outcome type 𝑜! at the time. Here negative desires and negative drives – 
that is, learnt and innate aversions – should be included. Then assuming 𝐴 has 
standing desires or drives for outcomes 𝑜!, 𝑜!,…  𝑜!, we can define the reward value 
of an outcome type for A at time t as follows: 
 𝑅!,!!"#$ 𝑜! =  (Pr 𝑜! 𝑜! − Pr (𝑜!|¬𝑜!))𝑑!,!(𝑜!)!!!! −  𝑑!,!(𝑜!) 
 
That is, the reward value of an outcome type is the degree to which it promotes the 
satisfaction of all of the agent’s other desires and drives, taking into account the 
conditional probabilities relating the outcome type to other desired outcomes, along 
with the strengths of the agent’s desires. Taking 𝑢! to be a token of outcome type 𝑜!, we can further define the reward value of a token outcome for 𝐴 at time 𝑡 in the 
following way: 
 𝑅!,!!"#$% 𝑢! = ( 𝛼!𝑑!,! 𝑜! −  𝛼!𝑑!,!(𝑜!))−  Pr (𝑜!|¬𝑜!)𝛼!𝑑!,!(𝑜!)!!!!!!!!  
 
In this formula, the outcome types indexed by ‘j’ are those of which tokens occur 
simultaneously with or subsequent to uk, and 𝛼!𝑑!,!(𝑜!) designates the strength of 
the agent’s occurrent desire or drive for outcome 𝑜! at time 𝑡, if they have one, or the 
strength of their standing desire or drive for that outcome if not. So according to this 
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formula, the reward value of a token outcome is the difference between the degree to 
which the outcome satisfies the agent’s occurrent desires and drives, except for their 
desire for that very outcome, and the likely degree to which these desires and drives 
would have been satisfied, if the outcome concerned had not occurred.  
To gain an initial grasp of these two formulae, it is useful to think of each as 
composed of three elements. First, there is a ‘positive’ element: in the case of the 
formula for outcome types, this is the sum of the strengths of the agent’s standing 
desires, weighted by the conditional probabilities of their being satisfied, given the 
outcome concerned; in the case of the formula for outcome tokens, it is the sum of 
the strengths of the agent’s occurrent desires for the outcomes that actually occurred 
together with or subsequent to the token outcome concerned. These elements give 
initial expression to the idea that the reward value of an outcome is its tendency to 
promote the aggregate satisfaction of the agent’s desires and drives. This is then 
refined by two further ‘negative’ elements. The sum of the agent’s desire strengths 
(standing or occurrent, depending on the formula), weighted by the probabilities of 
their being satisfied if the outcome concerned does not occur, is subtracted. 
Intuitively, the reason why this is necessary is that if some outcome makes the 
satisfaction of an agent’s desires and drives less likely, then that outcome has 
negative reward value. So reward value is a measure of how some outcome affects 
the probabilities of others. The other ‘negative’ element is the strength of the agent’s 
desire for the outcome itself, which is subtracted because merely desiring an 
outcome is not in itself sufficient to make that outcome rewarding. This term occurs 
with weight 1 in the ‘positive’ element, so the effect of this ‘negative’ element is 
just to cancel it out – to ensure that the strength of the agent’s desire for the outcome 
concerned has no direct effect. Intuitively, this goes back to one of the most basic 
ideas underlying my claims in this thesis, which is that it would be highly 
maladaptive for us to desire at random. 
There are several important points to note about the account of reward set out in 
these two formulae. 
First, an apparent constraint on an adequate theory of reward is that the reward 
value of an outcome type should be approximately equal to the average reward value 
of tokens of that type. To see that my account satisfies this constraint, let 𝑢!! ,𝑢!!,…𝑢!!  be a large number of tokens of outcome type 𝑜!, and let 𝑎!!𝑑!,! 𝑜!  be 
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the strength of A’s occurrent desire for 𝑜! on the occasion of 𝑢!!. Then the constraint 
will be satisfied if: 
 
𝑙𝑅!,!!"#$ 𝑜! −  𝑅!,!!"#$% 𝑢!!  ≈  0!!!!  
 
That is: 
 𝑙 (Pr 𝑜! 𝑜! − Pr (𝑜!|¬𝑜!))𝑑!,!(𝑜!)!!!! −  𝑑!,!(𝑜!)
−  ( 𝛼!!𝑑!,! 𝑜! −  𝛼!!𝑑!,!(𝑜!))!!!!!!!!
−  Pr 𝑜! ¬𝑜! 𝑎!!𝑑!,! 𝑜!!!!! ≈  0 
 
Rearranging gives us: 
 𝑙 Pr 𝑜! 𝑜! 𝑑!,! 𝑜! + !!!! 𝑙 Pr 𝑜! ¬𝑜! 𝑎!!𝑑!,! 𝑜! − 𝑙!!!! Pr (𝑜!|¬𝑜!)𝑑!,!(𝑜!)!!!!+  𝛼!!𝑑!,! 𝑜! − 𝑙𝑑!,!(𝑜!)!!!! −  𝛼!!𝑑!,! 𝑜! ≈ 0!!!!!!!!  
 
Of these, the two terms in square brackets are both approximately zero, assuming 
that the variations in occurrent desire strength between the various occurrences of 
the outcome type cancel each other out. This entails that: 
 
𝑙 Pr 𝑜!|𝑜! 𝑑!,! 𝑜! − !!!! 𝛼!!𝑑!,! 𝑜! ≈ 0!!!!!!!!  
 
which is true, again relying on the assumption about desire strength, because over a 
large number of occurrences, the outcome types designated by 𝑜! will occur together 
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with 𝑜! with a frequency proportional to the conditional probability of their 
occurrence, given 𝑜!. So my account satisfies this apparent constraint. 
A second apparent constraint on a theory of reward is that for an agent that lacks 
desires, the theory should entail that reward just is the tendency to promote the 
aggregate satisfaction of basic drives. In purely habitual creatures, this is what we 
should expect the habit system to aim to maximise. And again, the present theory 
satisfies this constraint. 
Third, this account coheres tolerably well with the account I have defended of 
how standing and occurrent desires are formed and modified. On this account of 
reward, in order to become more accurate as representations of reward, standing 
desires should be strengthened when new evidence is received, suggesting that they 
are more strongly probabilistically associated with the objects of other desires and 
drives than the previous evidence had suggested; and this is an empirically plausible 
account of the function of the desire-updating system (bearing in mind the 
uncertainty about that system detailed in section 3.5). Occurrent desires for outcome 
types should be strong when occurrent desires and drives for positively 
probabilistically-associated outcomes are strong; and again this seems to be how 
occurrent desires work – they form mutually-reinforcing networks, and are boosted 
by occurrent drives when incentive learning has taken place. 
Fourth, on this account it is both possible for desires to be inaccurate qua 
representations, and for them to be very accurate (perfect accuracy is unlikely since 
we are dealing with continuously variable properties – it is unlikely for anyone to 
have a perfectly accurate desire, just as it is unlikely for one to have a perfectly 
accurate belief about e.g. one’s own height). For example, consider an addict’s 
desire for heroin, after they have ceased to find the drug pleasurable. This desire will 
be very strong, but the reward value of heroin for the addict will be determined by 
the extent to which taking heroin tends to promote or frustrate the addict’s other 
desires and basic drives. Given that taking heroin will make the satisfaction of many 
of their other desires and drives much less likely than refraining from taking it 
would, this reward value may be strongly negative (although refraining would make 
highly aversive withdrawal symptoms very likely). So, as we would hope, the 
account entails that the desires for drugs of stereotypical addicts massively 
overestimate the reward values of those drugs. Assessing whether desires are likely 
to be accurate on this account is more difficult, because we know so little about how 
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they are formed and updated. But assuming that this process relies on a reward 
prediction error signal and that desires and drives are used to measure reward levels 
for generating this signal, then it is plausible that our desires could sometimes be 
accurate. Depending on exactly how the system works, the signal may well be 
positive when outcomes are associated with objects of desires and drives to a greater 
degree than the agent expected; so the strengths of desires will tend to reflect the 
degree to which their objects are associated with the objects of other desires and 
drives. 
Fifth, this account entails that outcomes will be rewarding to different degrees for 
different people, in a plausible way. One way in which differences between 
individuals of this kind might be thought to emerge is in virtue of its being the case 
that desiring an outcome in itself is sufficient to make that outcome rewarding. 
However, one of the strengths of my account is that it does not support this 
suggestion. It cannot be part of the function of the reward system to generate desires 
for outcomes that are probabilistically independent of the objects of our basic drives 
(although it is possible that such desires might occasionally be formed), but such 
desires could be accurate if desiring an outcome was sufficient to make it rewarding. 
We can see this point more clearly by thinking about how strong a new desire should 
be: in this case it is clear that only the extent to which the outcome concerned 
promotes the satisfaction of one’s existing desires and drives should matter. 
This approach still leaves room for variation between individuals from several 
sources. Although desiring some outcome does not in itself make that outcome more 
rewarding, humans have the capacity to experience and to desire pleasure, and what 
causes us pleasure is determined at least in part by what we desire. So most 
outcomes we desire will be rewarding for us in so far as their occurrence will cause 
us pleasure, which we desire. In addition to this, we vary in the strengths of our 
basic drives, and in the probabilistic relationships which hold between outcome 
types, where the outcomes concerned involve us. On the former point, it is highly 
likely that there is variation between individuals in the strengths of our innate drives 
for, for example, sugary foods or social success. These differences will have 
substantial knock-on effects in the rewardingness, for us, of a wide range of 
outcomes. On the latter point, our different skills, abilities, personalities and 
circumstances make a great deal of difference to whether certain outcomes will or 
will not promote the satisfaction of our basic drives and desires. To take just one 
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example, for a talented athlete taking part in competitive sports will be strongly 
associated with receiving acclaim and enhanced social status, but for a less talented 
athlete this probabilistic (in this case causal) link will be much weaker. 
Sixth, and finally, a possible objection to this account is that it gets the reward 
value of the objects of basic drives wrong. To take a particularly clear example, it 
surely cannot be the case that the reward value of having sex for an organism is 
determined by the extent to which this promotes the satisfaction of their other 
desires and basic drives. It is obviously appropriate for most organisms to have 
strong drives for sex regardless of the effect this has on their ability to get food, for 
instance. The reason why this objection does not succeed is that the role of basic 
drives is not to track the reward values of outcomes; instead, basic drive strengths 
should be expected to approximate the degrees to which their objects promote the 
organism’s chances of survival and reproduction. So my view is that desires are pure 
indicatives representing the reward values of outcomes, which is to say that they 
represent the degrees to which these outcomes tend to promote the aggregate 
satisfaction of our other desires and basic drives. 
 
9.3 Summary of the Argument So Far 
 
In this final section of part II, I recap the argument so far. Over the last nine 
chapters, I have steadily built up a positive argument for my claim that desires have 
only the mind-to-world direction of fit, which I will survey here. The remaining 
chapter – chapter 10 – addresses one implication of my view, and responds to a 
possible objection. Rather than summarising each of the chapters in order, I will 
start from my conclusion and work backwards, explaining how the arguments and 
evidence I have presented support that conclusion and answer some of the questions 
that my view raises. 
My conclusion is that desires have only the mind-to-world direction of fit. That 
is, they have indicative content but not imperative content. This claim may prompt 
several questions. One question which I have just discussed is what desires say; my 
provisional answer to this question is that desires represent the levels of reward that 
outcomes provide, where reward is the tendency to satisfy the agent’s desires and 
basic drives. This may look worryingly self-referential, but the truth-conditions of 
individual desires are not fixed by those very desires. Instead, for desires to succeed 
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as indicative representations their strengths must accurately reflect the extent to 
which their objects are positively probabilistically associated with the objects of the 
agent’s other desires and basic drives. Reward is the ‘common currency’ used by the 
goal-directed and habit systems in assessing actions and outcomes, and the evidence 
from neuroscience and psychology suggests that these systems aim for the 
satisfaction of agents’ desires, as well as their basic drives. These points raise very 
interesting questions about the relationships between reward and individual well-
being, and between desires that are accurate as representations and those that it is 
rational or fitting to have, but I have not addressed these questions. 
A further issue is that my conclusion may strike some readers as likely to involve 
a misappropriation of the notion of direction of fit. Isn’t the whole point of this 
notion to illuminate a deep difference between desire and belief? This is an issue 
which I discuss in more detail in chapters 6 and 10. The key points of my view are: 
that direction of fit is a much more widespread phenomenon than the focus on desire 
and belief suggests; and that the primary notion of direction of fit is of a distinction 
between two kinds of representation, one of which aims to say how things are, while 
the other says what to do or what should be brought about. The Discretion View, the 
theory of direction of fit which I developed and defended in chapter 8, is 
unequivocally an account of the phenomenon understood in exactly this way. 
However, the most important question my conclusion raises is why we should 
believe it. There is a powerful intuitive case for the idea that desires have indicative 
content, representing their objects as good in some way, because it would be so 
strange if we desired at random. But I have not developed this case in detail, and it 
does not support the more controversial part of my conclusion, which is that desires 
lack imperative content. Instead, my argument is based on an investigation of the 
nature of direction of fit in biological representations, conducted with no particular 
emphasis on desire. My conclusion may be seen as a corollary of the Discretion 
View, which is the thesis that what it takes for a representation to have indicative 
content is for it to have the function of co-occurring with specific normal conditions 
for the behaviour it causes in its consumer, and what it takes for a representation to 
have imperative content is for its consumer to have the function of performing a 
specific behaviour when adapted by this representation. This is a teleosemantic 
theory of direction of fit, so we can ask both why the teleosemantic approach is 
justified, and why this particular theory should be accepted. 
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I addressed the first of these two topics in chapters 6 and 7. In sections 6.4 and 
7.1 I gave arguments in favour of a teleosemantic approach. Thinking about 
functions is a good way to think about many aspects of representation, particularly 
in the case of biological representations, because their status and properties as 
representations are determined by the roles they play in biological systems. To 
analyse representations we need to understand these roles, which means 
understanding how the systems in which they are embedded work, along with the 
nature of the contribution that representations make. The idea that representations 
are used to co-ordinate the behaviour of producers and consumers is a fundamental 
breakthrough in this project. Furthermore, the two directions of fit seem to be 
distinguished by what different kinds of representations are for. Those with the 
mind-to-world direction of fit are for keeping track of, and conveying information 
about, how things are, while those with the world-to-mind direction of fit are for 
specifying tasks and goals. So the directions of fit seem to be kinds of functions for 
representations. A further advantage of the teleosemantic approach for my purpose 
is that the kinds of properties that it appeals to in the analysis of representations are 
ones that desires have, which can be discovered by empirical methods. 
 My argument for the Discretion View was given in chapter 8. If we look at the 
issues with an open mind, I argued, we can see that for representations to have 
imperative content, their consumers must lack discretion. This is because 
(biological) representations can work in either or both of two ways: by co-occurring 
with some state of affairs which is relevant to how their consumers should behave, 
but which does not trivially determine appropriate behaviour; or by occurring when 
a specific behaviour on the part of the consumer is appropriate. In the first case, 
representations tell their consumers how things are, and in the second they tell them 
what to do. Many representations make a contribution which combines these two 
ways of working, and thus have both directions of fit. 
What the Discretion View means for the direction of fit of desire is that if desires 
are biological representations with consumers that have discretion, then they are 
pure indicatives. So my argument also relies crucially on the account of the nature of 
desire that I gave in part I; this is a sense in which my conclusion is much more than 
a corollary of the Discretion View. Two aspects of the account of desire that I 
developed in part I make particularly important contributions to my argument. First, 
it is of course important that on my account, the systems that consume desires have 
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discretion. What the goal-directed system should do when it is adapted by a 
particular occurrent desire depends not only on the object and strength of that desire, 
but also on the other desires that adapt the system at that time, and on the agent’s 
instrumental beliefs. I argued that the goal-directed system is typically adapted by 
several occurrent desires at any given time in section 4.3. Standing desires are 
consumed by the system that generates occurrent desires, and this system has 
discretion because it is continually adapted by all of the agent’s standing desires, but 
has the function of producing occurrent desires only for those outcomes that are 
salient at the time. The strengths of occurrent desires are also only partly determined 
by the strengths of standing desires. 
Second, one of my major goals in part I was to show that desires are the members 
of psychological natural kind. In order to establish this conclusion, I argued that 
outcome values form a psychological natural kind, and have many of the most 
important properties that desires are normally thought to have. Outcome values 
combine instrumental beliefs to motivate a high proportion of human actions; they 
come in occurrent and standing forms; they have a wide range of objects, at least in 
humans, and are formed and modified by a process which is responsive to evidence 
to about the right extent; and they interact in roughly the ways that desires are 
thought to with habits, emotions and intentions. One reason why this is important is 
that outcome values have characteristic functions, established by biological 
processes, and their producers and consumers also have such functions with respect 
to outcome values. This means that outcome values, and hence desires, are 
biological representations, so the Discretion View applies. 
Finally, I have also responded to two lines of objection that threatened to 
undermine my argument at relatively early stages. One was the objection that an 
empirically-informed philosophical theory of desire has already been developed, by 
Tim Schroeder (2004), and that he both settled on a theory that was extensionally 
distinct from mine, and argued (although not in detail) that desires have only the 
world-to-mind direction of fit. In chapter 5, I argued for the superiority of my 
account of desire over Schroeder’s; the key difference was that on his view, even 
standing basic drives count as desires. This is most fundamentally a problem 
because standing basic drives are, in the terminology I introduced then, mental rules 
rather than mental states. The second line of objection was that teleosemantics has 
been discredited by the indeterminacy, swampman and liberality objections, and 
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consequently cannot provide the framework for a correct theory of direction of fit. In 
chapter 7 I offered detailed responses to all three of these objections, and I also 
argued for the determinacy of direction of fit under the Discretion View in section 
8.4. 
 
In this chapter, I have shown that the combined results of parts I and II imply that 
both standing and occurrent desires are pure indicatives, or have only the mind-to-
world direction of fit. I have also presented an account of the nature of reward which 
satisfies certain basic constraints, and serves to illuminate the content of desires. In 
the last section, I recapped some of the key claims and arguments of chapters 1-9. 
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Part III: Motivation 
 
Chapter 10: The Humean Theory of Motivation 
 
10.1 Introduction to Part III 
 
One of the most influential discussions of direction of fit in the philosophical 
literature is by Michael Smith (1987, 1994), who appeals to what he takes to be the 
directions of fit of desire and belief in arguing for a claim known as the Humean 
Theory of Motivation (HTM). HTM is in essence the claim that motivation by 
reasons requires the presence of desires, and cannot be generated by beliefs alone. 
Here in part III, I discuss the relationships between my view, Smith’s argument, and 
the Humean Theory. 
In this part of the thesis, my topic is the implications of the work of parts I and II 
for theories of reasons and rational motivation. The possible implications of 
empirically-informed investigations of processes leading to action for such theories 
are very extensive, because it is widely thought that reasons must in some sense be 
capable of motivating us; or to put it another way, because whatever acting for 
reasons involves, it must be something that humans actually do. This means that 
empirical questions such as those addressed in part I have fairly close connections to 
central issues in ethics and meta-ethics. For example, internalism about reasons is 
the thesis that all reasons for action are derived from those of the agent’s mental 
states that are capable of motivating him or her. This claim is now most strongly 
associated with Bernard Williams (1979), but also plays a very important role in the 
moral theories of Hume and Kant, among many others. If internalism about reasons 
is true, then both empirical and philosophical research will be necessary to learn 
how reasons for action arise. Another important example of the potential importance 
of empirical research concerns perhaps the most famous argument for 
noncognitivism about moral judgments, which is the thesis that moral judgments are 
not beliefs. This argument, which is also prominent in Hume’s moral philosophy, 
relies on the premises that moral judgments are intrinsically motivating, and that 
beliefs alone cannot motivate us (a version of HTM). On the face of it, both 
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premises are empirical claims about the kinds of mental processes which lead to 
motivation and action. 
However, in this chapter I will discuss only issues relating to the form of 
Humeanism advocated by Smith and James Lenman (1996). In the next section I 
describe Smith’s version of the Humean Theory of Motivation, and outline his 
argument. In sections 10.3 and 10.4 I give a careful analysis of this argument, 
showing that there are some parts of Smith’s Humeanism that are contradicted by 
my view, but other parts that are consistent with it. The crucial problem with 
Smith’s argument is that he falsely assumes that mental states that set goals for 
action must have the world-to-mind direction of fit. In section 10.5 I discuss, and 
reject, a possible response that a Humean might make to my arguments, and in 
section 10.6 I consider the possibility that the dispute between the Humean and I is 
merely verbal. 
One central purpose of this chapter is to respond to a likely objection to my view. 
This objection is that the Humean Theory of Motivation requires that desires and 
beliefs have opposite directions of fit, so my conclusion can be correct only if HTM 
is false. My response to this objection is that HTM itself is compatible with my 
view, although certain elements of Smith’s argument for HTM are not. Largely as a 
result of Smith’s influence, philosophical thought has tended to connect the 
representational property of direction of fit too closely with properties of mental 
states relating to reasons, motivation and explanation. So a further aim in this 
chapter (which I pursue simultaneously) is to disentangle these ideas. 
 
10.2 The Humean Theory of Motivation and Smith’s Argument 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, I will take the Humean Theory of Motivation to 
be the following claim: 
 
Humean Theory of Motivation (HTM): For an agent to be motivated by a reason, 
they must be motivated by a desire that they believe the action under 
consideration would help to satisfy. 
 
There are two important points about this version of HTM which stand in need of 
further explanation. 
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 First, it is important that this is a claim about motivation by reasons. To get 
clearer about this idea, it is helpful to contrast motivating reasons with normative 
reasons. Normative reasons are often described as considerations that count in 
favour of some course of action or other. They are the reasons that we ought to be 
sensitive to, and which contribute to making it the case that particular actions are 
right or justified, morally or otherwise. In contrast, motivating reasons are the 
considerations that can correctly be cited when giving rationalising explanations of 
motivation and action. Rationalising explanations explain actions by showing how 
they were rational or intelligible responses to the agent’s situation. However, 
considerations which show how actions were rational or intelligible are only 
motivating reasons when they in fact helped to produce the agent’s motivation – that 
is, when the agent was motivated by these considerations. So an agent has a 
motivating reason R if and only if: (i) R makes some action A a rational or 
intelligible thing for the agent to do; and (ii) the agent is motivated to perform A in 
part because they believe or notice R. 
When things go well, our motivating reasons are normative reasons. Normative 
reasons are certainly considerations that are capable of making actions appear 
rational or intelligible, and it is common for us to be motivated by these reasons. For 
example, suppose I wanted to travel to London, and knew that the only train left at 
10 o’clock. The fact that the only train left at this time would be a normative reason 
for me, given my desires, to go to the station just before 10. But it could also easily 
be a motivating reason for me to perform this action, if I had the relevant belief. 
However, things do not always go well, and sometimes we have motivating reasons 
which are not normative reasons. Suppose now that my belief that the London train 
left at 10 o’clock was false. Then, at least according to some views of reasons, I 
would have a motivating reason to go to the station just before 10, because I would 
be motivated to do this by a consideration that made this action rational or 
intelligible. But this consideration – that the London train left at 10 – would not be a 
normative reason for me to go to the station then, because it would not be true. It is 
also possible for us to have normative reasons which do not motivate us, for instance 
because we are unaware of them. 
These points show that the present version of HTM is a theory of the kind of 
motivation of which rationalising explanation is possible. It claims that all 
motivation of this kind works in the same way as the travelling-to-London example 
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just given: the agent has a desire for some outcome; they believe that some 
consideration implies that a certain action would help to satisfy this desire; and they 
are consequently motivated by this consideration to perform the action. However, it 
is important that this leaves open the possibility that we can also be motivated in 
other ways, as long as this motivation cannot be the subject of rationalising 
explanations. If it weren’t for this point, the fact that we can be motivated by habits, 
in the absence of any relevant desire, would be a very strong objection to HTM. But 
given that HTM concerns motivation by reasons, the theory can be plausibly 
defended on the grounds that when we act out of habit we are not motivated by 
reasons. The fact that HTM concerns motivation by reasons is also important for 
Smith’s argument, as we will shortly see. 
The second point to note about this version of HTM is that it is weaker than some 
alternatives, in two noteworthy respects. A difference from Smith’s own formulation 
of HTM is that this version does not claim that belief-desire pairs which generate 
motivation are motivating reasons, but only that they are necessary for motivation 
by reasons. I am using the slightly weaker formulation in order to avoid a 
controversy about whether mental states can be reasons (see Alvarez 2010). 
In addition to this, in meta-ethics the Humean Theory of Motivation is often 
taken to be the claim that beliefs alone cannot motivate us. The crucial difference 
between this formulation (call it HTM*) and the version of HTM I am considering is 
that HTM* rules out two ways in which beliefs could be solely responsible for 
motivation, which are left open by my HTM. These are that there could be some 
beliefs that are at the same time desires (sometimes called ‘besires’), and that there 
are some beliefs that are capable on their own of causing new desires to be formed. 
Variants of these two strategies have been adopted as ways of explaining how moral 
judgments can be beliefs which are capable of motivating us independently of our 
antecedent desires, by philosophers including Nagel (1970), McDowell (1979), 
Darwall (1983) and Altham (1986). They are rejected by Humeans, who argue that 
beliefs and desires are ‘distinct existences’, so there can be no ‘besires’ (Smith 1987, 
1994), and that desires cannot be rationally derived from beliefs alone (Lenman 
1996). But this aspect of the Humean view – the insistence on the ontological and 
rational separateness of beliefs and desires – is not the aspect that conflicts with my 
view of the direction of fit of desire. Instead, the conflict comes from the Humean 
idea that motivation requires states with the world-to-mind direction of fit, and the 
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strategies that HTM* opposes are precisely ways to make this Humean idea 
compatible with cognitivism about moral judgments (that is, the view that moral 
judgments are beliefs). So my concern is with the idea that desires are necessary for 
motivation, not with the idea that beliefs are not sufficient. 
We can now turn to Smith’s argument for HTM. He employs the following three 
premises (1994, p. 116): 
 
A. Having a motivating reason is, inter alia, having a goal. 
B. Having a goal is being in a state with which the world must fit. 
C. Being in a state with which the world must fit is desiring. 
 
From this Smith concludes that having a motivating reason involves having a desire, 
and from here it is only a short step to HTM, since HTM is the claim that being 
motivated by a such a reason involves being motivated by a desire. By ‘being in a 
state with which the world must fit’, Smith explains, he means being in a state with 
the world-to-mind direction of fit. In his (2011), he writes that this means having 
within oneself a representation of how the world is to be (p. 154). The reason why 
beliefs cannot provide motivating reasons is that they only purport to represent how 
things are, and thus cannot provide us with goals, a thought expressed vividly by 
James Lenman (1996, p. 300): 
 
A belief is a representation of the way we think the world is, a desire a 
representation of how we would have it be. Given this understanding of beliefs 
and desires respectively, it is only when we have some desire that we have 
anything that is even a candidate for a reason to interfere with the world… You 
can have representations of the way things are until you are blue in the face… but 
you don’t begin to have a reason to interfere so long as you couldn’t care less 
about the way things are. This possibility of caring less only arises when you start 
to prefer some possible ways for the world to be over others. And the direction of 
fit of any such preferences is world-word and not vice-versa. 
 
The conflict between my view and the Humeanism of Smith and Lenman is 
therefore clear. I have claimed that desires have only the mind-to-world direction of 
fit; but Smith and Lenman claim that states with the world-to-mind direction of fit 
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are necessary for motivation, and that these states are desires. The view which I 
argued for in detail in parts I and II contradicts premise C of Smith’s argument, so if 
I am right, the argument fails. However, the implications of my view go further than 
this, as I explain in the next two sections. 
 
10.3 Two Components of Humeanism 
 
As I have mentioned, in this chapter one of my main aims is to respond to a 
possible objection to my view. The objection is that my conclusion is in some way 
incompatible with HTM, and now that we have seen Smith’s argument, we can see 
better how such an objection may go. For suppose we accept HTM, along with the 
first two premises of Smith’s argument: 
 
HTM: For an agent to be motivated by a reason, they must be motivated by a 
desire that they believe the action under consideration would help to satisfy. 
A: Having a motivating reason is, inter alia, having a goal. 
B: Having a goal is being in a state with which the world must fit. 
 
Given premise A, the best explanation of why being motivated by a reason requires 
being motivated by a desire seems to be that desires set goals for action. In fact, it is 
hard to resist this conclusion, since it seems that what it is for some outcome to be a 
goal for action for an agent is – at least roughly – for them to be motivated by their 
belief that the action will help to bring about that outcome. So having a goal 
amounts to having a desire. This means that, given premise B, desires must have the 
world-to-mind direction of fit. 
Although not deductive, this argument seems to show that my position can only 
be sustained if we reject either the Humean Theory of Motivation, premise A, or 
premise B. In this section I will argue that we should reject premise B. We can 
usefully think of Smith and Lenman’s Humeanism as made up of two components. 
The first component includes HTM itself, premise A, and a further claim which I 
will mention shortly, all of which are compatible with my view, and all of which are 
concerned solely with the nature of motivation by reasons. The second component 
includes premises B and C, links ideas concerning motivation by reasons with 
direction of fit, and is in my view mistaken. 
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To reject the Humean Theory of Motivation would be the wrong strategy for 
dealing with the present objection. This is because an equally powerful argument 
against my conclusion can be generated by combining premises A and B with the 
much weaker claim that being motivated by beliefs and desires is one way of being 
motivated by reasons. If this weaker claim is true, then again it seems that desires 
must play the role of setting goals for action, given that having a motivating reason 
requires having a goal (premise A). So again it follows from premise B, the claim 
that having a goal consists in having an internal representation with the world-to-
mind direction of fit, that desires must have the world-to-mind direction of fit. All 
that we lose by replacing HTM with the weaker claim is the result that desires are 
the only goal-setting states. We should accept that being motivated by beliefs and 
desires is one way of being motivated by reasons, because describing agents’ beliefs 
and desires is the paradigmatic form of rationalising explanation. So we must reject 
either premise A, or premise B, or both. 
Smith (1987, 1994) describes both A and B as ‘unassailable’, although he does 
not argue explicitly for B. The reason why he takes A to be unassailable is that it is 
an immediate consequence of the teleological account of rationalising explanation, 
to which he subscribes: 
 
Teleological Account of Rationalising Explanation: All rationalising explanations 
work by showing how the action concerned could be seen as appropriate, given 
some goal the agent had. 
 
Those who accept the teleological account, like Smith, think that what it is to make 
an action appear rational or intelligible is to show how it could be seen as a rational 
means to a goal, aim or end that the agent had. Given that motivating reasons are 
considerations that can be cited in giving rationalising explanations, it follows that 
one can only have a motivating reason if one has a goal. 
The teleological account is controversial, so there may be some reason to doubt 
premise A. In particular, consider the position of someone who believes that there 
are normative reasons for action that apply to all of us, regardless of our goals, 
desires or other attitudes. A philosopher with this view might well choose to argue 
that when someone is motivated by such a reason, it is possible to explain why they 
are so motivated just by giving this reason, without appealing (explicitly or 
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implicitly) to any goal the agent had. However, just as was the case with HTM, we 
should not respond to the present objection by rejecting premise A, because the 
argument will still go through if it is replaced by a much weaker premise, which is 
much harder to deny. Consider the Teleological Account of Belief-Desire 
Explanation: 
 
Teleological Account of Belief-Desire Explanation: Rationalising explanations 
which cite the agent’s beliefs and desires work by showing how the action 
concerned could be seen as appropriate, given some goal the agent had. 
 
This claim is very highly plausible, and it follows that when an agent is motivated 
by a reason in virtue of having some belief and desire, that agent must have a goal. 
This is the weaker alternative to premise A that we need to make the objection go 
through. 
My conclusion is therefore faced with the following objection: 
 
[Alternative to HTM]: Being motivated by beliefs and desires is one way of being 
motivated by reasons. 
[Alternative to A]: When an agent is motivated by a reason in virtue of having 
some belief and desire, that agent must have a goal. 
B: Having a goal is being in a state with which the world must fit. 
Conclusion: Desires are states with which the world must fit. 
 
I find the first two premises of this argument genuinely unassailable, and again the 
inference from the premises to the conclusion is compelling, although not deductive. 
So my claim that desires have only the mind-to-world direction of fit is, in my view, 
incompatible with Smith’s premise B. I therefore take my arguments of parts I and 
II, together with the present discussion, to amount to a powerful case against B. To 
put the point in Lenman’s terms, this argument shows that we do care about things 
in virtue of certain representations of the way things are. 
We can therefore distinguish two components of Smith and Lenman’s Humean 
Theory. The first is a set of claims about motivating reasons and rationalising 
explanation that includes HTM itself, the teleological account of rationalising 
explanation, and Smith’s premise A. These are united by the idea that having goals – 
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and therefore having desires – is necessary for motivation by reasons. My claim that 
desires have only the mind-to-world direction of fit is compatible with this 
component of Humeanism, because I accept that desires generate motivating 
reasons, in virtue of the fact that desiring an outcome is a way of having a goal. If 
this is right, the truth of the claims that make up this component turns on: whether 
there are other ways of having goals, besides having desires; and more 
fundamentally, whether there are other ways of having motivating reasons, besides 
having goals. Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this thesis, and I am 
therefore agnostic about HTM, the teleological account of rationalising explanation, 
and premise A. 
The second component of Smith and Lenman’s Humeanism includes premises B 
and C. That is, it includes the claims that goal-setting states must be representations 
with the world-to-mind direction of fit, and that all and only desires are such mental 
representations. So the key idea here is that, given the first component, 
representations with the world-to-mind direction of fit have a particular and crucial 
role to play in rational motivation. This component concerns how representational 
properties of mental states link up with their roles in rational motivation. If desires 
have only the mind-to-world direction of fit, then – given the plausible further claim 
that desires set goals for action – Smith and Lenman’s views on this topic cannot be 
correct. 
Although premises B and C are necessary for Smith’s argument for HTM, it 
seems entirely coherent to accept HTM while rejecting these premises. For instance, 
Sinhababu (2009) defends the Humean Theory of Motivation on the grounds that 
there are no compelling cases of human motivation or action (for reasons) that 
cannot be elegantly explained by citing beliefs and desires. He lists five properties of 
desire which enter into his explanations of difficult cases, all of which fit readily 
into the account I developed in part I. In the next section I will further defend the 
claim that HTM is compatible with my view, by giving an account of how desires 
set goals for action which does not rely on the claim that they have the world-to-






10.4 How Desires Set Goals 
 
As I have explained, although I am agnostic about HTM itself, I do accept that 
desires generate motivating reasons, and that they do so by setting goals for action. 
In the first half of this section I will outline a conception of goals, and of what it is 
for mental states to set them, which supports this claim and is also compatible with 
my view that desires have only the mind-to-world direction of fit. In the second half 
I will consider Smith’s reasons for accepting his premise B. 
The notion of a goal which is relevant here is constitutively tied to the 
teleological form of rational explanation. Teleological explanations explain actions 
or motivation by showing how they are rational or intelligible responses to the 
agent’s situation, given the agent’s goals. So what it is for an agent to have a goal is 
for there to be some end such that we can rationalise possible actions on the part of 
the agent, by showing how they might be thought to further this end. However, there 
are important ways in which this characterisation of what it is to have a goal may be 
interpreted too broadly. 
First, crucially, it is not enough that we can make sense of an agent’s action by 
attributing some end to them, for this to be among their goals; rather, it must be the 
case that their pursuit of the end concerned contributed to the rational process that 
led to their action. For example, imagine a man travelling by train from Glasgow to 
Fort William. It would certainly be possible in principle to rationalise this action by 
attributing to the man the goal of taking one of Britain’s most scenic train journeys, 
but this is not sufficient to show that it was his goal. It may be that he had no interest 
in scenic train journeys, and simply wanted to visit someone in Fort William by the 
cheapest means available to him. So it seems that agents’ goals are determined by 
their mental states, since they are determined by the factors that can contribute to the 
various processes of rational deliberation that they might go through. 
Second, agents’ goals are inputs to, not outputs from, processes of rational 
deliberation. To continue with the example, it is possible to imagine that someone 
might have the goal of travelling by train from Glasgow to Fort William, and this 
would allow us to make at least some sense of their doing so. But in a more typical 
case, doing this would be chosen as the best means to achieving some other goals, 
such as enjoying the scenery or spending time with a friend. Teleological 
explanations that cite less specific ends such as these will reflect more accurately 
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what the agents concerned really care about. However, like all explanations, 
teleological explanations work best when they focus on features of the situation 
which are neither too specific, nor too general. In keeping with this, it will also 
usually be wrong to think of agents as having extremely general goals such as doing 
what is best for themselves, since these will typically fail to reflect what is 
distinctive about the agent concerned, and will not be explicitly considered in 
rational deliberation. 
Our goals, then, are roughly the ends that we use our rational abilities, and in 
particular our capacity for means-ends reasoning, to pursue. So the mental states that 
set our goals are those that determine these ends. 
With this in mind, desires set human agents’ goals because humans tend to be 
motivated to do things that they believe will increase the likelihood of the outcomes 
they desire. The goal-directed system implements a rational process in which goal-
setting states – desires – combine with instrumental beliefs in the selection of 
actions. Desires are inputs to the goal-directed system, rather than outputs of it, but 
they also vary between individuals and over time. Teleological explanations of 
human action and motivation are apt partly because many human actions are caused 
by the action of this system, and because it almost always functions at least well 
enough that the action concerned will be intelligible as the pursuit of one of the 
outcomes the agent desires. However, this is not to say that desires are the only 
mental states that are capable of setting goals. For instance, it may be that evaluative 
judgments can also do so, if they are capable of motivating us through processes of 
practical reasoning that are suitably independent of the goal-directed system. 
These points may not be surprising, but they are worth making for the sake of 
emphasising that they are consistent with my claim that desires have only the mind-
to-world direction of fit. They show that if the Discretion View is correct, then there 
is a set of possible biological functions which is sufficient to entail that the mental 
states that have them set goals for action, but which is not sufficient to entail that 
these mental states have imperative content. 
 
It may strike readers familiar with Smith’s work that he does have an argument 
for his premise B (i.e. the claim that having a goal is a matter of being in a state with 
the world-to-mind direction of fit), and that I have not explicitly responded to it so 
far in this chapter. If Smith has an argument for this claim, it centres on his account 
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of direction of fit, which includes the proposal that states with the world-to-mind 
direction of fit towards a proposition p are roughly (Smith’s qualification) those that 
tend to endure in the presence of a perception that not p, and dispose the subject to 
bring it about that p (1987, p. 54). Smith is explicitly proposing a functional-
dispositional characterisation of direction of fit in mental states, and consequently 
also of desire, since he takes desires to be defined by their direction of fit. But it 
would also be reasonable to think of him as proposing a functional-dispositional 
characterisation of having a goal, since this is on my account a matter of being 
disposed to undergo processes of practical reasoning concerning a particular end.30 
And presumably this account of having a goal would be the same as his theory of 
the world-to-mind direction of fit. So Smith’s argument for premise B might be that 
he has given a theory which unifies the goal-setting property of mental states with 
the representational property of having the world-to-mind direction of fit. 
Smith and I may well agree, then, about what it is for mental states to set goals 
for action, and hence for agents to have goals. But there is no need to go any further 
than we just have in trying to understand Smith’s reasons for accepting premise B, 
because they will certainly rely on his view of direction of fit, and this is 
contradicted by the Discretion View. According to Smith’s theory of direction of fit, 
desires have the world-to-mind direction of fit, even if we adopt my account of 
desire and drop Smith’s idea that desires are defined by their direction of fit. Desires 
in my sense are such that they tend to endure in the presence of perceptions that 
represent that they are unsatisfied, and they dispose us to act so as to bring about 
their objects. So if it succeeds, my argument for the Discretion View shows that 
Smith’s theory of direction of fit is false. This point is particularly clear since my 
argument focuses on the extensions of the directions of fit. So whatever Smith might 
say in defence of premise B, my response would be the same: that desires set goals, 
and the correct theory of direction of fit implies that desires have only the mind-to-
world direction of fit, so premise B cannot be right. 
 
 
                                                
30 Note that my although my account of desire is a natural-kind view, my account of having a goal is 
functional. This leaves open the possibility that states other than desires could set goals for action. I 
am not sure whether having a goal is a matter of teleological function, as representational properties 
are, or a matter of ‘function’ in the sense employed in traditional functionalism in the metaphysics of 
mind (which is also the sense in which Smith uses this term). But I do not think this issue is 
important for present purposes. 
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10.5 Going Up a Level 
 
In this section, I will consider and reject a possible line of response that Humeans 
might attempt against my arguments. One way in which the disagreement between 
Humeans and anti-Humeans is often brought out is by considering cases in which 
we might ordinarily describe people as motivated not by their desires but by their 
beliefs. For example, we hear of philosophers who ‘have no desire’ to attend 
committee meetings, but believe that it is their duty to do so. According to the anti-
Humeans, the motivation these philosophers experience does not depend on their 
having any particular desires, but only on their beliefs about their duty. One 
response Humeans can make might be called ‘going up a level’; they respond that 
the philosophers will be motivated by beliefs about their duty only if they desire to 
do their duty. Going up a level in this way is also a possible response to my claim 
that desires lack the world-to-mind direction of fit. Very roughly, the idea would be 
that even though we seem to be motivated by states that don’t fit the Humeans’ 
theory (in the meta-ethical case, because they are beliefs; in the present case, 
because they have the wrong direction of fit), there are in fact states that do fit the 
theory at ‘the level above’. 
There are two possible forms that such a response might take. The more 
ambitious form would argue that while the states that I have called desires do have 
only the mind-to-world direction of fit, they are not in fact desires. Instead, on this 
proposal, they would be beliefs about reward. We would each desire reward, and 
would represent it as to be brought about, and reward – rather than the outcomes that 
we represent as rewarding – would be the goal that we pursue when our behaviour is 
controlled by the goal-directed system. These claims would each be grounded on the 
point that we are in some sense disposed to pursue reward, in virtue of the way that 
the goal-directed and habitual systems work; these systems cause us to perform the 
actions that we represent as most rewarding, when they work according to their 
functions. If this proposal were correct, then all of the Humeans’ claims could be 
true, consistently with my analysis of the representational properties of the states I 
have called desires. A more conservative form would drop the idea that what we 
desire is reward, but would continue to insist that we represent reward as to be 
brought about. If the more conservative form was preferred, the Humean could 
continue to maintain both that representations with the world-to-mind direction of fit 
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are necessary for rational motivation (presumably in order to determine goals), and 
that desires were also necessary, a point which I have not disputed. If the bolder 
form was preferred, they could further claim that the imperative representations 
concerned were the necessary desires. In either case, they could maintain valuable 
parts of their doctrine which are threatened by my arguments.  
However, neither form of this response is plausible, as I will now argue. We do 
not in general desire reward; nor do we represent it as to be brought about; and nor 
is it generally among our goals. 
The reason why it is wrong to suggest that we desire reward goes back to a 
distinction drawn in chapter 5. There I argued that standing basic drives are not 
desires, because desires are mental states, while standing basic drives are mental 
rules. The same point applies here, because the fact that we are disposed to perform 
the actions that we represent as most rewarding is grounded on the existence of a 
mental rule (or perhaps of more than one mental rule), not a mental state. Mental 
rules are, by definition, innate features each of which causes exactly one kind of 
transition between mental states. The goal-directed system is innate, and disposes us 
to pursue reward by causing transitions from desires and instrumental beliefs, to 
further representations which tend to control the behaviour of downstream systems 
for selecting and generating actions. This system is centred on a mental rule that 
governs transitions from desires and instrumental beliefs to these further 
representations. We do not learn to pursue reward via the goal-directed system, and 
our disposition to do so is best explained in biological, rather than psychological, 
terms. To the extent that our disposition to pursue reward is also mediated by the 
habit system and downstream action-selection systems (the ‘Action Selector’ in the 
diagram in section 3.6), the mental rules that govern these systems will also be 
partially responsible for the disposition in question. But again, there is little doubt 
that these systems are innate, and consequently that the disposition to pursue reward 
is grounded on mental rules, not mental states. 
The second suggestion by the Humean is that we possess mental representations 
with the world-to-mind direction of fit, that represent reward as something to be 
brought about. The fact that our disposition to pursue reward is grounded on mental 
rules is one reason to doubt this; it is appealing to think of rules and representations 
as distinct and complementary features of computational systems. In addition to this, 
it is doubtful whether the psychological feature that underlies our disposition to 
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perform rewarding actions could be a representation, because typically 
representations either vary over time or sometimes occur, and sometimes fail to 
occur. This allows them to influence the behaviour of co-operating systems, by 
carrying information about some state of affairs which obtains at some times and not 
at others. Representations which do not do this rarely, if ever, occur, because 
systems do not need signals to help them to adapt to unchanging states of affairs. 
There may be exceptions to this rule, in which constant representations are used in 
the implementation of certain computational processes, but we have no reason to 
think that this is such a case. Instead, the feature we are concerned with seems to be 
a paradigmatic example of a rule for how representations are to be handled, rather 
than a representation itself. 
Finally, there is the thought that our only goal is reward. The Humean has little 
reason to defend this idea without either of the previous two claims, because I have 
agreed that the presence of goals is a part of what makes it the case that we are 
motivated by reasons when we act on our desires. Without the previous two claims, 
this point would not allow the Humean to defend either the idea that goals are set by 
states with the world-to-mind direction of fit, or that these states are desires. But in 
any case, this thought has little to recommend it. One problem is that we are less 
rational in our pursuit of reward than in our pursuit of the outcomes we desire, 
because of the ways in which our desires can and cannot be updated. Because our 
desires can only be changed by reward signals, we fairly frequently desire outcomes 
despite believing that those outcomes are unhealthy, or incompatible with other 
outcomes that we desire. So we are motivated to pursue these outcomes despite 
having good evidence that they are not, on balance, rewarding. Because we are 
irrational in pursuing reward, to this extent, rationalising explanations that take 
reward to be our goal will be less successful than explanations that take us to be 
aiming at satisfying our desires. Of course, we are sometimes motivated to perform 
actions that we have good reasons to believe will not promote the satisfaction of our 
desires, because we are not perfectly rational in updating our instrumental beliefs; 
and this does affect the quality of rationalising explanations. A rationalising 
explanation is less powerful if it involves attributing to an agent a belief which it is 
hard to understand their having. But this problem is significantly more severe if our 
goal is reward. A related issue is that people’s desires vary considerably, and this is 
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apparently crucial to explaining differences in their behaviour, but it is hard to 
understand this variation in desires as a product of rational processes. 
Another, simpler problem is that we care about the things we desire, in a way that 
we do not care about reward. Given that reward is aggregate drive- and desire-
satisfaction, it would not normally make sense for someone to prefer that their 
desires were satisfied, over getting reward. But it certainly seems that the reason we 
would care about aggregate drive- and desire-satisfaction, if we thought about it, is 
that we care about the objects of our desires and drives. Consider a cyclist with a 
strong desire to race in the Tour de France. If our goal is reward, then the cyclist has 
a reason to want this, which is that racing the Tour would be rewarding for him, 
because he desires it and things associated with it. He should feel no special 
connection with this objective, because any other strong desire he might have would 
also offer the prospect of reward. But this is not an attractive picture of the cyclist’s 
concerns; it is more plausible to suggest that if he has a reason to want to ride the 
Tour it is that it is the world’s most iconic and challenging race. To a significant 
extent, though, the cyclist would deny that he wants to ride the Tour for any reason 
other than that it’s the Tour. That is what both desires and goals are like – they are 
not wholly rational, because they do not serve other desires and goals, although they 
are often connected to them. Thinking of reward as our goal draws the line between 
the rational and the non-rational factors in motivation in the wrong place. So ‘going 
up a level’ would not be a good way for the Humean to respond to my arguments. 
 
10.6 Dissolving the Disagreement? 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that the Humean view put forward by Smith and 
Lenman goes wrong in accepting what I have called the second component of their 
view, which links desire and goal-setting to the world-to-mind direction of fit. Smith 
and Lenman claim, in my view falsely, that having a goal is a matter of representing 
some outcome as to be brought about, and that desiring also involves a 
representation of this kind. As I will explain in this final section, though, it is 
possible to interpret Smith and Lenman as having a different phenomenon in mind 
when they talk about direction of fit from the one I have investigated. That is, it is 
possible that the Humeans and I talk past each other when we talk about direction of 
fit. And on this alternative interpretation of Smith and Lenman’s views, I do not 
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disagree with them about the relationship between having a goal, desiring, and (what 
they call) the world-to-mind direction of fit. 
One aspect of the way that Smith and many other philosophers think of direction 
of fit is that it is a way to distinguish between beliefs and desires. If this idea is 
really at the heart of Smith’s thinking about direction of fit, then it may be that he 
would be prepared to give up the idea that the directions of fit are two kinds of 
representation, rather than the claim that desires, which set goals, have one direction 
of fit, while beliefs, which keep track of how things are, have the other. In this case, 
direction of fit would be fundamentally a property of mental states, rather than of 
representations. Exactly how Smith’s views would relate to mine in this case 
depends on the details of the alternative conception of direction of fit. Specifically, it 
goes back to an issue that I discussed in section 6.3. 
As I described in that section, there are two different ways in which philosophers 
elaborate on the idea that mental representations are essential components of states 
such as beliefs and desires. The first way, which I have adopted, takes states such as 
beliefs and desires to be mental representations. This view implies that unless the 
terms ‘content’ and ‘direction of fit’ are ambiguous, the content of a belief or desire 
is the content of the mental representation with which it is identical, and the 
direction of fit of a belief or desire is the direction of fit of that same mental 
representation. The second takes beliefs and desires to be attitudes to mental 
representations, which themselves lack directions of fit. These mental 
representations merely stand for states of affairs, somewhat like the italicised 
expression in the sentence, ‘If Argentina has the strongest squad, then they deserve 
to win the world cup.’ On this view, the content of a mental state is the 
representation it involves, and is hence distinct from the content of the 
representation itself; and the direction of fit of the mental state is a property of the 
attitude, and is not the same as the direction of fit of the representation, since the 
representation lacks direction of fit. It is clear that which of these two views one 
accepts will make a difference to how one thinks of direction of fit, especially if one 
takes it to be primarily a property of mental states rather than representations. So I 
will first discuss the position of a Humean who accepts the first view, then that of 
one who accepts the second. 
On the first view, beliefs and desires are representations, just as sentences, maps, 
traffic signals, many paintings, and the communicative signals of non-human 
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animals are too. I take it to be accepted on all sides that there is a property of these 
non-mental representations that can reasonably be called direction of fit, that divides 
them into various kinds, depending on whether they have imperative content, 
indicative content, both or neither. If this is right, then it is very likely that beliefs 
and desires have directions of fit in this sense. The claim that I have defended in part 
II is that desires have only the mind-to-world direction of fit, in this sense of 
direction of fit. So one way in which the disagreement between the Humean and I 
could be dissolved is if they have a different sense of direction of fit in mind. The 
only thing that the Humean’s sense of direction of fit could amount to, on these 
assumptions, is just what they take to distinguish beliefs from desires. The idea 
would be roughly that what it is for a mental state to have the world-to-mind 
direction of fit is for it to set a goal for action – that is, for it to be of a kind that 
interacts in the right way with instrumental beliefs in processes of rational 
deliberation. What it is for a mental state to have the mind-to-world direction of fit 
might be, say, that it is of a kind that is correctly formed and updated by theoretical 
reasoning. How this related to the classification of mental representations in respect 
of the properties they share with non-mental representations would be a further 
issue. 
If this is the sense of direction of fit that Humeans have in mind, then I have no 
disagreement with them. I share their view that desires set goals for action, and 
hence that in this sense they have the world-to-mind direction of fit. I am agnostic 
about whether desires are the only mental states like this, and about whether HTM 
and the teleological account of rationalising explanation are correct. However, we 
should note that this interpretation comes with a significant cost. It means that parts 
of the way that Smith and Lenman express their Humeanism, which emphasise that 
beliefs and desires are representations and that direction of fit is a matter of 
representing how things are or what to do, are seriously misleading. This is because 
on this view direction of fit is not about what beliefs and desires are like qua 
representations. 
On the second view, direction of fit is a property of attitudes to representations. 
On this view, if sentences, maps, and traffic signals have directions of fit it is not in 
the same sense that beliefs and desires do, since these are representations, not 
attitudes to representations. If this is the sense of direction of fit that Humeans have 
in mind, then I do not exactly dispute their claim that desires have the world-to-mind 
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direction of fit, or that this is essential to goal-setting. Instead, I very much doubt a 
presupposition of this claim, which is that beliefs and desires are attitudes to 
representations rather than being representations themselves. However, I have not 
argued this point, and will not do so here. Again, if this is the right interpretation of 
Smith and Lenman, then some parts of the way they express their view are 
misleading, such as their calling beliefs and desires ‘representations’. 
 
In this chapter, I have considered the implications of my claim that desires have 
only the mind-to-world direction of fit for a certain form of Humeanism about 
rational motivation. I have argued that this claim is consistent with the Humean 
Theory of Motivation itself and with some associated theses, such as the teleological 
account of rationalising explanation. However, assuming that Smith, like me, takes 
direction of fit to be a property that beliefs and desires share with non-mental 
representations, my claim is inconsistent with one of the premises in his argument 
for HTM, and also gives us good reason to deny another. As I understand their 
views, Smith and Lenman go wrong in thinking that a certain property of some 
representations – the world-to-mind direction of fit – is necessarily co-extensive 
among mental states with the property of setting goals for action. This idea is 






It is a platitude, but nonetheless true, that the value of a project often lies as much 
in the journey as in the destination. My conclusion that desires have only the mind-
to-world direction of fit is significant, as I explained in part III, but is also a 
corollary of two broader claims, which I defended in parts I and II respectively. The 
first is the thesis that what it is for something to be a desire is for it to be a member 
of the natural kind of psychological state that functions as an input to the goal-
directed control system, with the role of tracking the reward values of outcomes. 
The second is the Discretion View: the claim that biological representations have 
imperative content if their consumers lack discretion, and have indicative content if 
their producers lack discretion. Each of these three claims – the corollary, and the 
two theses from which it follows – has its own implications, and raises its own 
questions. 
One implication of my claim that desires have only the mind-to-world direction 
of fit, discussed in part III, is that Smith’s very well-known argument for the 
Humean Theory of Motivation fails. However, the Humean Theory itself is not 
contradicted by any point I have defended. Somewhat more broadly, Smith’s 
argument has popularised the idea that beliefs and desires are distinguished by their 
directions of fit, which are properties they share with other representations. In 
connection with this, it has also encouraged the idea that the directions of fit are 
necessarily co-extensive among mental states with certain roles in practical and 
theoretical reasoning. These are the roles of setting goals for action, performed by 
desires and perhaps also by other states, such as evaluative beliefs, and of keeping 
track of states of affairs which are relevant to determining how to promote our goals, 
performed most obviously by instrumental beliefs. These two closely-related ideas, 
which are not often questioned, are both false if my claim about the direction of fit 
of desire is correct. Whether or not my arguments succeed, I hope to have shown 
that it ought to be regarded as an open and substantive question how the properties 
of beliefs and desires as representations, and their properties as components of 
rational processes, relate to one another. 
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Meanwhile, the account of desire developed in part I is of interest independently 
of the issue of direction of fit, because desires are central to many philosophical 
theories, as well as having profound impacts on our lives. Having one’s desires 
satisfied – or perhaps some privileged subset of them – is thought by some 
philosophers to be constitutive of well-being. Desires are also central to theories of 
free will, self-control and moral responsibility. It has recently been argued that what 
it is to be virtuous is to have and act on the correct desires (Arpaly & Schroeder 
2014). And desires also figure prominently in theories in meta-ethics, particularly 
concerning the nature of practical reasons and of rational motivation. In addition to 
all this, as I noted in the introduction to this thesis, our desires both have great 
influence on our behaviour and experiences in the short term, and shape the projects 
and concerns that run through our entire lives. So knowing what desires are can help 
us to understand, and consequently to critique or defend, all of these philosophical 
theories, and can also help us to understand our own choices and feelings. The 
scientific evidence and theories that I present in part I should be the subject of much 
greater philosophical scrutiny than is currently the case; the issue concerning 
direction of fit that I have chosen to explore here is just one of many possible 
implications. 
Finally, the Discretion View offers a new response to a foundational question 
about representation. I suspect that no one, simple formula can specify with 
complete generality what it takes for an entity to be a representation with a particular 
content and direction of fit. Instead, different theories (or theses within a grand 
theory) will be needed for representations of different kinds. However, even if this is 
correct, it is also plausible that there is some basic class of representations from 
which the others derive, in various ways. For example, representations that stand for 
individual objects or properties may be contentful, and have their content 
determined, in virtue of the roles they play in semantically complex representations 
with indicative or imperative content. Or sentences in natural languages may have 
their content and status as representations determined in part by the relationships 
they stand in to mental representations. If there is such a basic class of 
representations, then biological representations – that is, those that have directions 
of fit in virtue of their biological functions and those of their producers and 
consumers – are an excellent candidate. This is one of the deepest ideas of the 
teleosemantic movement. So biological representations are an important subject. 
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Also, as I discussed at several stages in chapters 6, 7 and 8, direction of fit in 
biological representations is intimately tied to their status as representations, and 
their content. In particular, what gives biological representations their status as 
representations is their having either the function that constitutes the mind-to-world 
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